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Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional
Consent
Michael S. Greve*
The Compact Clause (Art. I, Sec. 10 U.S. Constitution) requires
congressionalapprovalfor "any agreement or compact" among the states. In
the teeth of this wording, the Supreme Court held, in U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Commission, (1978), that the Clause applies only to state
compacts that "encroach " uponfederal supremacy. Courts havefollowed this
precedent in sustaining the 1998 multi-state agreement on tobacco litigation
againstCompact Clause challenges.
Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent argues that U.S. Steel was
wrongly decided. Congressional"negatives, " including the Compact Clause,
invert the default rulefor constitutionallysuspect classes ofstate laws. Whereas
ordinary state laws are permitted to go into (and remain in) effect unless and
until Congress or the courts exercise their authority under the Supremacy
Clause, congressionalnegatives renderstate laws inoperativeunless and until
Congress takes affirmative action. By limiting the operation of the Compact
Clause to state agreements that encroach on federal supremacy-which are
unlawful in any event-the Supreme Court has re-inverted the constitutional
presumption and emptied the Compact Clause of all content.
This Article explains the forgotten constitutionallogic and wisdom of the
Compact Clause and argues for a Compact Clause jurisprudence that will
safeguardconstitutionalpurposes(in particular,the protection of equality and
comity among the states). It shows that both the 1967 Multistate Tax Compact
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Warren, and Stephen F. Williams. I have also benefited from roundtable discussions at
the American Enterprise Institute and a faculty workshop at the George Mason University
Law School. Kim Hendrickson capably directed a changing team of research assistants.
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considered in U.S. Steel and the 1998 tobacco settlement are clearly
unconstitutional without congressional consent. It concludes that a reinvigorated Compact Clause is consistent with principled, constitutional
federalism doctrines.
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COMPACTS AND CARTELS

I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Upside-Down, Inside-Out Compact Clause
On November 17, 1998, the attorneys general of forty-six states and the
major U.S. tobacco manufacturers signed an agreement governing the sale of
cigarettes and other tobacco products in the United States. The so-called Master
Settlement Agreement ("MSA"), which ended an unprecedented state litigation
campaign against the tobacco industry, provides for the companies' payment of
nearly a quarter of a trillion dollars, over a period of twenty-five years, in
"damages" and other payments to the states.' In all but name, the payments are
a national consumption tax, paid almost entirely by individual smokers.' No
legislator at any level of government ever voted for (or against) that tax. Most
importantly, the United States Congress did not approve the MSA.
The Compact Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States
Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress
...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power."3 The MSA bears the signatures of forty-six state attorneys general and,
by its terms, requires approval by eighty percent of the signatory states for its full
implementation." It would thus appear to be a state "agreement" and, as such,
require congressional consent. In several lawsuits regarding the MSA, however,
federal courts have dismissed Compact Clause claims, uniformly with little
discussion.5
Perplexing at first sight, these rulings rely on Supreme Court precedents that
have held, occasionally in haec verba, that the Compact Clause cannot possibly
mean what it says.6 The leading modem case, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax

•1.
The Master Settlement Agreement [hereinafter "MSA"] cannot be found in any

law library or statute book. Itis, however, available online, and all references hereinafter
are to the online text. MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT & AMENDMENTS, at
http://www.naag.org/issues/tobacco/index.php?sdpid=919 (last visited April 3, 2003).

2. See infra notes 267-69, accompanying text, and sources cited.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
4. MSA, supranote 1, art. 11(u).
5. In the leading appellate case, the Fourth Circuit discussed the merits of the
plaintiff's Compact Clause claim in five short paragraphs. Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales,
278 F.3d 339, 359-60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Star Sci., Inc. v. Kilgore, 123 S.
Ct. 93 (2002). For similarly cursory dismissals, see, e.g., PTI Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc.,
100 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2000); and Mariana v. Fisher, 226 F. Supp. 2d
575, 586-87 (2002) (appealpending). One court characterized the plaintiffs' (poorlypled) Compact Clause claim as "plainly frivolous." Hise v. Philip Morris, Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 1201, 1210 (N.D. Ok. 1999), aff'd, No. 99-5113, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2497
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 384 (2000).
6. The most important pronouncement to this effect is Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
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Commission,7 arose over a multi-state arrangement governing the taxation of
interstate business income. In sustaining the arrangement against a Compact
Clause challenge, the Supreme Court read the Clause, in the teeth of its clear
language, to require congressional approval only when a state compact impinges
upon the supremacy of the United States. Because such compacts are bound to
be void in any case under a conventional constitutional or preemption analysis,
it is difficult to imagine a state agreement on which the Compact Clause would
operate as a distinct constitutional requirement and obstacle.
Extant compacts and their fate in the courts illustrate the emasculation of
the Compact Clause. Prior to 1921, thirty-six compacts between states were put
into effect with the consent of Congress; virtually all of these settled boundaries
between contiguous states.' Modem compacts, in contrast, often address "tough
national issues"9 and establish expansive (and expensive) regulatory regimes.
The 200-odd state compacts now in effect (excluding boundary agreements)
cover a broad range of issues, from environmental and energy policy (39
compacts) to water allocation (38), traffic and transportation (28), crime control
(16), and education (12), among other matters."0
Many compacts are
administered, on an on-going basis, by standing compact boards or
commissions. " While most compacts operate with congressional consent (and,

U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (discussed infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text). In the same
spirit, the Court has classified particular interstate arrangements as not really "compacts"
in the relevant sense. See Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953); Massachusetts v.
Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939); S.F.R. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896) (all holding that
reciprocity agreements do not constitute compacts within the meaning of the Compact
Clause); Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159,
175 (1985) (affirming that position, though possibly in dictum-see infra note 103). The
Court has also held that congressional consent may be implied from congressional
acquiescence. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893); Virginia v. West
Virginia, 78 U.S. 39 (1870); Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837); Green
v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85-87 (1823). For a brief discussion of the form and
timing of congressional consent, see infra notes 356-67 and accompanying text.
7. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
8. Brevard Crihfield, InterstateCompacts, 1783-1977: An Overview, THE BOOK
OF THE STATES 1978-79, at 580 (Council of State Governments, 1978). Charles Warren,
The Supreme Court and the Sovereign States 121-24 (Appendix E) (1924), lists twentynine congressionally approved compacts over that period.
9. Edward D. Feigenbaum, InterstateCompacts &Agreements, 26 THE BOOK OF
THE STATES 453 (Council of State Governments, 1986).
10. The figures are derived from William Kevin Voit, Interstate Compacts &
Agencies 1998 (Council of State Governments, 1998). An alphabetical listing shows 192
compacts. Id. at 11-14. The descriptive portion of the report shows 208 compacts. Id.
at 15-133. In addition, the report lists fifty-one compacts that "may be" dormant or
defunct. Id. at 159-60.
11. A precise count is hard to come by. William Voit lists 116 compact authorities,
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in a few instances, subject to periodic renewal requirements), 2 some compacts
have gone into effect without receiving congressional approval. The Multistate
Tax Compact ("MTC") sustained in U.S. Steel, as well as the 1998 tobacco
settlement, both went into effect after-and despite-unsuccessful attempts to
obtain congressional consent.a The judicial decisions that have to date sustained
those arrangements fit a consistent pattern: even though most compact litigation
seems to have arisen over unapproved compacts, 4 it appears that no court has
ever voided a state agreement for failure to obtain congressional consent.5
This Article argues that the judiciary should enforce the Compact Clause.
The constitutional text alone might appear sufficient to sustain that argument:
if the plain text of the Compact Clause means anything, it must mean that state
agreements of the scale, complexity, and consequence of the MTC or the MSA
require congressional consent. The record of judicial obtuseness and scholarly
indifference, 6 however, warrants a more elaborate effort to recover the forgotten
constitutional logic and purpose of the Compact Clause and its place in the
federal architecture. The Compact Clause-a species of the congressional
"negative" James Madison urged upon the Constitutional Convention 7- in v er ts
the general constitutional default rule for state enactments: whereas the ordinary
supremacy arrangement of the Constitution allows state laws to become and
remain effective until a court enjoins or Congress preempts them, the Compact
Clause renders state enactments within its range ineffective unless and until

boards, commissions, and committees. Id. at 157-58. While some of these bodies may
be dormant or defunct, some existing multistate bodies may have been omitted from the
list. Id. at 157.
12. See, e.g., Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil & Gas, 49 Stat. 939 (1935)
(briefly discussed infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text); Northeast Interstate Dairy

Compact, 7 U.S.C. §7256 (2000).
13. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (MTC); infra notes 234-38 and
accompanying text (MSA). See David E. Engdahl, Characterizationof Interstate
Arrangements: When Is a CompactNot a Compact?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 63,70-71 (1965)
[hereinafter Engdahl, Interstate Arrangements] (providing examples and describing
states' increased insistence that certain types of compacts do not require congressional
approval).
14. Seattle Master Builders v. Pac. Northwest Elec. Power & Conservation
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1374 (9th Cir. 1986) (Beezer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1059 (1987).
15. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements,supra note 13, at 69 ("[I]n every case since

Virginiav. Tennessee in which an interstate arrangement has been challenged for lack of
congressional consent, it has been held exempt from the consent requirement") (footnote
omitted). Thirty-plus years later, the statement is still accurate.
16. The literature on the Compact Clause is slim. To my knowledge, not a single
law review article or textbook published during the past half-century has criticized the
judicial emasculation of the Clause as questionable, let alone clearly erroneous.
17. See infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
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Congress affirmatively validates them. By reserving the application of that rule
to compacts that compromise federal supremacy, the Supreme Court has
effectively re-inverted the default rule and brought state agreements under the
very supremacy arrangement from which the Compact Clause exempts them.
That move constitutes a twofold constitutional error. The Compact Clause
merits judicial respect not only because it is the constitutional default principle
but also because it is the correctprinciple. Congressional approval for all state
agreements, or something very close to it, is the only compact rule that is
consistent with constitutional federalism.
B. Function and Form
A jurisprudence that has turned the Compact Clause on its head is, in its
own way, a considerable judicial achievement. The fuel that propelled the case
law on its ill-fated trajectory was an interpretive shift from the text and form of
the Compact Clause to its purpose and function-more precisely, a gross
misunderstanding of its function. From the Compact Clause, whose
uncompromising language leaves no doubt about the Founders' "deep-seated and
special fear of agreements between States,"' 8 scholars and judges shifted to a
functional view of interstate compacts as an efficient and underutilized
institutional arrangement.' 9 Their arguments come in full federalist regalia and
portray state compacts as a pristine and constitutionally favored example of
cooperative federalism in action.2"

18. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,489 (1978) (White,
J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., VINCENT V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: A STUDY OF THE
INTERSTATE COMPACT 149 (1953) (recommending compacts as a means to protect the
vitality of the states and to relieve an overburdened national government); FREDERICK
ZIMMERMAN &MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, 126 (1951)
("The interstate compact is a strong legal instrument for expanding cooperative
federalism in situations to which other cooperative methods are not as applicable.");
Richard C. Kearney & John J. Stucker, InterstateCompacts andthe Management ofLow
Level Radioactive Wastes, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 210, 214 (1985) (interstate compacts as
an effective means to protect state sovereignty and cooperation where national
government remains inactive); Jo M. Ferguson, The Legal Basis for a Southern
University-InterstateAgreements Without Congressional Consent, 38 KY. L.J. 347

(1950); Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925) [hereinafter
Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause]; Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?
Federalismand InformallinterstateCooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842,858-59 (1989).

20. State officials and the leaders of state lobbying and umbrella organizations,
such as the Council of State Governments and the National Association of Attorneys
General, have been especially ardent in celebrating state compacts as a federalist
arrangement par excellence and in denouncing perceived or real congressional

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/1
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This intellectual tradition reaches back to an impressive 1925 law review
article by (later) Justice Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, which celebrated
"the imaginative adaptation of the compact idea" to increased regionalism and
"[t]he overwhelming difficulties confronting modem society. '21 While
Frankfurter and Landis did not argue for dispensing with the congressional
consent requirement (quite the opposite),22 they furnished the intellectual
apparatus-and the soothing rhetoric of cooperation, flexibility, and
localism-that later generations of scholars and judges would put to that
purpose.23 Their cheerful endorsement of state compacts partook of a broader
intellectual and political effort to portray America's traditional, "dual" federalism
as archaic and doctrinaire. The needs of a modem, complex, industrial society,
the Progressives and their New Deal heirs argued, command government
improvisation, experimentation, and cooperation. The New Deal and, after
initial resistance, the Supreme Court embraced the best-known and perhaps most
consequential form of "cooperative federalism"-vertical power- and revenuesharing arrangements between the states and the national government.24 The
embrace of horizontal cooperation among states followed the same political and
judicial trajectory. The Supreme Court sustained state agreements against a

interferences. For a particularly strident example of states-rights chauvinism, see
Ferguson, supra note 19. See also Feigenbaum, supra note 9, at 453 (Compact Clause
intended to "facilitate" state agreements); and Robert G. Dixon, Jr., ConstitutionalBases
for Regionalism: Centralization;Interstate Compacts; FederalRegional Taxation, 33
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 65 (1964) ("As a matter of first impression, it could be argued

that the intent of the Framers... was to enable the states, by consent, to take joint action
to solve problems which laybeyond the power and capacity of any one state.") (emphasis
added) (describing state officials' views). One might as well argue that the Founders
intended to "facilitate" and "enable" state duties on imports and exports by subjecting
such imposition to approval by Congress. See U.S. CONST.art. I, § 10, ci. 2.
21. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause,supra note 19, at 729.
22. Since state agreements may affect non-party states, "Congress must exercise
national supervision through its power to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it under
appropriate conditions. The framers thus astutely created a mechanism of legal control
over affairs that are projected beyond state lines and yet may not call for, nor be capable
of, national treatment." Id. at 694 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter apparently
considered congressional approval de rigeurfor all state compacts. West Virginia ex rel.
Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951).
23. Cf Seattle Master Builders v. Pac. Northwest Elec. Power & Conservation
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (Frankfurter & Landis article "set[s] the
tone for the modem use of compacts."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
24. The standard account of the transition from dual to cooperative federalism is
Edward S. Corwin, The Passingof Dual Federalism,36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950). See also
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1934).
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variety of challenges25 and, moreover, affirmatively encouraged states to utilize
compacts as a means of resolving boundary disputes, water rights questions, and
pollution problems.26 By 1959, the Court waxed approvingly about "imagination
and resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships" and about the
"voluntary and cooperative actions of individual States with a view to increasing
harmony within the federalism created by the Constitution."27
The most persuasive defense of this interpretation rests on what we now call
a transaction cost model. Federalism poses problems of coordination (such as
interstate pollution) and scale (such as the management of natural resource
systems that span state jurisdictions).2" Bargaining by the affected states may
provide a more efficient solution to such problems than the alternative available
channels-litigation or centralized, federal legislation and regulation.2 9 From
this vantage, the constitutional requirement of congressional approval for state
agreements seems dysfunctional. In addition to creating delay and uncertainty,
Congress might hold sensible and efficient state bargains hostage to logrolling
and rent-seeking.30 Experience has also shown that Congress may impose
onerous conditions on state compacts and their administrators, thus dissipating
the gains from flexibility and local control that compacts may produce.3 So long

25. See, e.g., Hinterlider v. La Plata River Co. & Cherry Creek Ditch, 304 U.S. 92
(1938) (compact trumps private appropriation rights guaranteed by state constitution);
West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951) (sustaining compact against
allegedly conflicting state constitutional claims).
26. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943). Perhaps the earliest
such encouragement can be found in New Yorkv. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296,313 (1921)
("[T]he grave problem of sewage disposal ... is one more likely to be wisely solved by

co-operative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of... the States
so vitally interested in it than, by proceedings in any court however constituted"). See
also Dyer, 341 U.S. at 27 (quoting that language).
27. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959). While Justice Frankfurter wrote
those stirring words, for a unanimous Court, in the course of rejecting a challenge to a
reciprocity agreement under the Fourteenth Amendment (but not the Compact Clause),
his pronouncement has been quoted approvingly in compact cases. See, e.g., U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 470 (1978).
28. See, e.g., Dale D. Goble, The Compact Clause and TransboundaryProblems:
"AFederalRemedyfor theDiseaseMost Incidentto a FederalGovernment," 17 ENVTL.
L. 785 (1987); Richard 0. Zerbe, OptimalEnvironmentalJurisdictions,4 ECOLOGY L.Q.
193 (1974); Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problemsof Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1964).
29. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause,supra note 19, at 705-08.
30. See David N. Copas, Jr., The Southeastern Water Compact, Panaceaor
Pandora'sBox? A Law and Economics Analysis of the Viability of Interstate Water
Compacts, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 697, 714-16 (1997).
31. Brevard Crihfield, The States andthe Council ofState Governments, 35 STATE
Gov'T 20, 65 (1962); Robert C. Elickson, Public Property Rights: A Government's
Rights and Duties When Its Landowners Come into Conflict with Outsiders, 52 S.CAL.
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as Congress and the Supreme Court remain free to superintend and, if need be,
void state compacts, "there is no danger of any misuse of the States' sovereign
powers in their agreements with each other."32

State compacts, however, may not only enhance efficiency and federalism;
they may also compromise those values. While states are capable of cooperating
with one another, they are also capable of-and prone to--doing very bad things
to one another. One state may exploit another. Two states may collude to
exploit a third. Some or all states may (as we shall see) collude to exploit each
other's citizens. The Founders were acutely aware of the need to protect states
and their citizens from sister-state aggression; that is why they adopted the
Compact Clause, among other constitutional provisions. One can say that the
Clause also, and simultaneously, protects national interests. The most urgent
among those "national" interests, however, is the protection of comity and
equality among the states.33 The judicial interpretation of the Clause has
completely suppressed horizontal, state-to-state federalism concerns. That is its
central flaw and error.
I shall argue that compacts pose four serious institutional risks: (1) state
bargaining with federal rights and prerogatives and, consequently, infringements
on the interests of the United States (especially the interest in preventing mutual
state aggression); (2) third-party externalities, meaning infringements on the
rights and interests of non-compacting states; (3) cartelization, meaning the
creation, through compacts, of institutional regimes and arrangements that
restrict policy competition among the states;34 and (4) agency problems,
including the transfer of state authority to unaccountable, irresponsible, extraconstitutional institutions. Because these risks affect even the most tenable
account of state bargaining, the functional view of the Compact Clause is
untenable on its own terms. But the risks just listed are not somehow separate
and apart from the Compact Clause; they are jazzed-up accounts of the dangers
that the Founders contemplated in enacting the Clause. Extant Compact Clause
doctrine, in contrast, acknowledges only the first risk, and even that only in a
highly attenuated form. It is oblivious to the risks of interstate externalities and
exploitation, and it encourages the states to create, through the establishment of
supra-state agencies, a Constitution parallel to the one we have. 3

L. REv. 1627, 1654-55 (1979).
32. Ferguson, supra note 19, at 359.
33. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause,supra note 19, at 693-95.

34. The suppression of policy competition has been described as a potential virtue
and advantage, rather than a problem, of state compacts. See, e.g., Jill E. Hasday,
Interstate Compacts in a DemocraticSociety: The Problem ofPermanency, 49 FLA. L.
REv. 1, 7 (1997); Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?, supra note 19. For reasons
explained infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text, this view rests on a
misunderstanding of the purpose of a federal Constitution.
35. Since I will return to the theme of unapproved state compacts as a means of
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A "federalism" that celebrates the exercise of state sovereignty, in
derogation of the Constitution and at the risk of diminishing both political
accountability and the rights of non-compact states, is federalism
fubar-[messed] up beyond all recognition. That is the easy part of the analysis.
The hard part is to distinguish between efficient compacts and those that inflict
unwarranted costs on third parties .(states, citizens, or the United States) and then
to figure out a constitutional rule that promises ex ante, over the long haul and
the general run of cases, to minimize the aggregate costs of institutional error on
either side. 6
One obvious candidate is the actual Compact Clause: no state agreement
or compact without congressional consent, period. On this textualist view, all
that remains is to define the essential elements of the Clause-what constitutes
a "compact" and an "agreement"; what constitutes a compact or agreement of
and by the state (as distinct from its officers or the state's acts in a proprietary,
non-sovereign capacity);37 and what constitutes timely congressional consent.3 "

establishing an alternative Constitution (see infra notes 165-68, 308-09, and
accompanying text), it is worth noting that others have perceived that potential-and not
always as a menace. In 1937, the Council of State Governments, an interstate body
established for the promotion and administration of state compacts, passed an ominously
entitled "Declaration of Interdependence," stating as follows:
When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for a nation to
repair the fabric which unites its many agencies of government, and to restore
the solidarity which is vital to orderly growth, it is the duty of responsible
officials to define the need and to find a way to meet it....
Through established agencies of cooperation, through uniform and reciprocal
laws and regulations, through compacts under the Constitution, through

informal collaboration, and through all other means possible, our nation, our
states, and our localities must fuse their activities with a new fervor of
national unity.
2 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS & AMERICAN LEGISLATORS' ASSOCIATION, BOOK
OF THE STATES, Book 2, 143-44 (1937) (emphasis added). For a similar What's-a-

Constitution-Among-Friends celebration of"extraconstitutional forms of legal invention"
and the "interplay of living forces of government to meet the evolving needs of a
complex society," see New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1959).
36. The Supreme Court has tended to focus on the likely effects of each individual

compact submitted for its consideration. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements,supra note
13, at 68. This expost perspective misconceives the constitutional enterprise.
37. The prevailing view; which I believe to be generally correct, holds that the
Compact Clause extends only to compacts that involve the exercise of sovereign state
power. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements,supra note 13, 88 n. 131. But see Edward T.
Swaine, NegotiatingFederalism: State Bargainingand the Dormant Treaty Power, 49
DUKE L.J. 1127, 1270 (2000) (arguing that the distinction between "proprietary" and
"sovereign" state actions "may be neither doctrinally sound nor easy to administer")
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Swaine, NegotiatingFederalism].
38. See infra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
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As already suggested, the case for enforcing the Compact Clause as written is to
my mind highly persuasive. Nonetheless, I will also articulate and defend a
slightly more limited interpretation: a challenge to a state compact for lack of
congressional consent should prevail if the plaintiffs establish a credible case that
the challenged state agreement implicates one or more of the four specific risks
identified above.39
The reasons for exploring this "functional" test are pragmatic. Cooperative
state compacts and agreements have become an entrenched and judicially
favored practice. It seems wise to push the demand for a re-examination and
revision no further than is necessary to avert serious, identifiable risks to
constitutional norms and values-not only in the interest of political feasibility
and legal continuity, but also because abrupt doctrinal adjustments tend to
produce undesired and often paradoxical consequences."0 Modem Compact
Clause theory, such as it is, is avowedly functional, not textual. Once that
judicial move has been made, a persuasive attempt to confront the functional
interpretation on its own terms seems a more promising argumentative strategy
than foot-stomping textualism. With any luck, a re-interpretation on shared
theoretical ground will generate a rule that more closely approximates the
original constitutional norm. In the case at hand, the approximation proves close
enough for comfort: a serious functional Compact Clause turns out to be a
thoroughly Madisonian construct.

39. As further explained infra notes 315-20 and accompanying text, the proposed
test turns on an examination of certain types of state compacts, rather than the effect or
purpose of individual compacts. For instance, the test would require congressional
consent for a state cartel-by-compact even if the cartel's empirical effects could be shown
to be de minimis. For a similar approach to state bargaining with foreign
governments-an issue with obvious structural similarities to the domestic Compact
Clause-see Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 37, at 1261 (arguing for an
"act-oriented approach [that] tries to delimit a class of activities that exceeds the limits
of state authority under the Constitution, eschewing any attempt at measuring effects,
balancing, or focusing on governmental purpose").
40. These consequences arise principally from the fact that political institutions,
including courts, may respond to new and improved rules in unexpected ways. See, e.g.,
Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have PerverseEffects?, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1325 (2001) (arguing that "decentralizing" Commerce Clause decisions may induce
centralization). A literal Compact Clause interpretation might well produce such effects:
confronted with a rule that requires congressional approval for all state agreements and
compacts, courts would further narrow the definition of what constitutes an agreement
or compact for constitutional purposes. The functional interpretation urged in this Article
seems less likely to prompt such a response.
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C. Outline
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the historical
development and the current state of Compact Clause doctrine. Part III outlines
the forgotten constitutional logic of the Compact Clause, and Part IV applies that
logic to a simple transaction cost model of state compacts. Parts V and VI
illustrate the serious risks posed by state compacts with, respectively, the 1967
Multistate Tax Compact of U.S. Steel fame and the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement between the states and tobacco manufacturers. Both agreements are
unconstitutional under any reasonable reading of the Compact Clause. Part VII
sketches a functional Compact Clause doctrine that would account for those risks
without unduly compromising useful state cooperation. The Part compares that
functional account to its close textual cousin and, moreover, argues that the
judicial enforcement of the congressional consent requirement-especially in the
proposed functional version-is consistent with the contemporary Supreme
Court's federalism doctrines. The concluding Part VIII argues that a Compact
Clause revival presents an opportunity to re-enforce federalism's horizontal,
state-to-state protections. That modest step would strengthen the Supreme
Court's federalism, and ours.
II. FROM TEXT TO FARCE
For a federal republic, and especially for a nascent federal republic, the
prospect of separate, unsupervised agreements among its member-states and
between a member-state and a foreign nation must constitute a cause for alarm.
One obvious threat is dissolution through sedition and secession-which, as we
have learned, states are more likely to commit collectively than individually."
A second threat is that states-of unequal size but equal sovereignty-may,
through cooperation, imperil the interests of a sister state.
The Founders were painfully aware of these dangers. The Articles of
Confederation barred any state from "enter[ing] into any confe[r]ence,
agreement, alliance, or treaty" with foreign powers "without the Consent of the
United States, in Congress assembled."4 2 Likewise, the Articles required
congressional consent for "any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever"

41. Of course, the Confederate states-in keeping with their theory of the
Constitution as a "compact" among the states-seceded individually, not as a
confederacy. States' rights advocates understood very well that a separate state compact
within a federal republic was a perfect absurdity; secession had to come first. That
accomplished, the Confederacy forbade internal state compacts as absolutely as treaties,

save for a narrow exception for cooperative navigational improvements of interstate
waterways. ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
42. Id. art. VI, §1.
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between the states43 and provided that the Congress shall be the last resort in
disputes and differences between the states." These arrangements, however,
proved inadequate to prevent disruptive controversies over ill-defined
boundaries, discrimination by some states against sister states, and infringements
on the United States through state treaties and agreements-with foreign nations,
Indian tribes, and among the states-without the consent of the Congress.45
The Founders responded to these problems by strengthening the national
government's authority and, simultaneously, by explicitly precluding the exercise
of certain powers by the states. Article I of the Constitution enumerates the
powers of Congress, and, in its final Section 10, denies specific powers to the
states. The first paragraph lists powers that the states may not exercise under any
circumstances (i.e., with or without the consent of Congress), beginning with the
provision that "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation."
The better-known injunctions against bills of attainder, the coinage of money, ex
post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contract are also listed here.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 list powers that the states may not
exercise without the consent of Congress. The second paragraph provides that
"No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
it's inspection Laws." The third paragraph, containing the Compact Clause,
provides in full:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay.
Agreements and compacts are subsumed under an injunction covering
practices that constitute manifest threats to the Union and the
Constitution-standing (state) armies, warfare, and actions conducive thereto;
and duties of tonnage-like duties on imports and exports, a species of the state
protectionism that so gravely concemed the Founders.
Moreover, the
constitutional language of the Compact Clause is broad and unqualified. A deal
among states, or between a state and a foreign nation, is either a "treaty" (etc.),

43. Id. art. VI, § 2.
44. Id. art. IX.
45. For James Madison's account of these problems, see James Madison, Preface
to the Debates in the Convention, in NOTES OF DEBATES INTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, 14 (Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio University Press 1984). For an instructive
discussion of state interferences with "national" interests and diplomatic initiatives under
the Articles of Confederation, see Swaine, Negotiating Federalism,supra note 37, at
1174-81, 1198-1210.
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in which case it is absolutely prohibited; or else, it is a "compact" or "agreement"
of some other kind, in which case it requires congressional approval. In short,
the constitutional text and context of the Compact Clause clearly evidence the
Founders' special concern over all-not just some-state agreements.
The "all-embracing"" nature of the Compact Clause has always been
recognized with respect to state agreements with foreign nations. As Chief
Justice Taney put it in Holmes v. Jennison (1840), a case arising over an
extradition arrangement between the governor of Vermont and a Canadian
official, the constitutional injunction against "any Agreement or Compact"
appears to "prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal,
positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties. 47 It is not
entirely clear whether Taney derived his comprehensive understanding from the
text of the Compact Clause itself or from an extra-textual "one voice" rationale
for foreign relations-that is, a presumption that the Founders intended the
nation to speak with a single, authoritative voice to other nations, leaving no
room for the states in that arena.48 (The phrase just quoted is preceded by a
claim that the Framers "anxiously desired to cut off all connection or
communication between a state and a foreign power.")49 The text of the Clause,
of course, treats state agreements with foreign powers on a par with state-to-state
agreements. If it compels a rigid interpretation in the foreign dimension, it
compels an equally rigid, forbidding interpretation in its domestic dimension.
Even at the time, though, that reading seemed counterintuitive. States had
concluded boundary agreements and made arrangements for public
improvements of roads and waterways-apparently, without a thought that such
agreements might require the explicit, ex ante consent of the Congress." The
understandable desire to facilitate useful cooperative ventures-without
subjecting them to the potentially onerous congressional consent
requirement-prevented several Justices from joining Justice Taney's opinion
in Holmes v. Jennison."' Overtime, it prompted a separation of the foreign from
the domestic Compact Clause. 2 The Supreme Court followed Taney on a "one-

46. WALLACE R. VAWTER, INTERSTATE COMPACTS-THE FEDERAL INTEREST 6

(1954).
47. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 572 (1840).
48. For an analysis of the "one voice" rationale in Holmes v. Jennison and
subsequent cases, see Swaine, Negotiating Federalism,supra note 37, at 1224-36.
49. Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 572.
50. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 66.
51. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 86.
52. That development parallels both the extra-textual separation of a foreign from
a domestic (negative) Commerce Clause and the ostensibly textual but probably mistaken
limitation of the Import-Export Clause to foreign rather than interstate trade. See
Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868). As for "probably mistaken," see
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610-40 (1997)
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voice" theory of the foreign Compact Clause13 and, domestically, drifted toward
the position that the Clause applied only to a relatively narrow class of
agreements.
The unlikely starting point of the latter development can be found in Justice
Joseph Story's attempt, in his influential Commentaries on the Constitution of

the UnitedStates, to distinguish state "treaties," which the Constitution prohibits
absolutely, from "agreements and compacts," which are permissible with the
consent of Congress. Noting the dearth of contemporaneous evidence that would
shed light on the Founders' distinction between treaties (etc.) and agreements
(etc.), Story suggested-tentatively, and admittedly on little authority but his
own speculation-that the absolute prohibition extends to "treaties of a political
character" and the qualified prohibition, to agreements involving the exercise of
"what might be deemed mere private rights of sovereignty."

4

shortly,55

For reasons that will appear
Justice Story's distinction is the
wrong starting point for a sensible understanding of the Compact Clause. The
salient point here is that the Founders' or Justice Story's distinction (what- and
whosever precisely it may have been) does not remotely suggest that some
interstate agreements should be exempt from the Compact Clause. The
Founders, obviously, believed no such thing. Neither did Justice Story-who,
tellingly, joined Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison and its
expansive understanding of "agreements and compacts." Nonetheless, "[i]n a
curious feat of judicial doubletalk, Story's distinction between 'treaties' and
,agreements or compacts' was applied to the new task of exempting all but a
narrow class of 'agreements and compacts' from the requirement of
congressional consent. 56
That development, ably described by Engdahl,57 found recognition by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Virginia v. Tennessee," an 1893 case involving a border
dispute between the two states. "By its terms," Justice Field mused for a

(Thomas, J.,
dissenting). See also Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the ImportExport Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 155,
182-215 (1999). The general trend toward a restrictive view of state authority in matters
affecting foreign affairs explains why the "domestic" Compact Clause should be
somewhat broader than its foreign cousin. It does not, however, explain the wholesale
emasculation of the domestic Compact Clause.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886) (suggesting that
Holmes v. Jennison was based on a general principle of exclusive federal control over
foreign relations and endorsing that position).
54.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1397 (1st ed. 1833) (in subsequent editions, § 1403).
55. Infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
56. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 66.
57. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 86-88.
58. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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unanimous Court-alluding to, without citing, Chief Justice Taney's broad
interpretation in Holmes v. Jennison-the Compact Clause is "sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating
to all kinds of subjects."59 It extends to agreements:
to which the United States can have no possible objection or have an
interest in interfering with, as well as to those which may tend to
increase and build up the political influence of the contracting states,
so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States
or interfere with their rightful management of particular subjects
placed under their entire control.60
Nevertheless, Justice Field concluded that the Compact Clause cannot possibly
be read to apply to "any agreement or compact." "[L]ooking at the object of the
constitutional provision" rather than its text, Justice Field determined that the
Clause is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase
of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the
just supremacy of the United States."6' State agreements, Justice Field argued,
should be subject to the constitutional requirement of congressional consent only
if they threaten to encroach upon the full and free exercise of federal authority.
Justice Field's discourse on the scope of the Compact Clause in Virginiav.
Tennessee is dictum, because a later part of his opinion holds that Congress had
in fact consented to the border agreement between the two states.62 Subsequent
cases, however, discussed Justice Field's opinion with approval.63 In the 1970s,

59. Id. at 517-18.
60. Id. at 518.
61. Id. at 519. A slightly different formulation appears id. at 517-18
(distinguishing agreements of no interest to the United States from those "which may
tend to increase and build up the political influence of the contracting states, so as to

encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States or interfere with their
rightful management of particular subjects placed under their entire control").
62. Id. at 521-22; see also Engdahl, InterstateArrangements,supranote 13, at 67
and sources cited therein at n.22 (passages on scope of Compact Clause probably dicta);
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 467 (1982) (characterizing
those passages as dicta). But see id. at 489 (White, J., dissenting) (" Virginiav. Tennessee
quite clearly holds that not all agreements and compacts must be submitted to the
Congress") (footnote omitted).
63. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914); Steams v.
Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900); Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894); see also U.S.
Steel, 434 U.S. at 469, n..20 (citing state cases relying on the Virginia v. Tennessee
"test").
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Justice Field's dictum became the U.S. Supreme Court's authoritative holding.64
In that light, two aspects of the opinion bear emphasis.
First, Virginia v. Tennessee views the Compact Clause entirely in its
vertical, state-to-federal dimension. It is silent on the horizontal effects of state
agreements on non-party states and their citizens. The omission marks a shift
from the traditional understanding of the Clause. As Chief Justice Taney put it,
the point of the Compact Clause is "to guard the rights and interests of the other
states, and to prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which
might affect injuriously the interest of the others."65 It is unlikely that Justice
Field intended to devalue that consideration; his failure to mention it, and his
language suggesting that the Compact Clause involves the balancing of state
versus federal interests, probably flow from the posture and the legal issue of the
case. Nonetheless, the shift in emphasis proved fateful and, over time, led to
wholesale judicial indifference to the horizontal concerns that underpin the
Compact Clause.
Second, even on the functional grounds urged by Justice Field-that is,
wholly apart from textual considerations-the "object" of the Compact Clause
warrants no inference to the effect that state agreements that hold no interest for
the United States should be exempt from the congressional consent requirement.
The institutional question is, who gets to say in the first instance what does or
does not constitute an interference with the full and free exercise of federal
authority? The constitutional rule, obviously, deprives the states of that authority
in all cases. It also deprives the judiciary of an independent role in deciding
whether or not state agreements are subject to, or should receive, congressional
consent. In sketching the contours of a safe harbor for (presumably) run-of-themill state cooperation, Virginiav. Tennessee worked a shift both in the appraisal
of the risks and dangers of state agreements and in the judiciary's role in
addressing them.
The extent of that shift is not altogether clear. If the congressional consent
requirement is maintained for all state agreements that might implicate federal
supremacy concerns, the practical effects will be quite similar to those of the
blanket constitutional rule.66 If, on the other hand, the consent requirement is
triggered only by state agreements that demonstrably encroach upon federal
supremacy, the Compact Clause is rendered a virtual nullity: with or without the
Clause, such agreements violate the ordinary rules of federal supremacy and
64. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.

65. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1855).
66. Engdahl observes that Virginia v. Tennessee has in political practice been
understood "in terms of the possible, rather than the actual, effects of 'compacts."'
Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supranote 13, at 69. In particular, states have sought
congressional consent for compacts where, under a strict reading of the precedents, no
consent is required. As noted, however, the states have not always exercised such
restraint and deference.
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preemption. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted this latter
construction.
New Hampshire v. Maine,67 like Virginia v. Tennessee, arose over the
identification of a pre-existing state boundary line. The principal question was
whether the judicial acceptance of a proposed consent decree between the
attorneys general of the two states, without an independentjudicial examination,
was consistent with the Supreme Court's Article III functions. Having answered
that question in the affirmative (over a dissent by three Justices), Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court devoted a slim two paragraphs to New
Hampshire's "suggestion" that the acceptance of the consent decree without an
independent judicial review might circumvent the Compact Clause. Those
paragraphs cite Virginia v. Tennessee for the proposition that a state agreement
that merely defines a "true and ancient boundary," as distinct from an "alienation
of territory," is not an "Agreement or Compact" or at any rate, not a compact of
the sort that would require congressional approval.6"
A brief twenty months after New Hampshire v. Maine, the Supreme Court
put that decision and Virginia v. Tennessee to astonishing use. In sustaining a
multistate compact governing the state taxation of business income in interstate
commerce, the Court effectively held that no otherwise constitutional state
agreement or compact requires congressional approval.
69
The tax compact at issue in U.S. Steel Corp.v. Multistate Tax Commission
was formed in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 1959 decision in
Northwestern States PortlandCement Co. v. Minnesota." Under a long line of
Supreme Court precedents, a-company's income from sales in foreign states
constituted income from interstate commerce and could not be taxed in or by
those states (so long as the company carried on exclusively interstate business).
In PortlandCement, the Supreme Court departed from those precedents and held
that states could, after all, tax interstate commerce and its proceeds, provided that
the taxed entity has some kind of "nexus" to the taxing jurisdiction and the tax
is "fairly apportioned" among the states.7 Corporate America promptly urged
Congress to overturn PortlandCement. Just as promptly, Congress slapped a
nameless moratorium, Pub. L. No. 86-272, on the state taxation of interstate
business income of firms whose foreign-state operations did not exceed minimal
activities-such as solicitation and delivery--enumerated in the statute." That

67. 426 U.S. 363 (1976).
68. Id. at 369-70 (quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 522 (1893)).
69. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
70. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, consolidated on
appealwith Williams & Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
71. Id. at 464-65.
72. "Imposition of net income tax-Minimum standards," Pub. L. No. 86-272,73
Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-381dd (2000)).
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"safe harbor" moratorium satisfied neither the states nor corporate America."
When the world's greatest deliberative body actually got around to deliberating,
it proved unable to resolve the interest group conflict. Commissions and
committees held numerous hearings and produced reams of paper, but none of
the dozen bills introduced over the span of a decade received an up-or-down vote
on the floor.74
The 1967 Multistate Tax Compact ("MTC") established a standing
Multistate Tax Commission. The Commission, which is composed of the tax
administrators from all member states, seeks to facilitate the administration of
state taxation for multistate businesses. Specifically, the Compact's stated
purposes are to facilitate the proper determination of multistate taxpayers' state
and local tax obligations; to promote uniformity; to facilitate taxpayer
convenience and compliance; and to avoid duplicative taxation.75 To that end,
the member states endowed the Commission with regulatory authority to
determine rules for the allocation and apportionment of business income among
member states and other multistate tax issues, subject to the member-states'
participation in the proceeding and subsequent approval of the regulations;76 with
executive authority to conduct corporate tax audits, upon request by a member
state or sua sponte;77 and with judicial authority to adjudicate disputes, through
compulsory arbitration, over the allocation of business income in disputes
between taxpayers and member-states' tax authorities. 78 The MTC became
effective, in accordance with its terms, upon the formal enactment by the
legislatures of seven states. 79 The MTC's architects sought congressional

73. See Jerome R. Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An
HistoricalPerspective, 29 VAND. L. REv. 335, 339-40 (1976) (noting that Pub. L. No.
86-272 largely immunized small multistate businesses, while leaving national
corporations exposed).
74.
The strenuous but unsuccessful congressional efforts to reach an
accommodation on interstate business taxation in the wake of Portland Cement are
described in vivid detail in Justice White's dissent in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm 'n, 434 U.S. 452, 486-89 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
75. Multistate Tax Commission, MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT art. I, available at
http://www.mtc.gov/ABOUTMTC/compact.htm (last visited April 3,2003) [hereinafter
MTC].
76. MTC, supra note 75, art. VII; IV.
77. MTC, supra note 75, art. VIII.
78. MTC, supra note 75, art. IX. Due to opposition by the State of California,
however, this provision did not go into effect. Jerry Sharpe, State Taxation ofInterstate
Businesses and the Multistate Tax Compact: The Searchfor a Delicate Uniformity, 11
COLUM. J.LAW &SOC. PROBS. 231,246 n.58 (1975) [hereinafter Sharpe, State Taxation].
79. See MTC, supra note 75, art. X(1).
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approval for their creation, and numerous bills to that effect were introduced in
Congress. None of them, however, received formal action."0
Business interests sued in state and federal courts, arguing that the MTC
violated the Compact Clause because Congress had failed to consent to the
arrangement.8 ' In U.S. Steel, the U.S. Supreme Court decisively rejected that
challenge. 2 Writing for a majority of seven Justices, Justice Powell held that the
Compact Clause covers only state agreements that may affect federal supremacy.
The MTC, according to the Court, posed no such danger.
After briefly describing the MTC's origin and purposes and the fate of the
case in the courts below, the US. Steel majority devoted twelve heavily
footnoted pages to a discussion of the constitutional origins of the Compact
Clause and the congressional consent requirement in the Supreme Court's
precedents. It described Justice Field's misinterpretation, in Virginia v.
83
Tennessee, of Justice Story's Commentaries as just that-a misinterpretation;
characterized Justice Field's remarks on the limited applicability of the Compact
Clause as "an extended dictum"; 4 and conceded that subsequent endorsements
of that dictum also constituted dicta. The opinion maintained, however, that
Justice Field's dictum became an actual holding in New Hampshirev. Maine.85
Powell's characterization of the precedent is simply wrong. 6 Had the New
Hampshire Court meant to endorse a broad proposition that it had theretofore
treated as mere dictum, it would presumably have devoted more than two cursory
paragraphs to the matter.8 In point of fact, the New HampshireCourt explicitly

80. Robert M. White, The Constitutionality of the Multistate Tax Compact, 29
L. REV. 453, 461 (1976).
81. In addition to U.S. Steel, see Kinnear v. Hertz Corp., 545 P.2d 1186 (Wash.
1976) (sustaining interstatejoint audit provisions of the Multistate Tax Compact against
Compact Clause and other challenges) (discussed in White, supra note 80, at 453).
82. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 478 (1978). In
addition, the U.S. Steel plaintiffs raised challenges under the Equal Protection, Due
Process, and Commerce Clauses. The Supreme Court roundly rejected those claims. Id.
at 478.
83. Id. at468 n.19.
84. Id. at 467.
85. Id. at 459-60. None of the cases citing Justice Field's test with approval
explicitly applied it. Id. at 469.
86. Powell probably knew it to be so. His claim that New Hampshire v. Maine
constitutes a binding endorsement of Virginia v. Tennessee's dicta appears at the
beginning, not the end, of his U.S. Steel disquisition on the history of the Compact
Clause. See U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 459-61. Had New Hampshire in fact established a
binding precedent, in so recent a case, that entire discussion would have been redundant.
87. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363,369-70 (1976). Certainly, the two
dissenting Justices in U.S. Steel would have caught the point in New Hampshire. They
did in fact dissent in that earlier case-without, however, even remarking on the
congressional consent requirement and its interpretation in Virginia v. Tennessee. See
VAND.
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declined to rule on the scope of the Compact Clause and its congressional
consent requirement.88 Wisely, then, Powell rested the remainder of his opinion
in U.S. Steel precisely not on the purported "holding" of New Hampshirebut on
the dictum of Virginia v. Tennessee. He quickly dismissed the petitioners'
argument that Virginia v. Tennessee should be limited to "bilateral agreements
involving no independent administrative body."8 9 Powell conceded that states
and the federal government had always thought compacts of comparable
complexity and consequence to require congressional consent, but dismissed that
fact as a political practice without precedential value.9" He then proclaimed
Justice Field's position, which he had earlier described as both misguided and
dictum, as the "Virginia v. Tennessee rule""' and-without mentioning New
Hampshirev. Maine-applied that so-called rule to the MTC.
In light of the manifest differences between the border-fixing agreement in
Virginia v. Tennessee and the convoluted tax regime at issue in US. Steel, one
ought to be skeptical about distilling Justice Field's musings into a mechanical
"rule" that limits the application of the Compact Clause to arrangements that
might compromise federal supremacy. Because a border demarcation between
two contiguous states is unlikely to involve the interests of a third state, Justice
Field's preoccupation with the vertical effect of compacts was, as noted,
understandable, even though lamentable. In contrast, the application of that onedimensional rule to the MTC-a regulatory regime that very obviously involves
the interests of sister states--effectively excludes the protection of those
interests, once thought to be a principal purpose of the Compact Clause, from
judicial consideration. As Justice White observed in dissent, it was "obvious that
non-Compact States can be placed at a competitive disadvantage by the
Multistate Tax Compact."92 Not bothering to deny the fact, the majority
responded that states are similarly affected by any number of policies enacted by
individual sister states.93 The gross theoretical mistake behind this averment is
discussed below.94 Suffice it here to state the readiest reply: so what? Those
other state policies are not constitutionally disfavored. State compacts are.

id. at 370-72.
88. Id. at 366 (having sustained Maine's exception to rejection of proposed consent
decree, on the grounds that entry is consistent with Article III, the Court had "no occasion
to address the other exceptions filed by the States"). Those "other exceptions" cover New
Hampshire's "suggestion" that the Compact Clause might bar the consent decree. Id. at
369.
89. Id. at 471-72.
90. Id. at471.
91. Id. at 472.
92. Id. at 495.
93. Id. at 477-78.
94. See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
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Having effectively excluded the MTC's horizontal effects on sister states
from constitutional consideration, the U.S. Steel majority proceeded to minimize
the impact of the arrangement on federal supremacy. "[T]he pertinent inquiry"
under the Virginia v. Tennessee "rule," the U.S. Steel Court observed in
professed agreement with the petitioners' position, "is one of potential, rather
than actual, impact upon federal supremacy.""5 But that is not the test the US.
Steel Court actually applied. Of the MTC's potentialimpact, an abundance of
evidence was before the Court. Much of it found its way into Justice White's
dissent, which describes the protracted federal debate preceding and
accompanying the creation of the MTC; the MTC's explicit organizational
purpose to forestall federal tax legislation; and the sustained, serious political
disputes between the MTC and the federal branches over international treaties
affecting the taxation of income earned by foreign companies in the United
States.96 In light of the "hostile stalemate" between the MTC and the federal
government, Justice White concluded, the MTC's potential impact on federal
concerns was simply beyond peradventure.97
The US. Steel majority's response to these observations appears in the
following passage:
On itsface the Multistate Tax Compact contains no provisions that
would enhance the political power of the member States in a way that
encroaches upon the supremacy of the United States. There well may
be some incremental increase in the bargaining power of the member
States quoad the corporations subject to their respective taxing
jurisdictions ....But the test is whether the Compact enhances state
power quoadthe National Government. This pact does notpurportto
authorize the member States to exercise any powers they could not
exercise in its absence. Nor is there any delegation of sovereign
power to the Commission; each State retains complete freedom to
adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the Commission. Moreover
...each State is free to withdraw at any time.9"

95. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 472. The dissenting Justices commended the majority
opinion on that recognition and couched the disagreement as merely a question of
applying the "potential impact" standard to the MTC. Id. at 484 (White, J., dissenting).
As shown in the text, the concession was unwarranted.
96. Id. at 486-89 (White, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 200-02 and
accompanying text.
97. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 488 (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 472-73 (emphasis added ).
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Putting aside, for now, the highly questionable characterization of the
MTC,99 the italicized introductory phrase shows that the majority's test is not the
"potential impact" rule of Virginia v. Tennessee; the test is an actual conflict
between the language of some compact provision and a federal (constitutional
or statutory) norm.' 0 Consistent with this reading, the passage just quoted
repeatedly formulates the "pertinent inquiry" as a question of affirmative, rather
than potential, "enhancement" and "encroachment." Under that theory, no state
compact requires congressional approval unless it declares an invasion of federal
supremacy in haec verba-on its face, as it were.
The same conclusion flows from the just-quoted contention that the MTC
did not "authorize the member States to exercise any powers they could not
exercise in its absence," which forms the majority's principal defense of its
ruling. Individual states may of course legislate in areas of concurrent authority,
including especially interstate commerce (within the bounds of the dormant
Commerce Clause), until Congress preempts them. Therefore, the U.S. Steel
Court concluded, they may do so collectively and by compact. As Justice White
pointed out, however, that conclusion cannot be right. "The [Compact] Clause
must mean that some actions which would be permissible for individual States
to undertake are not permissible for a group of States to agreeto undertake."''
Otherwise, the Clause is empty.
The majority's curt reply to this objection is that it confuses federal interests
with federal supremacy. The MTC plainly governs the taxation of interstate
commerce, which the Constitution commits to the care and authority of the
United States Congress. However, "every state cooperative action touching
interstate or foreign commerce implicates some federal interest. Were that the
test under the Compact Clause, virtually all interstate agreements and reciprocal

99. See infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
100. A true "potential impact" test cannot distinguish between facial and as-applied
validity. A discussion of this or that application and operation of a legal
provision-along the lines of Justice White's U.S. Steel dissent-is simply a showing
that the provision has, or has already had, the forbidden potential. That showing is not
a basis for a separate "as-applied" challenge; it goes directly to the validity of the
provision. The U.S. Steel Court ignored this logic. Throughout its opinion, the majority
deflected the petitioners' and the dissenters' arguments about the operation of the
Compact with references to the MTC's purportedly unobjectionable language. Justice
Powell, the author of U.S. Steel, in a later case described his opinion as having upheld
the MTC against a facial challenge. ASARCO v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S.
307, 312 n.7 (1982). The suggestion of a meaningful distinction between an as-applied
and a facial challenge to the MTC-and certainly the veiled suggestion that the former
might have succeeded where the latter did not-illustrates that the US. Steel Court did
not simply misapply the "potential impact" test; rather, it applied a different test
altogether.
101. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 482 (1982).
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legislation would require congressional approval."' 02 That, of course, is what the
text of the Compact Clause provides. We know, however, that not all interstate
agreements can sensibly be viewed as requiring congressional approval; vide
Virginia v. Tennessee. Therefore, according to US. Steel, none should require

approval save those that, "on their face," purport to exercise a power reserved
exclusively to the federal government and those that conflict with a preemptive
federal law. That syllogism is the sum and substance of contemporary Compact
Clause doctrine.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC

After US. Steel, one can hardly imagine a state compact that would run
afoul of the Compact Clause without first, or at least also, running afoul of other,
independent constitutional obstacles. But while US. Steel effectively declared
the Compact Clause inoperative, it is the only Supreme Court decision in over
two centuries to so hold. No case prior to US. Steel embodied such a holding,
and while the Supreme Court has never questioned the US. Steel decision, it has
never affirmatively relied on it, either."0 3 Thus, unlike constitutional questions

102. Id. at 479 n.33.
103. Supreme Court decisions contain the following citations to U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Comm 'n: Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 57
(1994) (O'Conner, J., dissenting); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation &Revenue Dept., 458
U.S. 354, 357 (1982); ASARCO, Inc., 458 U.S. at 312; W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization,451 U.S. 648,671 (1981); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981);
Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 451 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,
445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 282 (1978)
(Blackmun, J.,dissenting). None of these cases relies on the U.S. Steel holding
concerning the congressional consent requirement; only two even mention it. The first
is Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 451 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
second, in Hess v. PortAuth. Trans-Hudson Corp., contains a throw-away footnote that
says, without explicitly holding, that "federal consent is not required" for compacts that
do not implicate federal concerns. Hess, 513 U.S. at 40 n.10 (citing Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-20 (1893), but, curiously, not citing U.S. Steel for the
proposition).
The only case that can be construed as an affirmation of U.S. Steel is the cavalierly
reasoned decision and opinion in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd.of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985). The so-called Douglas Amendment to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 permitted the Federal Reserve Board to approve bank
applications to purchase a bank in another state if, and only if, the acquisition was
"specifically authorized by the statute laws of the [acquisition target's] State." Northeast
Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 163; Bank Holding Company Act, § 3(d) ch. 395, 70 Stat. 133
(1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1814 (2000)). Several New England states
authorized acquisitions by banks headquartered in other New England states, provided
those states enacted a reciprocal authorization (though not necessarily one limited to New
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that are effectively immunized from principled consideration by piles of
precedents, the Compact Clause affords us the luxury of being able to take a
single step back to the Constitution and its logic.
At first impression, that endeavor appears unpromising. Constitutional
scholars from Justice Story forward have noted the dearth of contemporaneous
evidence on the specific meaning of the Compact Clause. "The records of the
Constitutional Convention furnish no light as to the source and scope" of the
Clause. °4 Its only mention in the FederalistPapers appears in No. 44, written
by James Madison.
The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and
confederations, Madison wrote, was "copied" from the Articles of Confederation
into the Constitution, "for reasons which need no explanation."'0 5 The restraint
on state imposts and duties "is enforced by all the arguments that prove the
necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils."'0 "
Further, the qualified prohibitions of the third paragraph of Article I, Section 10,

England states). NortheastBancorp,472 U.S. at 164. New York banks argued that the
reciprocal statutes permitting acquisitions by out-of-state New England banks, but not by
banks outside that region, violated, inter alia, the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Compact Clause. Id. at 162. The Supreme Court determined that the Douglas
Amendment authorized the arrangement, which would otherwise have violated the
dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 174. As to the Compact Clause claim, Chief Justice
Rehnquist expressed "some doubt as to whether there is an agreement amounting to a
compact" and found "several of the classic indicia of a compact" missing. Id. at 175.
However (continued the Court), "even if we were to assume" the existence of a compact,
not all compacts require congressional approval. Id. The petitioners' contention that the
regional agreements affronted the sovereignty of sister states outside New England was
baseless: "We do not see how the statutes in question either enhance the politicalpower
of the New England States at the expense of other states or have an 'impact on our
federal structure."' Id. at 176 (quoting US. Steel, 434 U.S. at 471,473).
On one reading, Northeast Bancorp stands for the following proposition: an
economic "Fortress New England," to the exclusion of other states, violates (barring
congressional authorization) the judge-made dormant Commerce Clause but not the
Compact Clause, because it has no impact on thefederal structure. See I LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1245 n.40 (3d ed. 2000). Respectfully, the
assertion-unsupported in Northeast Bancorp by any further argument or
explanation-would have floored the Founders.
It is more plausible and charitable to read the Northeast Bancorp Court's
pronouncements following the "even if" sentence as dicta. On that reading, the case
holds that reciprocity agreements-as distinct from compacts---do not require
congressional approval. That proposition is defensible, though not self-evidently or
necessarily correct. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text. On the yet more
difficult question of selective reciprocity agreements in NortheastBancorpand in general
see infra note 318.
104. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause,supra note 19, at 694.
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 281 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
106. Id. at 283.
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including the Compact Clause, "fall within reasonings which are either so
obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without
remark."' 7 And to all a good night. No record exists on the distinction between
treaties and compacts. Some scholars have argued that the Founders derived it
from then-extant theories and concepts developed by leading authorities on the
Law of Nations, especially Vattel.'0 8 But if so, their understanding was lost even
to the immediately following generation. 0 9
The interpretive fog, however, is almost entirely a result of the misguided
preoccupation with the distinction between treaties and compacts, between
absolute and qualified prohibition. The distinction that preoccupied the
Founders was the far more basic choice between two very different institutional
means of federal control over centrifugal tendencies in the states-legal
supremacy, and a (qualified or absolute) prohibition. On that fundamental
choice, the historical record is as clear as sunlight. The adoption of a qualified
prohibition, in lieu of a plain-vanilla supremacy arrangement, for state
agreements is the key to the constitutional logic of the Compact Clause.
A. CongressionalConsent and Supremacy
James Madison arrived at the Philadelphia Convention loaded for bear. The
linchpin of his agenda was a national "negative" on state laws,"0 which should
apply "in all cases whatsoever."' ' What Madison had in mind was not a federal
veto over existing state legislation-a kind of ex post federal preemption.
Rather, in advocating a negative "in all cases whatsoever," he insisted that no
state law should go into effect without federal approval." 2 Madison intended to

107. Id.
108. See especially the erudite discussion by Engdahl, Interstate Arrangements,
supra note 13, at 75-81.
109. Chief Justice Marshall, for a prominent example, used the terms "compacts"
and "treaties" interchangeably:
A state is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation. If these
compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty-making
power, which is conferred entirely on the general government; if with each
other, for political purposes, they can scarcely fail to interfere with the general

purpose and intent of the constitution.
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833) (emphasis added).
110. Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REv. 611, 634-35
(1999); see also id. nn. 101-02 (describing a negative as the central element of Madison's

plans).
111. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF MADISON 1786-87, at 317, 318 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975)
[hereinafter PAPERS OF MADISON].
112. Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws. James Madison, the
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arm the national government with the means to arrest the states' proclivity "to
invade the national jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of nations [and]
to harass each other with rival and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views
of interest.""' 3 As the broad sweep of his proposal suggests, though, Madison
also desired to protect the citizens of the various states from depredations by
their own state governments. The Convention, Madison argued, should "seize
the occasion of reforming the national government to treat the internal defects
of the states." ' 4 The reason for Madison's vast ambition-seemingly absurd,
considering that the Convention had more than its work cut out just in
establishing a viable Union-was his conviction that the states' outward
aggression and their internal defects had a common source: factionalism. In
pressing for a comprehensive negative, Madison proposed to tackle that problem
at the source, as opposed to curbing its particular, outward manifestations."'
The Convention debated Madison's negative, in somewhat different
versions, on three occasions: during early June, in the first run-through of the
Virginia delegation's plan for the Convention; in mid-July, when Madison's
proposal got entangled in the debate over the Great Compromise on
representation in the federal legislature; and again in August, when Madison,
with an obduracy born of despair over the fate of the nation, re-introduced the
proposal to an impatient Convention that had long moved on to constitutional
minutiae. "6 On all three occasions, Madison's proposal for a blanket negative
was rejected. Two arguments carried the day against Madison. First, his
numerous opponents denounced the proposed negative as a nationalistic
instrument that would (as Gouverneur Morris put it) "disgust all the States,""' 7
Constitution, and the Crisis ofRepublican Government, 36

WM. & MARY QUART. 215,
219 (1979).
113. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9
PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 11l, at 382, 384. Kramer, supra note 110, at 626-36,
provides an excellent account of the genesis of Madison's views on the negative and its
intended purposes and scope.

114. Kramer, supra note 110, at 634 n.99 (quoting JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS INTHE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 47 (1996)).
115. Kramer, supra note 110, at 648 passim. The Convention, of course, rejected
Madison's proposal and instead subjected particular classes of state laws (compacts,
duties, etc.)-those with obvious deleterious effects on sister states-to particularized
prohibitions and negatives in the Constitution. Id. Kramer argues that the delegates
never grasped Madison's point that those odious measures merely illustrated the more
general problem of state factionalism. Id. For the purposes at hand, nothing hangs on
the question of whether the delegates failed to grasp Madison's argument or whether they
understood and rejected it. Either way, the Convention clearly apprehended the dangers
that certain classes of state laws would pose to the harmony of the union.
116. Kramer, supra note 110, at 650.
117. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 28 (Madison's notes,

July 17, 1787) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
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thus dooming the constitutional venture. "' Second, the proposed negative would
sweep too broadly, rendering it both impracticable and unnecessary. The
negative would compel states to obtain national consent for urgent matters, when
the national legislature might not be in session. At the same time, the negative
would compel Congress to concern itself with the states' "internal police," and
thus, with state activities "to which the United States can have no possible
objection or have any interest in interfering with," as Justice Field would later
put it. '

9

The Convention rejected Madison's proposal for an all-encompassing
negative and instead adopted federal supremacy-asserted either through the
courts, in the ordinary course of deciding cases and controversies, or through
congressional legislation-as the general constitutional arrangement. Strictly
speaking, the negative and federal supremacy are not mutually exclusive
alternatives. States may seek to evade a negative, or for that matter, an absolute
prohibition, just as they may seek to evade an ordinary federal statute. One way
or the other, federal supremacy depends on judicial enforcement. 2 The
difference is the default principle on which federal supremacy operates: the
negative renders state laws inoperative, pending affirmative congressional action,
whereas the supremacy principle alone-let's call it "mere supremacy'"-permits
state laws to be enacted and to remain in effect until and unless a court or the
Congress sets them aside. In that sense, the negative and mere supremacy are
mutually exclusive alternatives. The Convention clearly understood them as
such, and the adoption of the Supremacy Clause promptly followed the rejection
of the negative.' 2 '

CONVENTION].

118. Id. at 391 ("Mr. Rutlidge. 'If nothing else, this alone would damn and ought
to damn the Constitution. Will any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this
manner."') (Madison's notes, Aug. 23, 1787).
119. Hobson, supra note 112, at 227 (citing and summarizing the delegates'
practical objections); cf Justice Field's formulation in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503, 518 (1893).
120. In defending the need for federal supremacy and the prominent role of the

courts in its enforcement, Hamilton illustrated his point by stressing the near-certainty of
state violations of absolute and qualified constitutional prohibitions, as distinct from the
exercise of concurrent powers. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter, ed., 196 1).
121. Hobson, supra note 112, at 228. As for "clearly understood," Gouvemeur
Morris's comment immediately preceding the rejection of the negative proposal on July
17 is instructive: "Mr. Govr. Morris was more & more opposed to the negative. The
proposal of it would disgust all the States. A law that ought to be negatived will be set
aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a
Nationl. Law." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 28
(Madison's notes July 17, 1787).
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However, the Convention retained absolute prohibitions ora congressional
negative for certain classes of state laws-those that are now listed in Article I,
Section 10, including the Compact Clause. The congressional consent
requirement for state agreements and compacts is the Madisonian negative, in a
specified range of application. This decision was not some quid pro quo to
appease the ornery Madison. Rather, even as the delegates rejected Madison's
entreaties to use the Convention as an opportunity to reform state politics
(preferring instead to leave that project for another time and place),' 22 they
emphatically agreed with his contention that certain species of state laws-the
"rage" for paper money, debtor relief laws, import duties-posed alarming
dangers to sister states and, hence, to the union. For these classes of state laws,
including compacts, the Convention deliberately broke with mere supremacy and
instead adopted either an absolute prohibition or the "disgusting" negative.
Uniformly, the prohibitions and negatives are directed against classes of state
laws with a manifest detrimental effect on sister states. As Madison might have
put it, the Convention sought to arrest factionalism at the borders.
Before pursuing the logic of this constitutional choice, two points-one
minor, the other of some significance-merit a brief mention. First, the nature
of the congressional consent clauses in Article I, Section 10 sheds light on
Madison's cursory discussion of those provisions, including and especially the
Compact Clause, in the Federalist Papers.2
While Madison may have
genuinely believed that the dangers of state compacts were "too obvious" to
warrant discussion, and while he may have expected his audience to share that
view, his extreme brevity may also reflect an effort to deflect unwanted
(Antifederalist) attention from the distinctly nationalistic resolution of the
compact problem in the Constitution. 24 Having experienced the determined
opposition to the general negative at the Convention, the Madison of the
FederalistPapers was hardly inclined to boast that his "pet scheme"' 25 was
actually retained for certain classes of state laws.
The second, more consequential point concerns the fateful debate over the
distinction between absolutely prohibited "treaties" (etc.) and "agreements and
compacts," which are subject to the Madisonian negative. Putting aside its
absurd turns, that debate misses the point that the constitutional choice between
absolute and qualified prohibition is secondary, both logically and in terms of

122. Kramer, supra note 110, at 647-48.
123. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
124. That interpretation is supported by a telling "mistake" in Madison's account
in the Federalist Papers: contrary to his representation (quoted supra in the text
accompanying note 105), the constitutional injunction against state treaties was not in
fact "copied" from the Articles of Confederation but rather strengthened. "The
prohibition in the Articles was conditional; in the Constitution it is absolute." Engdahl,
InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 75 n.59.
125. RAKOVE, supra note 114, at 435.
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institutional significance, to the constitutional choice between federal legal
supremacy and (qualified or absolute) prohibition. The distinction between
treaties and compacts is of little practical import so long as, and because, neither
kind ofbargaincan be concludedwithout the approvalofCongress.'26 Congress

might mis-classify a compact as a treaty and declare itself constitutionally barred
from approving it. That mistake is tantamount to a simple rejection of a compact
and, therefore, without consequence. Conversely, Congress might mis-classify
a treaty as a compact and proceed to approve it. That is conceivable, but highly
unlikely. The question has never arisen in an actual case and, in light of its
unequivocal commitment to the Congress, is quite probably non-justiciable." 7
In any event, ajudicial ruling to the effect that Congress mistakenly approved a
constitutionally prohibited state treaty would afford more, rather than less,
protection against divisive state agreements.
The distinction between treaties and compacts is not altogether irrelevant.
Legislative deliberations on the point should be informed by the Founders'
understanding of the constitutional distinction, obscure though it may be. 2 But

126. Cf Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause, supra note 19, at 694-95

(identifying constitutional commitment to Congress as the central feature of the Compact
Clause).
127. S. 2467, GA TTImplementing Legislation:HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation,103d Cong., 2d Sess. 319 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT Hearings] (testimony by Professor Laurence H. Tribe) (suggesting that the
classification of particular international agreements as Article II"treaties" or something
else maynot bejusticiable and characterizing the question as "tough"). The case against
justiciability is even stronger under Article I, which clearly commits treaties and
compacts to Congress (regardless of where the distinction is drawn), than under Article
II, which provides for the approval of "treaties" without specifying how and by whom
they are to be distinguished from other sorts of agreements.
128. To my mind, the most natural interpretation is that treaties (and the like) are
something more formal, lasting, and consequential than mere "agreements and
compacts." In particular, treaties (and the like) threaten to compromise the parties'
sovereignty to a greater extent than mere one-shot agreements. See Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1266-68 (1995). At some point,
state agreements may effect such a departure from the original constitutional design that
even Congress may not permit them. This view of a constitutional continuum is
buttressed by the progression from the less to the more formal within each clause
("Treaties, Alliances and Confederations"; "Agreements and Compacts"). GATT
Hearings,supra note 127, at 288 (letter from Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter submitted

into the record by Professor Tribe). Assuming that the word "treaty" means the same in
Article IIas it does in Article I, the Treaty Clause of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2,
requiring the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate to treaties made by the President,
further supports the interpretation just sketched. While that Clause (unlike Article I) does
not explicitly distinguish between treaties and other kinds of agreements, the idea of
subjecting treaties, but not (unspecified) other agreements, to a requirement of approval
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one should not search for a hard-and-fast rule where some play in the joints can
easily be tolerated, and may in fact be preferable. The purpose of precluding
divisive state agreements has been accomplished, so far as possible, once any
and all state agreements have been exempted from mere supremacy and instead
been subjected to a negative or to an absolute prohibition. No serious
institutional risk or consequence attends to an erroneous congressional
identification of a compact as a treaty, or vice versa.
Only in August, after the Convention had made the basic choice on
supremacy (in the general run of cases), did the delegates turn to the question of
whether the exceptions to that rule should be governed by a negative or an
absolute prohibition. Considering the delegates' discussion of the parallel
provisions of Article I, Section 10, it may be just as well that the record at this
point falls silent on the Founders' Compact Clause. For example, the delegates
engaged in a rambling discussion on the distinction, if any, between duties and
imposts.'29 The Import Clause eventually came to contain an exception for state
charges that are "absolutely necessary" to carry out a state's inspection laws; a
parallel qualification for the Tonnage Clause was introduced and discussed (on
the day of the Convention's adjournment, and to Madison's obvious irritation),
but voted down. 3 ' The discussions accompanying those choices have an air of
pedantry, impatience, and sheer exhaustion. A learned disquisition on the
niceties of "compacts" and "treaties" under the Law of Nations, one feels, might
well have earned its author a public flogging-and a deserved one at that: the
crucial decision against mere supremacy had long been made.
B. Why Mere Supremacy Is Not Enough
The fact that the very same delegates who so resolutely rejected the
Madisonian negative deliberately adopted that instrument for state agreements
and compacts should carry some constitutional weight. In light of the modem
Supreme Court's obtuseness on the point, the reasons for the Convention's
decision warrant further exploration.
The most obvious reason has already been suggested: if one rejects, along
with the great majority of delegates, Madison's endeavor to remedy the internal
defects of state politics at and through the Constitutional Convention, then a
general negative is grossly overinclusive. It covers a vast array of state activities

by two-thirds of the Senate makes sense only on the assumption that treaties are
something more formal, something more threatening to state and popular sovereignty,
than other sorts of arrangements. Id. at 287-88 (letter from Professor Slaughter).
129. 2 RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 305-08
(Madison's notes, Aug. 16, 1787).
130. 2 REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 625-26
(Madison's notes, Sept. 15, 1787).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

that pose no risk to the Union, at considerable institutional cost. As Thomas
Jefferson tweaked Madison in a pre-Convention letter from Paris, the proposal
"mend[s] a small hole by covering the whole garment."'' Time and again,
Madison's opponents at the Convention turned to this argument. As George
Mason put it-again, foreshadowing Justice Field's language in Virginia v.
Tennessee-it would be highly impracticable and onerous to obtain
congressional consent every time a state decides to build a bridge within its own
territory.' 32
The overinclusiveness argument obviously does not apply to the use of the
negative in areas of state activity that constitute manifest threats to sister states
and to the union. That observation does not quite explain, though, why the
negative is necessary in those areas-in other words, why the ordinary exercise
of legal supremacy, through the courts or by Congress, is not enough. The
answer lies in a comparative analysis of institutional risks and benefits.
Supremacy, in the area of enumerated congressional powers, is plenary, but
its exercise is somewhat uncertain. Supremacy must be asserted by courts, in the
ordinary course of deciding cases and controversies. Cases may materialize late,
or never, and courts may neglect to enforce the rightful supremacy concerns of
the United States.' 33 Congress can, within its enumerated powers, preempt state

131. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 20, 1787), in 10
PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note I11, at 64.
132. 2 RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 390 (Madison's

notes, July 17, 1787).
133.

See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 117, at 27

(Madison's notes, July 17, 1787); see also Kramer, supra note 110, at 653 n.180
(discussing Madison's sentiment and citing non-Convention sources). It bears emphasis
that "courts," to the Founders, principally meant state courts, subject to Supreme Court
review. The very real possibilitythat parochial judicial interpretations of compacts might
create strife rather than harmony among the states is an additional reason against reliance
on mere supremacy in the compact context. In the twentieth century, that possibility
prompted the Supreme Court to characterize compact law, first, as some kind of "law of
the Union" and, later, as unequivocally federal law. See Delaware River Joint Toll
Bridge Comm'n v. Colbum, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940) (approved compact constitutes
federal law); Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 26 (1950) (state court interpretation of state
constitution in conflict with compact presents federal question); Petty v. TennesseeMissouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275,278 (1959) (federal law governs interpretations
of compacts); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1981) (congressionally approved
compacts present federal question regardless of parties' understanding of compact terms);
New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 782 n.4 (1998) (federal courts not bound by state
court interpretation of compact). The broad extension of federal law andjurisdiction has
problems of its own and has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Note, ChartingNo Man's
Land: Applying Jurisdictionaland Choice ofLaw Doctrinesto InterstateCompacts, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1991 (1998); L. Mark Eichhom, Note, Cuyler v. Adams & the
Characterizationof Compact Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1991); David E. Engdahl,
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legislation and correct errors by displacing inconvenient state laws and (subconstitutional) judicial decisions, but-to anticipate a point that will shortly
emerge as the central justification for the negative-it may not always muster the
will or the energy to do so. Supremacy, in short, will produce a number of "false
negatives"--that is, unredressed offenses against national rights and
prerogatives.
Those institutional mistakes, however, are tolerable in the general run of
cases where inconvenient state laws might call for federal intervention.' The
institutional alternative would generate an unacceptable number of false positives
and, moreover, unacceptable institutional transaction costs. That, in a nutshell,
was the case against the general negative. The analysis flips, however, when we
have good grounds to suspect that a particular class of state activities spells
trouble. Under that scenario, the supremacy arrangement would produce huge
error costs, whereas the negative would produce few false positives. Consider
an obvious example, the exercise of concurrent state authority within the ambit
of the Commerce Clause: states will often enact protectionist measures disguised
as "police power" regulation. Such menaces to sister states and the Union,
however, are relatively rare compared to the great mass of police power
regulation. Under the supremacy arrangement of the Commerce Clause, we
permit those incursions-pending judicial or congressional
intervention-because the costs of subjecting all state legislation to
congressional preapproval are unacceptably high. Not so, however, with state
duties on tonnage or import tariffs. While these measures, too, fall under the
general description of "interstate commerce"-and, therefore, barring special
constitutional treatment, under the operation of the supremacy principle-they
are extremely likely to be protectionist and exploitative. Hence, the Constitution
subjects them to the negative.
While even a negative (or for that matter an unqualified prohibition on state
laws) cannot entirely preclude evasive state maneuvers, it does provide an added
safeguard. The evasion of an unequivocal negative by state legislatures or
judges requires more cleverness, factious spirit, and willfulness than does the
ordinary "police power" interference with interstate commerce. A state
legislature that violates the Import-Export Clause-or the Compact Clause, as

ConstructionofInterstateCompacts: A QuestionableFederalQuestion, 51 VA. L. REv.

987 (1965); see also Petty, 359 U.S. at 283-89 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Cuyler, 449
U.S. at 450-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
134. The paragraph in the text explicates the constitutional choice, not Madison's
position. Madison himself believed-based on his experience in the Virginia

Assembly-that the typical state legislature "enacted scores of laws, of which a few had
genuine merit but the rest were either inconsequential or positively harmful." Hobson,
supra note 112, at 224. The assumption that state legislatures chum out mostly garbage
might well warrant a comprehensive negative, so long as it can be provided at reasonable
cost. For reasons noted, though, the Convention rejected Madison's proposal.
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written-is unlikely to have done so inadvertently; it should be presumed to have
pushed the constitutional envelope. Likewise, a negative or absolute prohibition
disciplines courts, so far as possible. The sorting of competing state and federal
powers in areas of concurrent authority is a difficult task, and judicial mistakes
will be common. Misinterpreting a constitutional injunction against state duties
of tonnage or, for that matter, against any unapproved state agreement requires
willfulness or massive intellectual confusion. 35
The greatest and central difference between the negative and mere
supremacy, however, lies in the federal legislative dynamics. The failure of
Congress to assert federal supremacy in all or at least most instances where that
might be needed is a matter of institutional design, rather than an occasional lack
of will. The constitutional cure to the dangers of factionalism, famously
described in Madison's FederalistNo. 51, is to extend the sphere within which
factions must operate and to further hamper their operation, in that extended
sphere, through the separation of powers and elaborate supermajoritarian
safeguards-prominently, in the form of bicameral consent and a presidential
veto. These ingenious precautions are worth having--even at the price of
sacrificing some good laws 36 -so long as the task at hand lies, as mostly it does,
in preventing federal legislation from interfering with beneficial or at least
harmless activities. (Private orderings are the classic example: occasional
market failures are bound to pale in comparison to the horrors of an institutional
system that facilitates interest-group driven government intervention.) The
precautions fail, however, and in fact have the opposite of the intended effect,
when the objects of federal legislation spell trouble and energetic affirmative
action is called for-for instance, because partial legislation at the state level
endangers the interests of sister states. Put more directly, the constitutional
obstacles that prevent partial laws at the federal level will, under a mere
supremacy arrangement, hamper the national government's ability to redress
piggishness at the state level.

135. Moreover, an explicit constitutional prohibition (qualified or absolute) will
suppress a broad range of state activities that would otherwise become the stuff of
litigation. Marginal cases andjudicial misinterpretations will occur under anyrule; what
matters in choosing and evaluating the legal rules is the stuff that never makes it into
court.

136. The necessity of safeguarding against partial legislation is a principal defense
of bicameralism and the presidential veto in the Federalist Papers. For example, see
Hamilton's defense of the presidential veto as a safeguard against:
the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the
greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments ....
The
injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be

amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.
THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The constitutional solution we have inherited is to invert the default rule for
problematic classes of state laws. Mere supremacy must rely on the ability of the
political branches to stitch together a supermajority in defense of national
interests. With respect to the great mass of state legislation, that arrangement
will (hopefully) minimize institutional error on either side.' 37 The negative, in
contrast, compels the advocates of proposed state legislation, rather than their
opponents, to find the requisite supermajorities.'3 8 It is appropriate that they
should have to do so, for the state laws on which the negative operates come with
a heavy suspicion of menacing sister states and, hence, the Union. In this
fashion, the Constitution makes the safeguards against faction work once more
against factionalism's most dangerous tendencies at the state level.
C. Risk-Free Federalism?
The Supreme Court has never denied the existence of the institutional risks
that induced the Founders to subject any and all state agreements to a
congressional negative. Rather, the functionalists on and off the bench have
minimized those risks by painting the congressional negative as grossly
overinclusive even in the areas to which the Founders limited it.
The locus classicus is Justice Field's dictum in Virginia v. Tennessee. By

way of illustrating that a literal interpretation of the Compact Clause would
sweep far too broadly, Justice Field adduced four examples-one state's
purchase of a "small parcel of land," within its own boundaries, that is owned by
another state; a state's shipment of goods belonging to it through another state,
on mutually agreeable terms; an agreement among neighboring states to drain a
137. That, at any rate, is Madison's sanguine conclusion at the end of THE
FEDERALIST No. 51: "In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great
variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the
whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and
the general good." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 325 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).

138. Arguably, this overstates the point. Whereas affirmative federal legislation
is of course subject to presentment and presidential veto, the state activities listed in
Article I, Section 10 are subject only to the consent of the Congress, thus rendering
approval of compacts somewhat easier to obtain than ordinary legislation. The language,
though, has been interpreted, at least by the political branches, as requiring executive as
well as congressional consent. President Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed a congressional
consent resolution to a state compact, whereupon the resolution was amended and resubmitted to the President in an acceptable form. ZIMMERMAN & WENDELL, supra note
19, at 93-94. In other words, the Compact Clause has been understood to require
approval by Congress, acting in the way in which Congress ordinarily enacts
legislation-i.e., subject to presentment, veto, and possibly judicial review. On that
interpretation, the constitutional negative fully reverses the burden of producing a
supermajority.
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"malarious and disease-producing district" that crosses the border separating the
states; and state cooperation for the purpose of preventing a "threatened invasion
of cholera, plague, or other causes of sickness and death."' 39 In such cases,
Justice Field proclaimed, congressional consent can "hardly be deemed
essential"; indeed, to require it under a literal reading of the Compact Clause
would be "the height of absurdity."' 4
Justice Field's examples fall remarkably short of making their intended
point. In the first two examples, the states act as market participants and as
parties to a private-law contract, not as sovereign political entities. Such
activities should not fall under the Compact Clause under any construction. 141
The fourth example-the aversion of an imminent health threat-can be
plausibly construed as falling under an implied necessity exemption to the
Compacts Clause, in analogy to the clause of Article I, Section 10, immediately
following the Compact Clause, that permits the states to wage war, without
congressional consent, when they are under attack.142 As for the drainage of a
border-crossing swamp, one need not be an unreserved supporter of federal
wetlands regulation to recognize that the activity might very well be of interest
to the Congress. The swamp, for instance, might well surround a navigable
stream, in which case it would be of interest to, and under the jurisdiction
of, the
143
federal government, and, moreover, of interest to downstream states.

139. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893).
140. Id.
141. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 88 n. 131.
142. Madison, in advocating an across-the-board negative, was willing to grant an
exception in cases of urgency. See e.g., I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, 168 (Madison's notes) (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Arguably, the explicit
constitutional provision for a "necessity defense" in case of war is an argument against
inferring or implying it in the Compact Clause. I do not find that objection fully
persuasive: the need for such an exception is simply more obvious in the case of physical
attack. In any event, Justice Fields' example has force only if the Compact Clause is read
to require priorcongressional consent. At the time of Virginia v. Tennessee, however,
it was well established that congressional consent may be given after the fact. See, e.g.,
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) I (1823). That holding was explicitly reaffirmed in
Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 521 ("[W]here the agreement relates to a matter which
could not well be considered until its nature is fully developed, it is not perceived why
the consent may not be subsequently given.").
143. Cf Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (2000), extends to all waters connected to navigable waters but not to isolated
ponds or wetlands). Justice Field clearly intended to supply an example of a state
agreement that no sensible person could possibly oppose. The fact that we now see
valuable wetlands where Justice Field and his contemporaries saw murderous swamps
should caution against exempting state arrangements from the Compact Clause on the
grounds of their "obviously" beneficial effects.
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Justice Field's difficulty in identifying more compelling examples is a sign
of the times, or perhaps the Justice's limited imagination. Virginia v. Tennessee
was decided before the uniform state law movement; before the Progressive
endeavor to marry local control with national ambitions; before the emergent
efforts to find "regional solutions for regional problems," such as metropolitan
areas that transcend state boundaries; before the distribution of federal income
tax proceeds under grants-in-aid programs to the states-in short, before the
cooperative enthusiasms that would soon mow down federalism's forms and
formalities. Justice Field's re-interpretation of the Compact Clause in Virginia
v. Tennessee is at bottom committed to a dual federalism: it seeks to separate the
federal government from the states, by discouraging a Compact Clause
interpretation that might prompt needless entanglement. The examples that
purport to make the case for a limited, functional analysis of the Compact Clause
are thoroughly traditional ones-police power stuff that states had done since the
founding and, indeed, before the founding. Precisely not the sorts of activities
that states might want to undertake in a modem society beyond the Founders'
ken and contemplation. For all its flaws, Virginia v. Tennessee sought to capture
the Founders' intention, not to re-interpret the Compact Clause for the perceived
needs of a modem society.
Later generations conveniently overlooked the context of Virginia v.
Tennessee and instead instrumentalized its dictum for cooperative ends. The
idea that Justice Field, that diehard common lawyer and dual federalist, should
be mobilized for the Progressive enterprise is ironic, but not altogether
unintelligible: if the Compact Clause is overbroad even with respect to the sorts
of state agreements the Founders did have in mind, why should the Clause apply
to new, emerging state agreements, spawned and necessitated by an increasingly
complex and interdependent industrial society, that the Founders could not
possibly have contemplated?
To put the rhetorical question into its most tenable declarative form: the
universe of unproblematic state agreements has expanded to the point of
justifying a turn from the congressional negative to ordinary supremacy. If the
Compact Clause negative operates-contrary to the Founders' fears-on a
universe of transactions that, on balance, do more good than harm, then the
objections that were successfully voiced at the Convention against the general
negative may also apply to the narrower negative for state compacts-undue and
unnecessary interference with affairs that concern only the states; useless
demands on an already over-extended Congress; a needless nationalization of
regional problems.
On that theory, the U.S. Steel Court may have been right, in a functional
(though obviously not a textual) sense, to revert to the supremacy arrangement.
If, on the other hand, state agreements do pose special risks, the calculus
becomes more complicated: the functional inquiry turns into a search for a
Compact Clause rule that would excise those special risks without, at the same
time, wiping out the gains that might be had from state cooperation.
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IV. THE RISKS OF COOPERATION

The most plausible case for lifting the congressional negative, I suggested
at the outset, rests on a transaction cost model. States, no less than individuals,
can strike Coasean bargains and realize gains from trade, provided the
transaction costs are sufficiently low.'
The Compact Clause negative, the
argument goes, drives up transaction costs; it should therefore be jettisoned.
Instead of erecting obstacles, the central authority should define the states'
property rights, enforce their bargains, minimize the transaction costs, and
otherwise stay out of the way.
Upon inspection, this functional case for a latitudinarian Compact Clause
proves untenable. The transaction cost model embodies non-trivial assumptions
about property rights, externalities, competition, and agency. In government
bargains, those assumptions cannot be taken for granted and are in fact quite
unlikely to obtain. We therefore have no reason to assume that state agreements
will automatically enhance efficiency. That observation alone casts doubt on a
sanguine functional view of the Compact Clause.
One can go further, though: a sensible transaction cost perspective suggests
that state agreements pose special risks-that is, risks over and above those that
attend to the individual, uncoordinated exercise of state sovereignty in a federal
republic. Those risks are interrelated and partially congruent. For purposes of
exposition and analysis, I classify them as follows: (1) state bargaining with
federal rights and prerogatives; (2) the imposition of externalities on third-party
states; (3) cartelization, meaning state agreements in restraint of economic and
political competition; and (4) agency problems, meaning a diffusion of political
accountability (often, though not always, through the creation of multistate
authorities). Jointly and severally, these distinct risks warrant something more
in the way of federal safeguards than mere supremacy-something like the
Compact Clause. Though couched in the language of modem transaction cost
and public choice theory, the analysis vindicates the Founders' constitutional
intuitions.

144. The theoretical origin of "Coasean" bargains that re-arrange entitlements

relative to the legal background norms is of course Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960). The general assumption is that minimal

transaction costs will routinely generate Coasean bargains. For a critical discussion of
this assumption, see Robert D. Cooter, The Cost of Coase, I1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-20
(1982). For an explicit (and appropriately circumspect) application to interstate
compacts, see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rulesfor TransboundaryPollution,46 DUKE

L.J. 931 (1997). For a sophisticated analysis of horizontal jurisdictional cooperation,
coupling a Coasean analysis with a game-theoretical approach, see ROBERT D. COOTER,
THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 108-15 (2000).
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A. Compact Risks
1. Uncertain Rights
Coasean bargains presume that actors bargain with what they own. Put
differently, efficient bargaining presupposes clearly defined property rights.
"States' rights," however, are not so defined, and cannot be so defined.
Federalism means that the national government and the states exercise sovereign
authority over the same citizens and territory, which in turn means that their
respective rights overlap. State compacts and agreements, therefore, pose a risk
that states will bargain with assets that belong not to them but rather, or also, to
the federal government.
Boundary settlements-for much of American history, the most common
form of state compacts-provide an example. A bilateral bargain through which
the Commonwealth of Virginia acquires half of West Virginia's territory may be
best for all concerned (at least in the party states), but it would also affect the
allocation of seats in the House of Representatives. (For all we know, the seats
may have been a bargaining chip in the transaction, if not its point.)' 45 The
bargain need not run afoul of the U.S. Steel test: it does not enhance the power
of "the states," collectively, quoad the national government, and it does not
adversely affect the political power (in the House of Representatives) of any state
except West Virginia-which explicitly agreed to the deal. That, however,
proves only that the test is wrong. West Virginia's seats in the House are hers,
but not in the same sense in which Coase's farmer owns his cattle. They are part
of a larger institutional arrangement and agreement, and, therefore, may not be
alienated or acquired without congressional consent. The same is true of all
powers in the federal domain, including those that are concurrently exercised by
the states.
To be sure, states may also encroach upon the federal domain when acting
individually-for instance, by erecting obstacles to interstate commerce under
the guise of police power regulation. The danger of incursion, however, is
particularly pronounced when those powers are exercised by agreement. States
are naturally disinclined to surrender their own sovereignty-that is, rights that
are indisputably and exclusively theirs-to another state or to a compact agency.
145. The point of the admittedly unrealistic hypothetical is simply to illustrate the
unworkability of the U.S. Steel test. As a matter of curious historical fact, the possibility
of a state-sponsored leveraged buy-out of a sister state was raised in a nineteenth century
boundary case arising under the Compact Clause: "By the compact of 1820, Tennessee
acquired nearly half a million of acres... ; if she could go ten miles north, she might two
hundred, and purchase out a sister state, sapping the foundations of the Union." Poole
v. Fleeger's Lessee, 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 185, 206 (1837) (John Catron, counsel for
defendant in error), quoted in Engdahl, Interstate Arrangements, supra note 13, at 81
n.82.
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They are much more likely to bargain with rights which they exercise at the
national government's sufferance. The MTC, for a splendid example, does not
attempt to harmonize the tax treatment of wholly domestic transactions, or for
that matter the tax credits and abatements through which states attempt to attract
business-even though a reciprocal agreement on such matters might well
improve locational efficiency, reduce transaction costs, and improve the affairs
of state governments. 1" Instead, the Compact governs only the taxation of
interstate transactions-the concurrent domain of the federal government.
Concurrently held rights are not only worth less than full sovereignty rights
(because they may be abrogated at any time); their exchange also holds a
prospect of defeating the national government's claims through a kind of joint
preemption in reverse. State regulatory compacts very often come about under
the threat of impending federal legislation-in other words, when (and because)
a sluggish Congress is approaching the point of exercising federal supremacy.
The creation of the MTC, for a prominent example, "was more a reaction to the
'evils' of possible federal intervention than a pure reaction to the problems of
'
diversity."147
Almost by definition, such "defensive" state compacts regulate
issues that, in the language of the U.S. Steel Court, are of "interest" to the
national government both in a theoretical and in an immediate, practical
sense-and precisely not matters that arguably lie in the states' own exclusive
domain.
There is no reason to expect that (state) bargaining with non-exclusive
rights, without the consent of the co-owners, is efficient. Precisely when states'
rights are non-exclusive, however, they are most likely to become a subject of
state bargaining. For that reason, state agreements are, as a class, more suspect
than ordinary, unilateral exercises of state powers. Unclear property rights
assignments imply that the co-owners of those rights must be consulted on their
exchange. The Compact Clause, as written, ensures that consultation. Its
modem interpretation does not.

146. Unlike protectionist measures that discriminate against outside parties, state
favoritism (such as subsidies and selective tax exemptions) is generally not thought to
violate the dormant Commerce Clause, on the theory that the costs of such measures fall
entirely, or very nearly so, on the state's own citizens. Few economists, however,
consider this industrial-policy race to the bottom efficient, and state officials have long
complained about the effects on their treasuries. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Commerce
ClauseRestraints on State Tax Incentives, 82 MINN. L. REV. 413 (1997); Melvin Burstein
& Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic War Among the States, 10
STATE TAx NOTES 1895 (1996). Even so, the MTC has confined its mandate to interstate
taxation.
147. Sharpe, State Taxation, supra note 78, at 244.
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2. Externalities
Consistent with a regime of clearly assigned property rights, the Coasean
model assumes that the parties will bargain over externalities and assign
responsibility and costs one way or the other-as distinct from fobbing them off
on a third party. A federal system of three or more states, however, enables two
(or more) states to inflict externalities that neither of them, acting on its own,
may be able to induce. Consider Justice Field's example of draining a malarious
bi-state swamp: while the benefits of that bargain would (by definition) not be
attainable by compacting States A and B, acting individually, neither would a
possible externality-water loss-to downstream State C.148 Put differently: the
qualified prohibition on state compacts provides protection against state
collusion and exploitation. A compact-free environment permits the downstream
state to obtain water from one of several upstream states at something close to
a competitive price, whereas an upstream state compact creates a monopoly and
a high risk of exploitation.
3. Cartelization
The externalities attendant to state agreements in restraint of trade
preoccupied the Founders. For instance, New Jersey, lacking a viable port, was
at the mercy of New York and Philadelphia, both of which taxed goods destined
for New Jersey. Alluding to a then-current metaphor, Madison compared the
state to "a cask bottled up at each end" and North Carolina, likewise lacking a
deep-sea port, to a "patient bleeding at both arms.' 1 49 By virtue of their
resources, location, or history, some states will always be in a more
advantageous position than others; that cannot be helped. What can be helped
is the anti-competitive and, in particular, the collusive exploitation of that
advantage. 5 °

148. The analysis holds under any assumption about political dynamics at the state
level. States A and B may want to push the externalities downstream for any number of
reasons-local producer demand; an authentic reflection of domestic voter demand for
public goods; or the sheer impossibility of ascertaining third-party externalities. See
Copas, Jr., supra note 30, at 722-23.
149. Madison, supra note 45, at 7.
150. See Saul Levmore, InterstateExploitationand JudicialIntervention, 69 VA.

L.REv. 563 (1983) [hereinafter Levmore, InterstateExploitation]. Levmore argues that
the prevention of interstate exploitation (as distinct from non-exploitative state
interferences with interstate commerce) should serve and, by and large, has served as the
foundation of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the dormant Commerce Clause
and related constitutional provisions. Id. Levmore notes the Compact Clause "can be
interpreted to reflect the theme of [his] article." Id. at 570 n. 17. When states collude,
exploitation of sister states is so likely "that Congress is called in to review the
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New Jersey's particular predicament was remedied through the ImportExport Clause, 5 ' rendering the Compact Clause redundant in this case. (IfNew
York and Pennsylvania may not individually levy duties on goods destined for
or coming from New Jersey, they may not do so by agreement, either.) State
cartels to the detriment of third states need not, however, involve practices that
are forbidden by an independent constitutional provision. When a particular
commodity-say, oil-is available in ten states but vital to all fifty, the producer
states' advantage may cause a problem of a constitutional magnitude even when
competition among the supplier states prevents the exploitation of consumer
states.' If the suppliers form an oil compact to restrict output and raise prices,
the problem is clear and manifest.
Such a domestic OPEC did in fact exist, complete with its own Saudi
Arabia-Texas, which at the time of the formation of the Interstate Compact to
Conserve Oil and Gas in 1935 controlled about half of all then-known U.S. oil
reserves. That state compact, like other natural resource compacts, 5 3 was
formed with congressional approval,' 54 and its history nicely illustrates the
purposes and effects of the Compact Clause negative. Under the U.S. Steel rule,
the oil-producing states could have established and managed their cartel unless
and until Congress affirmatively exercised its powers under the Commerce
Clause and the Supremacy Clause. The benefits of the arrangement, though,
were more concentrated-on the producer cartel's member-states-than the costs
to the consumer states. Affirmative legislation would have forced anti-cartel
states to overcome that hurdle, as well as the federal supermajority requirements.
The Compact Clause negative, in contrast, forced the supplier states to attract
votes from consumer states (through logrolling, or by diluting the cartelizing

arrangement at the outset." Id. The exposition, here and below, of interstate exploitation
as a Compact Clause risk is consistent with Levmore's suggestion and analysis.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be

absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."). See also Michelin Tire Corp.
v.Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1976).
152. The clearest example is the imposition of severance taxes for raw materials.
See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (sustaining coal
severance tax against constitutional challenge). The constitutionality of such taxes under

the dormant Commerce Clause is a difficult question. For excellent discussions see
Levmore, Interstate Exploitation, supra note 150, at 611-18; Stephen F. Williams,
Severance Taxes &Federalism: The Role ofthe Supreme Court in Preservinga National
Common Market for Energy Supplies, 53 COLO. L. REv. 281.(1982).
153. For example, three marine fisheries compacts were formed during the 1940s.
For an account of the first and largest of these compacts, establishing the Atlantic States
Marine Fisheries Commission, see WELDON V. BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 22-3 3 (1965).

154. Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, 49 Stat. 939 (1935).
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effects). That dynamic prompted earnest and vigorous assurances, on the part
of the producer states, that their arrangement was not a price-fixing cartel (which
is of course precisely what it was, though not a terribly successful one)."'5
Nonetheless, a requirement for periodic congressional reapproval contained in
the Compact generated increasingly stringent federal oversight and control over
the Compact and its administration.' 56
The threat of cartelization extends not only to the exploitation of natural
resource advantages and bottlenecks (such as deep-sea ports) but also to policy
arrangements. Suppose that fifteen labor-dominated states in a nation of twenty
states wish to maintain "living wage" requirements within their own
jurisdictions. Suppose further that they agree, by compact, to "harmonize" their
living wage requirements and moreover, to purchase goods exclusively from
manufacturers that (a) pay the agreed-upon wage and (b) refuse to do business
with suppliers that do not. Under suitable conditions-for example, substantial
market power and high exit costs-the cartelists may succeed in wiping out the
competitive advantages that the five dissenting states have chosen to preserve.
Or suppose several states-those that are not domiciles for large, integrated
insurance companies-agree to deny a business license to any insurance
company that refuses to write policies, for any business line (such as car
insurance), in any state of the union.'57 The exercise of federal supremacy to
trump such cartels would have to overcome supermajoritarian obstacles. The
Compact Clause reverses that burden and, in doing so, provides a measure of
security against collusive interstate exploitation.
4. Agency and Delegation Problems
Pure transaction cost models presuppose a symmetry of incentives, if not
actual identity, between principals and agents.
Transactions among
governments, however, may involve significant agency problems. Such
problems are particularly likely to arise under intergovernmental cartel
arrangements. In fact, every such cartel will present agency and delegation
issues.

155. BARTON, supra note 153, at 12-17. The cartel's effectiveness was hampered

by the emergence of new oil-producing states, which undermined the chief producer
state's (Texas) ability to maintain supply and price discipline. Id. at 16-17.
156. BARTON,supra note 153, at 14-15. While the compact still exists, the radically
different market conditions of the early 1970s rendered its output ceilings superfluous.
I ROBERT L. BRADLY, JR., OIL, GAS, & GOVERNMENT: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 104-06
(1996).
157. Several individual states have imposed equivalent exit restrictions on
insurance companies. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 161-65 (1992).
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Agency problems are probably negligible when state bargains are one-shot
deals. An agreement by two states to demarcate more precisely an agreed-upon
boundary-the subject of Virginia v. Tennessee-is'an example:
the
benefits-such as the avoidance of needless disputes in the future-are roughly
symmetrical. Barring unusual circumstances, neither side has reason to expect
that the other side will benefit disproportionately. Legislative approval in the
compact states confirms a final assignment of mutual rights and obligations. The
deal can be implemented without extensive cooperation and monitoring by the
parties. Under those circumstances, there is no reason to suspect an asymmetry
of incentives between the governors and the governed.
Regulatory state bargains, in contrast, often involve the allocation of funds
and, consequently, disputes over the parties' relative (financial and institutional)
contributions." 8
Such compacts typically attempt to regulate complex
arrangements that are subject to change, either because natural circumstances
change (as is often the case in compacts dealing with water rights) or because
private actors adjust their conduct in response to new (compact) law. Moreover,
questions may arise as to how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed.
Ex ante, the distributive question invites strategic gamesmanship;" 9 ex post, it
compels the parties to monitor each other's performance and to establish
formulas and mechanisms for the periodic allocation of contributions and gains.
The costs of doing so rise in proportion to the number of players and the
complexity and duration of the cooperative venture.
The monitoring costs are high even for the agents, meaning state
legislatures. For the citizen-principals, the costs are prohibitive. By way of a
simple example, let five states (A-E) be the exclusive producers of consumer
good "X." Powerful producers in each state would very much like their
government to increase the price of X, but cannot do so because consumers
would purchase more X from one of the four rival states. Suppose, however, that
the governors of A-E agree to impose a surcharge on X-sales, to be shared by the
state government and the producers (in some proportion): all producers and all
governments will be better off. All consumer-citizens will be worse off.'6

158. Dixon, Jr., supra note 20, at 58.
159. COOTER, supra note 144, at 60-62, 110-12.
160. Agricultural compacts establishing minimum price regulations fit this pattern.
See, e.g., Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, 7 U.S.C. § 7526 (2000), amendment &
reauthorizationpending, H.R. 324, 108th Cong. (2003). Those compacts provide
another fine illustration of the salience and the dynamics of the congressional consent
requirement. Opponents ofthe regulations-competing states and consumers in compact
states-would be unable to mobilize a majority for their dismantlement. Dairy compacts,
however, are generally understood to require congressional consent, and that
circumstance has compelled the producers interests in compact states to find the requisite
majorities in Congress. They have not always managed to do so. The Northeast Dairy
Compact, for example, expired in 2001 and is still awaiting reauthorization.
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Rent-seeking at the state level, of course, is an ordinary phenomenon, as is
the temptation of beggar-thy-neighbor policies. State agreements, however,
exacerbate those risks. First, state cartels will on some margin dampen
jurisdictional competition and dilute the citizens' exit rights that would otherwise
discipline rent-seeking. Second, a state (A) that intends to beggar its neighbor
(B) does not really intend to beggar B, as a state; it intends to beggar B's
citizens. State B, meanwhile, has the same purpose in mind vis-i-vis A. The
agents of A and B, in other words, have symmetrical incentives to exploit each
other's citizens. 6 ' Unless goverment agents are perfectly monitored, state
agreements provide them with opportunities to procure, for govemments,
benefits that neither state could procure individually-while exposing citizens
to risks that they would not incur if such agreements were subject to special
impediments, or prohibited altogether.
Compacts seeking to establish an on-going cooperative regime-as distinct
from agreements that conclusively settle mutual claims and rights-virtually
always require a standing board or commission, because somebody must monitor
the parties' performance, secure their cooperation, and allocate and distribute the
gains. Such bodies exhibit delegation problems in a particularly acute form and,
in practice, have consistently been found to elude democratic control and
accountability. Beginning with the scandal-plagued New York-New Jersey Port
Authority-the first compact commission, and Frankfurter's and Landis's
paradigmatic example of fruitful state cooperation 6 2 -compact commissions
have proven to be poorly supervised even by state legislatures (not to mention
voters) and thus prone to mismanagement and bureaucratic empire-building. 6 a

161. They also have symmetrical incentives to exploit their own citizens by

disguising the true cost of government programs. The imposition of a sales tax (more
precisely, use tax) collection obligation on out-of-state sellers is an example of this
stratagem.
162. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause,supra note 19, at 697-98. On
the scandals and mismanagement at the Port Authority, which prompted a congressional
investigation and an acrimonious political confrontation between the Authority and the
Congress, see Emmanual Celler, Congress, Compactsand InterstateAuthorities,26 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 682 (1961).
163. The most impressive empirical demonstration of the diffusion of
accountability and loss of public control that characterizes compact commissions is
MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 308-09
(1971); see also Hasday, supra note 34; and Note, ChartingNo Man's Land,supranote
133, at 1995, n.29.
Compact commissions somewhere between the national government and the states
pose serious constitutional questions even when they are created or, as the case may be,
approved by Congress. See Virginia v. U.S. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing constitutional questions presented by Ozone Transport Commission
established under Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 7511 c; case decided on independent
statutory grounds). In these instances, however, the commission's life can be terminated
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The notion that a state legislature can bind its successors by consenting to a state
agreement that can be terminated only with the consent of other states-as is the
case under compacts that do not provide for the option of a unilateral
withdrawal-raises additional problems of democratic governance and
accountability. 64
B. Constitutionalism
The risks just identified are hardly unique to state compacts. Congressional
legislation-notjust compact approval, but legislationperse-poses very similar
risks. Federal statutes routinely favor some states over others, substitute policy
cartels for state competition, and exploit through (vertical) schemes of
intergovernmental cooperation the "slack" that is produced by the imperfect
monitoring of state and federal politicians.165 Nor has Congress proven immune
to the temptation of establishing interstate agencies off the constitutional charts,
from the Tennessee Valley Authority to the Ozone Transport Commission."'
by the single, superior body that created it in the first instance. (States may, by virtue of
the same logic, create inferior counties and districts and delegate their police powers to
those entities.) In contrast, states cannot unilaterally terminate the life of an interstate
agency they have helped to create. Thus, such agencies pose a special and particularly
urgent delegation problem. Dixon, Jr., supra note 20, at 73-75.
164. Hasday, supra note 34, at 2-3. Some scholars have argued that cooperative
state arrangements requiring continuous cooperation and standing compact commissions
are beyond the purview of the Compact Clause. The Founders, those commentators
claim, intended the Clause to apply to agreements that conclusively determine the rights
between the parties; agreements that fail to do so should ipsofacto be exempt from the
Clause. See, e.g., Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 97-101; White,
supranote 80, at 458-59, 462. The Multistate Tax Commission advanced this argument
in the U.S. Steel litigation. Brief for Appellee at 36, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (No. 76-635). That, however, was the one argument that
the Supreme Court opinion (which was, in virtually all other respects, a toned-down
recitation of the MTC's brief) did not endorse-perhaps, because the Court had already
held state compacts of whatever description to be effectively exempt from the
congressional consent requirement; perhaps, because the claim was too much even for
a Court that was otherwise unperturbed by constitutional considerations. Off-the-charts
compact commissions are obviously more problematic than run-of-the-mill boundary
settlements. The fact that such fourth-branch-of-government constructs would have
blown the Founders' minds cannot justify their exclusion from the Compact Clause.
165. The potential for bilateral exploitation of agency problems and collusion
between state and federal officials is the central argument against the federal
"commandeering" of state officials. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183
(1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 (1997). For the application of this
argument to the Compact Clause, see infra notes 347-53 and accompanying text.
166. See Tennesse Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831 dd (2000);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 751 lc (2000) (Ozone Transport Commission); see also
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Obviously, Congress cannot trample on federal prerogatives, but that advantage
is compensated, in a manner of speaking, by comparable disadvantages attendant
to federal legislation-for instance, the undesirability of a uniform national
solution for problems that may be regional in scope. In that light, we may wish
to tolerate high-risk state bargains, rather than cramming compacts, or issues that
could be addressed through compacts, into the United States Congress.
The objection has a certain surface plausibility, but it misses
constitutionalism's point. Under any federal system, states will tend toward
parochialism and mutual exploitation. No constitution can suppress political
gamesmanship without abolishing states as quasi-autonomous entities. What a
constitution can and must do, however, is to coordinate the games, such that the
equilibria remain within a range that is generally perceived as tolerably fair and
efficient.' 67 To that end, a constitution allocates powers and specifies the
composition and procedures of the coordinating institutions.
Our own Constitution ameliorates the specific risks of state compacts in two
related ways. First, the congressional approval requirement guarantees that every
state will be informed of, and be heard on, sister states' agreements. In this
manner, the Compact Clause reduces the costs each state would otherwise incur
in monitoring and countermanding cartels, collusion, and combinations adverse
to its own interests. Second, supermajority requirements provide a measure of
protection against parochial state combinations to the detriment of the nonconsenting states.
One can plausibly argue that these are the rules that states would choose
behind a pre-constitutional veil of ignorance. The protections are not cost-free,
because they preclude some bargains that some states might at some future time
find in their interest. That price, however, may be worth paying for effective
protection against the horrendous risk of becoming a victim of collusion among
(supposedly) sister states. In any event, the Compact Clause negative is the
coordination mechanism that the Founders did in fact choose, and if
constitutionalism means anything, it means that the players may not defect to
some other mechanism when that happens to be in their short-term interest. A
federal constitution must ensure that bargains among states are made in the
agreed-upon place and manner, and nowhere else. A constitution that fails to
hold the players to their pre-commitment strategy is a mere treaty of
convenience. "'
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338

(1999) (creating incentives for formation of state insurance regulatory compacts).
167. On the notion of a constitution as a means of coordination see Peter C.
Ordeshook, ConstitutionalStability, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 137 (1992).
168. No federal system permits unsupervised, separate side-agreements among
member-states. See, e.g., German Constitution art. 32(3) (authorizing states to conclude

treaties on matters within their legislative competence and "with the consent of the
federal government" [Bundesregierung]. Although the article speaks of treaties with
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V. MULTISTATE TAXATION: A SECOND LOOK
This Part applies the preceding analysis of compact risks to the Multistate
Tax Compact of US. Steel fame; the following Part VI performs the same
operation on the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement between tobacco
manufacturers and state attorneys general. Both agreements are cartels; both
entail-and are in fact driven by-the imposition of substantial externalities;

foreign countries, it is commonly understood to apply also to treaties among the
Laender). Even looser, non-constitutional confederations typically preclude such
defections. A highly instructive contemporary example is the European Union. EC
Treaty art. II (ex 5a) provides as follows:
I.
Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between
themselves may be authorized [by the European Council] to make use
of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down bythis Treaty,
provided that the cooperation proposed:
(a) does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of
the Community;
(b) does not affect Community policies, actions or programmes;
(c) does not concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between
nationals of Member States;
(d) remains within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community
by this Treaty; and
(e) does not constitute a discrimination or restriction of trade between
Member States and does not distort the conditions of competition
between the latter.
Id.
See also TEU art. 43,44 (ex K. 15, K. 16). Art. 11 is a kind ofCompact Clause-plus.
All member-state cooperation within the scope of the European Treaties is subject to
approval by the Council, and even the Council may approve cooperative ventures only
under very limited conditions. See, e.g., Jo Shaw, The Treaty ofAmsterdam: Challenges
of Flexibility and Legitimacy, 4 EUR. L.J. 63 (1998). The universe of unapprovable
cooperative ventures is equivalent to the U.S. Constitution's absolute prohibition on state
treaties. The list of features that render proposed cooperation unapprovable, and
especially the injunction against cartel arrangements in restraint of interstate trade, runs
parallel to the compact risks explicated in this Part.
Article Il1-most of which was added to the EC Treaty in the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1999)-attempts to facilitate closer cooperation among EU members so inclined,
without having the pace of integration dictated by the slowest member. (For a brief
discussion see STEPHEN WEATHERILL& PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW 23-27 (3d ed. 1999)
and sources cited therein at nn.74-79). That endeavor, though, runs up against the
baseline premises and purposes of the European Treaties-non-discrimination, equality
among member-states, and the supermajority requirements and other procedural
protections that the established European institutions afford dissident member-states.
The narrow scope of EC Treaty Article 11 reflects a jealous effort to safeguard those
protections. In the same fashion, the Compact Clause precludes states from creating a
constitution at variance with the one we actually have.
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both pose massive agency and delegation problems; both infringe on the
constitutionally protected interests of the union and of sister states. Both
agreements, and all similar state agreements present and future, are
unconstitutional under any reasonable Compact Clause analysis.
A. Compact Risks
1. The MTC as a Tax Cartel
Like any decentralized tax system, the state taxation of interstate business
income abounds with coordination problems." 9 The Supreme Court's decision
in PortlandCement, 7 ' permitting the "fair apportionment" of interstate business
income in every state where the taxed entity has a "nexus," entailed that a single
sale might be taxed in four different states, each time under a different allocation
and apportionment formula. 7' Thus, business income could easily be taxed on
more than 100 percent of its base. Paradoxically (and worse, from the states'
perspective), taxable income could escape taxation altogether.
The MTC's stated mission, as noted, is to address these problems through
political harmonization. From the outset, though, the Compact was widely
viewed as an attempt to establish a tax cartel. By the time of the U.S. Steel
litigation, the MTC Commission had acquired an "image as the agent of a group
of small states trying to increase their revenues by 'feeding off' 'eastern'
businesses,"172 meaning businesses commercially domiciled in the eastern states.
A simple thought experiment suggests that these impressions accurately reflect
the MTC's nature and raison d'etre.
Tax coordination problems can in principle be solved without a political
supra-state regulatory institution: states could agree, on a reciprocal basis, to tax
all business income only in the company's domicile state, meaning the
company's principal place ofbusiness or its state of incorporation. 73 Such a rule
of origin or "mutual recognition" (as it is called by the European Union, which
applies the principle to certain regulatory matters) 174 largely obviates the need for
169. Long before the Multistate Tax Compact, Frankfurter and Landis discussed
state tax administration as a fruitful area for state cooperation. Frankfurter &Landis, The
Compact Clause, supra note 19, at 704. For an identical, contemporaneous suggestion,
see WARREN, supra note 8, at 72.
170. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)
(briefly discussed supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text).
171. Sharpe, State Taxation, supra note 78, at 238.
172. Sharpe, State Taxation, supra note 78, at 274 (footnote omitted).
173. I assume for purposes of illustration that all taxed businesses are U.S.
corporations and that all their income is earned in the U.S. Multinational corporations
and operations complicate but do not materially change the analysis.
174. The literature on mutual recognition within the European Union has reached
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continuous political harmonization. While secondary questions (such as the
definition of corporate subsidiaries) may require coordination, the origin rule is
essentially self-enforcing: a company that receives a tax claim from a nondomicile state would obtain an injunction, and that would be the end of the
matter. Mutual recognition, however, implies uninhibited tax competition.
States would compete for business by lowering taxes and, all else equal, taxes
would drop everywhere. If the domicile rule is the state of incorporation, the
equilibrium tax rate is zero.
Naturally, states do not desire that outcome. In fact, it was precisely the
traditional allocation of business income to domicile states that prompted the
creation of the MTC by mostly small states west of the Mississippi. (Those
"market states," whose leading role earned the Compact its reputation as a tax
cartel, have remained the backbone of the MTC's membership. Eastern
corporate domicile states-New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia-never became full MTC members.) " ' Market states benefit from tax
apportionment (rather than allocation), which subjects corporate income to
taxation in any destination jurisdiction where a company does business,
regardless of the company's domicile and structure. Complete apportionment of
business income will completely eviscerate tax competition with respect to firm
location. Theoretically, uniform apportionment will also capture, for taxation
purposes, no less (and no more) than 100 percent of total business income. A
corollary of the full apportionment rule is a principle of unitary taxation, which
treats a corporation's subsidiaries as a single entity for purposes of taxation.
This device prevents corporations from escaping taxation through clever
corporate restructuring. Put less charitably, unitary taxation enables a state to
capture a foreign corporation's income even if the corporation's subsidiary in the
state earned no income or even incurred losses.
The Multistate Tax Commission has favored apportionment and unitary
taxation ab ovo.'76 It has pushed these principles to the outer limits permitted by

torrential proportions, especially in European journals. A readily accessible overview is
Wolfgang Kerber, InterjurisdictionalCompetition Within the European Union, 23

217 (2000).
175. Over time, the MTC developed "associate" and "sovereignty" memberships,
which do not require enactment of--or compliance with-the Compact. For the MTC's
description see http://www.mtc.gov/ABOUTMTC/Aboutmtc3.htm (last updated Jan. 27,
2003). Some non-Compact states have availed themselves of these opportunities. See
Multistate Tax Commission, at http://www.mtc.gov/#membership (listing current
membership) (last visited Apr. 8, 2003).
176. Article IVof the Multistate Tax Compact in substance constitutes the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA") and, with it, a destination test for
the calculation and apportionment of retail sale business income. Grossly
oversimplifying a complicated reality, if a New York company earns twenty percent of
its income from sales in California, its income will for tax purposes be apportioned on
FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
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federal law and constitutional constraints, and occasionally beyond those
limits.'
The MTC's purpose, in other words, is not tax harmonization
simpliciter. Rather, its purpose is to achieve tax harmonization, while
suppressing (locational)tax competition. One can quarrel over the extent to
which the MTC has achieved that objective, and one can plausibly argue that the
compact cannot fully succeed. '8 But the MTC's nature as a tax cartel is beyond
peradventure.
2. Externalities
Obviously, the MTC Commission cannot impose its rules on non-member
states. It can, however, dissipate some of the non-member states' competitive
advantages. The U.S. Steel Court understood this point; Justice White's dissent
made it explicitly.'
Non-business dividend income, for instance, had
traditionally been allocated to domicile states for purposes of taxation. Many of
the big domicile states (such as New York) exempted such income from taxation.
The MTC moved toward apportionment of dividend income among the states,
thereby diluting tax competition on this margin and dissipating the non-taxing
states' advantage.
Justice Powell's majority opinion readily conceded the point, but responded
that the economic effects of the MTC's dividend regime on non-member states
were no different from the "pressure" that states routinely experience as a result
of regulatory or tax decisions made by other states. 80 That is a lot like saying
that a private firm need not fear price-fixing among its competitors because the
competitors are permitted to take unilateral actions that might put the firm out of
business anyway. If the private market analogy fails to persuade, re-consider the
analogy of physical interstate externalities: the unregulated use of a waterway
may leave a downstream state dry, because upstream states will individually
over-exploit the resource. It does not follow, however, that the upstream states
may agree on an allocation that deprives the downstream state of water. 81
Interstate externalities are one thing. Externalities imposed by state agreement
are a different beast altogether.

that basis-even if the company has only a nominal presence in California.
177. See, e.g., JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, I STATE
TAXATION 9-85 (3d ed. 1998) (MTC definition of business income "in the context of
dividends appears overbroad both from a statutory and constitutional standpoint").
178. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
179. "[N]on-Compact States can be placed at a competitive disadvantage by the
Multistate Tax Compact." U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,
495 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 477-78.
181. See infra notes 324-25.
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3. Agency and Delegation
Under the MTC's joint audit and enforcement provisions, the Commission
may subpoena any person beyond the borders of a member state requesting such
a subpoena; under certain circumstances, it may also conduct joint audits sua
sponte. 82 These powers-which, contrary to the U.S. Steel Court's
representations, 8 3 "clearly exceed those of any member acting alone"' 84-create
a situation in which political responsibility for a highly coercive exercise of
sovereign authority gets lost in an intragovemmental shuffle. 5 The MTC
plaintiffs provided compelling, unrebutted evidence of proceedings in which
companies confronted a bewildering array of MTC and state auditors with
86
uncertain and conflicting claims of authority.1
Similar problems characterize the Commission's regulatory authority. In
the U.S. Steel litigation, the MTC described its regulations as inconsequential
"recommendations." After all, the Commission argued, MTC regulations have
no legal force unless they are adopted by the appropriate state officials through
ordinary rulemaking procedures under state law. The Commission exercised no
power the member-states could not also exercise individually, and each state
remained in any event free to withdraw from the Compact at any time.' 87 The
ready acceptance of those arguments by the U.S. Steel Court, however, betrays
a lack of realism or, more likely, willful blindness.'88

182. MTC, supra note 75, art. VIII(3).
183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
184. White, supra note 80, at 465 (footnote omitted). The author defends the
arrangement as inconsequential and akin to a reciprocity arrangement. Id. at 465-66; see
also U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 492-93 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the MTC
possesses some coercive force over member states).
185.

Sharpe, State Taxation, supra note 78, at 260 ("Another tier of tax

administration .

.

. makes it easier for responsibility for tax decisions to be 'lost'

somewhere between the states and the MTC."). A long footnote to the quoted sentence
provides mind-boggling examples of abuses that the diffusion of responsibility invites.
Id.
186. Petitioners' Brief at 43 n.58, U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. 452.
187. MTC, supra note 75, art. VII(3); Defendant's Brief at 40-44, U.S. Steel, 434
U.S. 452.
188. Cf supra notes 98-101. It also betrays a misunderstanding of the delegation

point. No governmental body can "delegate" apower that it cannot exercise individually.
A purported attempt to do so poses an ultra vires problem, not a delegation problem.
Similarly, if the mere possibility of withdrawal sufficed to avert delegation problems,
there could be no delegation of power by Congress, which can always revoke a
delegation of its powers. An irrevocable "delegation" is not a delegation but a
constitutional amendment. A rule against delegation necessarily implies that
governmental bodies may not transfer their constitutional powers to another body even
for a limited duration.
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Joining the Compact requires an act of state legislation; withdrawing from
it requires a repeal of that statute. 8 9 This all-or-nothing quality lends genuine
regulatory force to the Commission's rulings,"" and the adoption of a particular
MTC "recommendation" says next to nothing about the member-states' authentic
preferences. The adopting is typically done by the tax commissioners who
compose the MTC in the first instance, and the state legislature that consented
to the MTC may never hear of a "recommendation" and its consequences. The
effect of the Commission's "extremely influential" regulations 9' has been to
enhance the fiscal policy-making authority of tax commissioners, who have
adopted and enforced MTC "recommendations" at the outer limits and, at times,
in contravention of applicable state law. 92 Even at the time of the MTC
litigation, prominent tax experts complained that member-states viewed the MTC
as a kind of "constitution" for a tax confederacy and its regulations, as akin to
confederate statutes that preempt local law. They likewise worried about the
attendant expansion of tax commissioners' fiscal authority.' 93 Experience since
has confirmed their apprehensions.
4. Federal Rights
Recall the U.S. Steel Court's refrain: the MTC might well affect the
interests of the United States, but not the federal government's legal
supremacy.'94 As explained, however, the Constitution subjects state compacts
to a negative, rather than mere supremacy, because constitutional supermajority
requirements will render the exercise of federal supremacy insufficiently
protective of federal interests. That argument applies with particular force to
interstate taxation.
Over the course of American history, Congress has intervened in the state
taxation of interstate commerce only a handful of times 9" and under very

189. MTC, supra note 75, art. X.2.
190. See US. Steel, 434 U.S. at 493 (White, J., dissenting).
191.

JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL

TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 578 (6th ed. 1997).

192. See, e.g., John C. Blase & John W. Westmoreland, QuillHas Been Plucked!
MTC States are Slowly Erodingthe SubstantialNexus Standard,73 N. DAK. L. REV. 685,
708-10 (1997) (describing state adoption of MTC interpretive regulations, the so-called
"Bulletin 95-1," in contravention of state statutory and case law); and Kaye Caldwell,
"Dispassionate"Debate on Bulletin 95-1?, STATE TAX NOTES, Aug. 27, 1996, at 20
(criticizing MTC's "total disregard for state law in asking the states to adopt" Bulletin 951).
193. Petitioners' Brief at 27 n.44, US. Steel, 434 U.S. 452.
194. Supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
195. Apparently, the 1959 "moratorium" enacted in response to the Supreme
Court's Portland Cement decision, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text,
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unusual circumstances. 96 Pleas for Congress to mend its ways, to mind its
constitutional obligations, and to address a seemingly intractable subject-matter
have been both common and futile. A congressional effort to find a general
formula for the state taxation of interstate commerce ipsofacto affects all states
(in an existential fashion) and industries of every size and nature. Given the
range and the intensity of the affected interests, the supermajoritarian difficulty
becomes well-nigh insurmountable. "'

represented the very first congressional intervention in the state and local taxation of
interstate commerce. DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION: THE CASE FOR
GREATER UNIFORMITY 3-4 n.10 (1993) (quoting and citing JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN &
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATEAND LOCALTAXATION 324 (5th ed. 1988)). Congressional
interventions have remained exceedingly rare. Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of
InterstateBusiness: Perspectiveson Two Centuries of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 41
TAX LAWYER 37,37 (1987); and see Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When
Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 173 (1997) [hereinafter Moore, State and
Local Taxation] (noting paucity of federal interventions between 1971 and 1996 and
showing, "that the empirical evidence and public choice theory cast doubt on the
likelihood of Congress ever enacting legislation mandating uniformity of state and local
taxation.").
196. The few congressional interventions have typically come at the behest of
individual, discrete industries or groups of taxpayers, such as railroads, pensioners,
Internet companies, and, naturally, members of Congress. See Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54-55
(1976) (current amended version codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (2000)); Act of Jan. 10,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 979 (1996) (barring states from taxing pension
income ofnonresidents); Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 122 Stat. 2681719 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151(2000)); Act of July 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-67, 91
Stat. 271 (codified at 4 U.S.C. § 113 (2000)) (prohibiting state or local governments,
other than jurisdictions from which a member of Congress is elected, from treating
legislator as resident for income tax purposes). See generally Moore, State and Local
Taxation, supra note 195, at 172-73 passim (evidence on congressional intervention in
state and local taxation is broadly consistent with public choice theory; congressional
abdication is overcome only by the public choice dynamics of concentrated benefits and
dispersed costs). For a public choice perspective consistent with Moore's evidence and
analysis, see Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the
Economic Theory ofRegulation: Toward a Public Choice Explanationof Federalism,
76 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990).
197. The exertion of congressional authority, moreover, would have to come in a
crystalline fashion. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S.
425,448 (1980) ("Concurrent federal and state taxation of income, of course, is a wellestablished norm. Absent some explicit directivefrom Congress, we cannot infer that
treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the
States." (emphasis added)); see generally Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507
U.S. 60, 64, 75-77 (1993) (inferring permission for a state tax from supposed
congressional failure to issue explicit prohibition). Even in the foreign affairs context,
where state power is at its nadir, state tax practice will stand barring an explicit
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The Supreme Court's own post-U.S. Steel decisions come close to
proving-so far as such things can be proven-thatjudicialoversight is likewise
insufficient to safeguard constitutional values in the area of interstate taxation.
Having downplayed federal interests in interstate taxation in U.S. Steel, the Court
took up a series of constitutional cases involving state efforts to tax corporate
subsidiaries under expansive notions of unitary taxation."" Those rulings had
the advantage of conceding that interstate taxation did, after all, implicate federal
(constitutional!) concerns. The attempt to develop manageable constitutional
rules proved futile, however, and the Court eventually abandoned the field.'99
In addition to leaving corporations without protection against exploitative
state taxation,2"0 the Court's surrender produced a diplomatic crisis with
America's closest trading partners over the states' aggressive application of
unitary taxation and worldwide combined income principles to foreign
corporations doing business in the United States. Those corporations and their
governments complained bitterly, through diplomatic and legal channels, about
the states' tactics, which they-and, for the most part, the United States
government-believed to contravene international tax treaties.20 ' The longcongressional directive to the contrary. Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S.
298, 321-29 (1994) (lack of unambiguous indication of congressional intent to prohibit
state tax regime constitutes implicit ,.pproval). The requirement of an explicit
congressional preemption further narrows the room for legislative compromise and,
hence, legislation over state taxation.
198. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980) (sustaining
state finding of "unitary business"); Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 439-45, 445-46 (1980)
(sustaining state finding of "unitary business"); see also ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State
Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (rejecting state findings and assessments) and F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 458 U.S. 354 (1982) (same).
199. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 175 (1983)
("[C]ourt will, if reasonably possible, defer to the judgment of state courts in deciding
whether a particular set of activities constitutes a 'unitary business."'). Although Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court in ContainerCorp., struggled mightily to paint this broad
deference as consistent with the painstaking judicial scrutiny applied in preceding cases,
it is not. See, e.g., ContainerCorp., 463 U.S. at 176 n.15. The Supreme Court has over
the past two decades largely ignored interstate tax problems, and its few interventions
have, with exceedingly rare exceptions (e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995)), been highly deferential. Cf.SHAVIRO, supra note 195,
at 4 (lamenting the Supreme Court's "wholesale retreat from even its limited past efforts
in the area").
200. State revenue departments will not find unitariness unless it means more
revenue for the home team-which, in turn, means that state courts will rarely, if ever,
upset such findings.
201. The foreign governments' long-running, progressively apoplectic complaints
and the Executive's efforts to manage the diplomatic crisis are described, discussed, and
shrugged off in Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-31 (1994). For an account of the controversy, the Barclays
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running dispute was already brewing at the time of the U.S. Steel litigation;
Justice White's dissent referenced it explicitly.2" 2 It was settled only well over
a decade later, after much acrimonious litigation and diplomatic exertions.
Any judicial effort to define the constitutional boundaries of state taxation
is fraught with enormous difficulties: the field is way too messy for rigid
conceptual rules. The blunt instrument of due process will work, if at all, only
on the very outer margins, such as the state taxation of enterprises that have no
contacts with the taxing jurisdiction.2 3 A more plausible policing tool is the
dormant Commerce Clause. In contrast to the Due Process Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause does not create rigid and
irreversible constitutional rules but rather operates like a Madisonian negative:
it puts state regulation out of operation, pending a congressional decision to the
contrary. Beyond that structural similarity, however, lurk salient differences and
difficulties.
First, the dormant Commerce Clause depends-unlike the Compact Clause
negative--on judicial interposition: it kicks in only when plaintiffs bring a case
and judges identify the challenged state enactment as belonging to the class of
practices that should be subject to the negative. Good plaintiffs, however, are
hard to find. States cannot be relied on to complain of sister-state aggression
because they are repeat players in a game of exploiting each other's citizens.20 4
For example, a state that suffers from the use of a particular tax apportionment
formula by another state will still hope to benefit from applying a different,
though equally discriminatory, apportionment formula for its own benefit.
Unless the exploitation is very direct and visible-for example, by hitting
powerful producer interests in the affected state-state governments will stay
their hand.20 5 Private plaintiffs, on the other hand, are likely to instrumentalize

Bank litigation, and the resolution of the conflict, see Swaine, NegotiatingFederalism,
supra note 37, at 1159-61.
202. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 488-89 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting).
203. The Supreme Court has recognized as much. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (Due Process Clause imposes no
restrictions on state taxation of interstate commerce).
204. As noted supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text, mutual exploitation will
be the dominant strategy rule unless state government agents are perfectly monitored.

205. Of the sixty-one dormant Commerce Clause cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court between 1970 and 1997, only five were brought by a state plaintiff. See
Christopher R. Drahozal, Preservingthe American Common Market: State and Local
Governments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 233 (1999).
In only eight additional cases did states lend amicus support to private plaintiffs (usually
utilities, which enjoy preferred political access and in whose welfare state governments
have a direct interest). Id.
The U.S. Steel litigation itself provides a stark example of the states' unreliability
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federalism arguments for extraneous purposes (such as profits). Because their
complaints pose a high risk of "false alarms," the Supreme Court tends to treat
them with a great deal of skepticism. 2 6 In short, it is highly likely that the
dormant Commerce Clause will be underenforced.
Second, and compounding the risk of underenforcement, the Commerce
Clause negative is problematic because it "is 'negative' not only because it
negates state regulation of commerce, but also because it does not appear in the
Constitution." ' 7 The construct may well bear lenient tests (such as a virtualper
se rule against facially discriminatory state laws), 2 8 but such tests will permit
state practices that everyone, including the deciding Justices, knows to be
discriminatory and exploitative.20 9 Stricter and more detailed constitutional tests

in complaining of sister-state aggression. Thirteen states-including some that had never
joined the MTC, or joined and then left it-filed an amicus brief in defense of state
authority. Brief of Amici Curiae, U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. 452. Not one state argued against
the MTC. None could do so without undermining, in the process, its own authority over
interstate taxation.
206. Drahozal, supra note 205 (showing that the Supreme Court treats private
dormant Commerce Clause complaints much less favorably than state complaints;
articulating the explanation suggested in the text).
207. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995)
(Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas has quipped that the dormant Commerce Clause
is more appropriately called the "negative Commerce Clause" because there is nothing
"dormant" about the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area.
Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609 n.l (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
208. Even Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, the harshest negative Commerce
Clause critics on the Supreme Court, endorse (or at least used to endorse) this test. See
West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. State taxation of interstate commerce provides a good illustration. The
Supreme Court has developed a four-part dormant Commerce Clause test for state
taxation, including a "fair apportionment" requirement demanding that a state's
apportionment formula, if applied by all states, would not result in double taxation.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). For an overview of the
Supreme Court's application of the test, see generally Walter Hellerstein, et al.,
Commerce Clause Restraintson State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 TAX. L. REV.
47(1995). The Court has refrained from imposing any particular apportionment formula,
however, and it has permitted each state to adopt a "consistent" formula even if no other
state in fact uses it. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (sustaining
single-factor sales formula despite widespread adoption of three-factor formula). Each
state is, thus, free to adopt the formula that happens to maximize its own portion of the
interstate tax take, with the result that taxation of more than 100 percent of some
companies' income tax base is virtually a foregone conclusion. Even actual proof of
double taxation, however, will not doom an individual state's apportionment scheme.
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,187 (1983); Barclays Bank,
PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.of California, 512 U.S. 298, 318-19 (1991) (actual double
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under the Clause might curb exploitative state practices. Such tests, however,
would tax judicial competence and threaten to constitutionalize essentially
legislative judgments, such as tax apportionment formulas. Most fatefully, they
would put enormous pressure on what is essentially a functional justification of
a judge-made doctrine of questionable provenance. In recognition of these
considerations, even advocates of stringent dormant Commerce Clause doctrines
make do with tests that leave considerable room for state tax exploitation and
discrimination.2" 0
The point of these observations, obviously, is not that enforcement of the
Compact Clause in U.S. Steel would have addressed the problem of exploitative
interstate taxation. (The Clause does not cover unilateral state exploitation.)
The point, rather, is that the Supreme Court's own post-U.S. Steel case law
confirms both the existence of federal interests in this area and the inordinate
difficulty of protecting those interests by judicial means-that is, the
enforcement of federal supremacy in the course of deciding cases and
controversies. For precisely those reasons, the Compact Clause provides a
comprehensive negative for a defined class of particularly dangerous state
activities.
The conclusion that that protection ought to be enforced follows regardless
of what one thinks of the legitimacy of the negative Commerce Clause and its
proper scope and content. A renunciation of the negative Commerce Clause as
'
an "intellectual adverse possession"2 11
surely cannot dismiss interstate
exploitation as constitutionally irrelevant. Rather, it must contend that the
Constitution exhaustively lists the means by which such exploitation must be
fought.212 Conversely, if concerns over interstate exploitation warrant a
judicially created negative, they most certainly warrant the enforcement of the
constitutional negatives-including the Compact Clause.2" 3

taxation does not violate dormant Commerce Clause unless it is the "inevitable" result
of state's tax regime).
210. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 195, at 112-14; Jesse H.Choper & Tung Yin,
State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach,
1998 SUP. CT. REv. 193, 211-12passim.
211. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265

(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. For a judicial argument along these lines, see Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging
enforcement of the Import-Export Clause, rather than the negative Commerce Clause, as
the constitutional means of policing state invasions on interstate commerce).
213. A plausible argument for the dormant Commerce Clause-a judge-made
negative against state laws that discriminate against or exploit sister states in interstate

commerce-must rest at least implicitly on the contention that the Madison of the
Convention was right: the supermajoritarian obstacles that prevent Congress-in the
ordinary course of events-from enacting harmful legislation will prove
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B. Harmless Error?
Perhaps the best defense of the US. Steel decision is that the MTC's realworld effects are no big whoop. The argument comes in political and economic
versions. Both possess a veneer of plausibility. Both, however, are untenable.
The political defense rests on the MTC's broad acceptance and modest role.
Non-Compact states and business interests seem to have accommodated
themselves to the MTC and the Commission." 4 While the Supreme Court's
endorsement of the MTC may have further weakened Congress's will to tackle
the state taxation of interstate business, that effect is probably marginal; one can
argue with equal plausibility that the still-extant possibility of federal
intervention has disciplined the MTC and its member-states. Serious quarrels
over state taxation and conflicts with federal interests tend to be occasioned by
actors other than the Commission. The driving force behind state unitary
taxation and worldwide combined reporting, for example, was the California
Franchise Tax Board,2 15 and while the MTC may have spread and intensified
state support for the Board's position,216 California had adopted it long before the
MTC's creation and would have pursued it in any event."1 7 Similarly, relentless

counterproductive when state parochialism calls for energetic national action. What is
needed is an institutional vehicle to reverse the supermajoritarian burden-in other
words, a negative. For an explicit argument to that effect, see SHAVIRO, supranote 195,
at 70-71. One can debate whether this consideration warrants the interposition of a
judicial negative over concurrent state legislation affecting interstate commerce, but it
rather strengthens the case for enforcing the negatives that are actually in the

Constitution.
214. For example, the Council on State Taxation, a business trade association,
promotes cooperation with the MTC. See http://www.statetax.org (last visited Apr. 14,
2003).
215. Hellerstein, supranote 73, at 346; Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.
of California, 512 U.S. 298, 306 (1991) (California "nearly the last state" to confine
combined reporting to U.S. waters' edge).
216. See generally James H. Peters, Use of Combined Reporting Required by
Increasing Number of States, 41 J. TAX. 375 (1974). The frequency of the Supreme
Court's "unitary business" and apportionment cases in the years after U.S. Steel, as well
as the fact that all state defendants in those cases were members of the MTC, suggests
that the MTC had a catalytic role in the spread of those tax practices.
217. Every cartel needs an exploitable advantage and, moreover, a leading member
to enforce market discipline. California's exploitable advantage is its sheer size: no
multi-national corporation can afford to withdraw from its huge market. Smaller MTC
member-states from Kansas to North Dakota may collectively possess comparable market

power, but the risk of defection precludes them from asserting it. As a condition of its
MTC membership, California insisted on a modification, in favor of populous states, of
the one-state, one-vote regime specified in the Compact and, moreover, on the nonenforcement of certain Compact provisions. In light of California's importance to the
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efforts to extend state use tax collection obligations to "remote" Internet or
catalogue sellers-that is, sellers that have no nexus, such as a store, in the
taxing jurisdiction-have been led by some state courts and, in the political
arena, by the National Governors' Association and other state and local lobbying
organizations. The MTC has played a subordinate, supporting role.21
But while these considerations might and probably should impress members
of Congress in a hypothetical debate over the wisdom of approving the MTC,
they beg the constitutional question of whether the protection against state
compacts and their adverse effects can be left to the uncertain exercise of
ordinary federal supremacy. The answer to that question is "no." The Founders
adopted the Compact Clause precisely because the expost exercise of supremacy
is too uncertain and, as to compacts, too demanding.
On economic grounds, it can (and has) been argued that the risk of state
cartelization is too small to warrant judicial insistence on the Compact Clause
negative. State policy cartels face the same difficulties that confront every
private cartel-holdout problems; disagreement over the distribution of gains
from cooperation; and the risk of defection. Barring central political intervention
and organization, cartels ultimately cannot overcome these problems." 9 Thus,
a Compact Clause that guards against unapproved state cartels guards against a
negligible and possibly non-existent risk.22
The MTC's history certainly illustrates the difficulties attendant to state
cartelization. From the outset, the MTC confronted hold-out opposition from

functioning of the cartel, the MTC acceded to both demands. Sharpe, State Taxation,
supra note 78, at 246 n.58, 272-73 n.21 1. It may be only a slight exaggeration to
describe the MTC as a multistate stage for the California Franchise Tax Board.
California's dominant position may in a sense seem to confirm the US. Steel
Court's averment that the MTC confers no power that a single state could not exercise
on its own (see U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73
(1978)); as a practical matter, the Compact arguably confers no power that California
could not exercise on its own. Exploitable advantages, however, raise constitutional
problems even when the exploitation is undertaken by individual states (e.g., through
severance taxes on natural resources). The constitutional minimum is that states must do
the exploiting on their own--or else, obtain congressional consent.
218. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, A Decisive Time in Fights Over Sales Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at C 10 (describing NGA's lead role).
219. Albert Breton, The Existence and StabilityoflnterjurisdictionalCompetition,
in COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 49 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds.,
1991). Consistent with this prediction, some states anticipated the need for central
intervention as a prerequisite for effective state tax cartelization. In the early 1970s, for
example, an ad-hoc group of state officials and business leaders proposed federal
legislation that would enable the MTC to make binding decisions for all fifty states.
Sharpe, State Taxation, supra note 78, at 266-67 n.172. That proposed compromise
between state autonomy and national uniformity, however, was never acted upon.
220. Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?, supra note 19, at 842, 860-61.
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eastern domicile states and from states such as Arizona, whose income from
copper mines could, under traditional allocation principles, be fairly attributed
entirely to the state.221 That pattern has continued to this day. Similarly, the
MTC has proven incapable of solving distributional conflicts among its
members. Theoretically, complete apportionment and unitary taxation can
capture an enormous stream of income that would otherwise escape taxation (due
to coordination problems, "leakage" and "evasion," and locational competition).
That prospect prompted the formation of the MTC. But even if the prospective
gains were to make every state better off (relative to the pre-existing regime of
uncoordinated tax competition), they still generate disputes over their
distribution. An apportionment formula that is neutral with respect to the preexisting distribution would lock in, rather than eviscerate, locational competition.
It is therefore unacceptable to the market states that stand to gain most from
cartelization. Conversely, an apportionment formula that changes the preexisting distribution will generate hold-out problems. This baseline problem has
no technocratic solution, for no apportionment formula is neutral.222 For this
reason, few if any MTC regulations are truly uniform; their application and
interpretation in the member-states vary greatly. The inability to agree on a
neutral baseline, in turn, means that the MTC must make continuous decisions
that affect the distribution of apportioned tax income-an institutional feature
that further increases the risk of hold-outs and defections.223 The MTC has been
compelled to minimize those risks by disavowing any power to make binding
decisions for the member-states. The Commission can cajole recalcitrant
members (other than California), and it can advance its "recommendations," in
cooperation with state officials, by exploiting agency and monitoring problems
at the state level.2 24 But it cannot truly enforce any particular market order, even
on its members.
Even so, the predictable failure of the MTC, or for that matter of most state
cartels, to live up to their aspirations provides no good reason to refrain from
enforcing the Compact Clause. Some state cartels might succeed in exploiting
their advantages to a troublesome extent. (The tobacco tax cartel, to be
examined shortly, is a clear example.) Judges are poorly equipped to determine,
through a case-by-case examination of individual compact-cartels, just how
much cartelization is too much, or whether a particular state cartel might wield

221. Sharpe, State Taxation, supra note 78, at 271.

222. For instance, the distribution of apportioned income under a commonly used
three-factor formula (property, payroll, and sales) will favor states with high property
values in direct proportion to the relative weight given to that factor.
223. Sharpe, State Taxation,supra note 78, at 271. ("[W]hat [holdout] states really
fear is an organization with the power to continually makejudgments that are binding on
them.").
224. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
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more or less market power in the future. Similarly, one can imagine some
efficient state cartels; the cooperative management of a common pool (such as
fisheries) through quotas may be an example. What looks like sustainable yield
management to some, however, will look like a naked output restriction to
others. A judicial inquiry into the purpose of the cartel arrangement will be a
crapshoot, and the allocation and distribution of its costs and benefits are
essentially a political judgment. All told, we are better off with a per se rule that
commits the approval or rejection of state cartels to the Congress.
The functional argument for a lenient Compact Clause interpretation is that
a judicial insistence on the congressional negative would thwart potentially
beneficial state agreements, without averting any serious risk. That argument,
though, cannot apply to policy cartels, for the promised benefits-harmonization
and coordination-are merely the flipside of the cartel risk. If the risk is
negligible (on account of the difficulties attendant to effective cartelization), the
corresponding benefits, if any, are too small to justify a latitudinarian Compact
Clause interpretation. Conversely, if the prospective benefits of spontaneous
state coordination and harmonization are deemed large, then so is the cartel risk.
Either way, the argument collapses under its own weight.
VI. THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ON TOBACCO
LITIGATION
The November 1998 Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA") provides for
a comprehensive settlement of then-pending state lawsuits against the major U.S.
tobacco manufacturers.
The core provisions of the MSA obligate the
participating tobacco manufacturers to pay very substantial sums, estimated at
roughly $206 billion through the year 2025,2"' to the forty-six signatory state
governments.226 In addition, the MSA establishes a massive regulatory regime
governing the sale and marketing of tobacco products in the United States.
The MSA differs in several salient respects from any preceding interstate
agreement, actual or contemplated. First, the Agreement aids none of the
purposes that have traditionally served tojustify a latitudinarian interpretation of
the Compact Clause. The agreement does not respond to a regional problem that
had escaped the attention of the Congress; it responds to a national problem and
regulates a national industry. (Some aspects of tobacco marketing, such as

225. Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious
Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 372-73 (2000). The financial provisions of the MSA
are briefly described infra notes 256-64 and accompanying text. For an overview, see W.
Kip Viscusi, A Postmortem on the CigaretteSettlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 537-43
(1999).
226. The government signatories also include five territories and the District of
Columbia. For reasons of convenience, I will simply refer to "states."
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advertising, have been the subject of federal legislation and regulation for a
considerable period of time.) Nor does the agreement address problems of scale,
interstate externalities, or coordination that might affect the state regulation and
taxation of tobacco. Purported "race to the bottom" problems do not affect the
regulation of the consumption and marketing of cigarettes.227 State competition
does of course affect the taxation of tobacco products, and, as shown below, the
MSA payments are structured as a uniform national tax so as to prevent crossborder arbitrage and tax leakage. It would be hard to argue, however, that
individual states are incapable of taxing tobacco products. Over the two decades
preceding the MSA, state and local tobacco taxes increased on average, and
differences in state tax rates widened substantially.22
Second, the MSA is the first interstate compact to which private market
actors-tobacco manufacturers-are an official party. While producer cartels
in the guise of interstate agreements are not unprecedented,22 9 the MSA is the
first compact that constitutes both an agreement among the states and a legally
binding agreement between the states and a specific group of producers.
This observation points to the MSA's third distinctive feature: it constitutes
a cartel in the most pristine sense. Its convoluted provisions insulate the
participating manufacturers from competition by new market entrants and, short
of a tipping point at which price elasticities reduce tobacco consumption, ensure
that consumers will pay virtually all of the costs associated with the MSA.230

227. Except perhaps in very extreme cases (such as complete local prohibition),
smokers are unlikely to sort themselves in accordance with state or local smoking
restrictions, let alone advertising regulations. The proliferation of restrictions over the
past few decades belies any "race to the bottom" theory. See MARTHA DERTHICK, UP IN
SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION INTOBACCO POLITICS 21-24 (2002).

228. Kathy Kristof, Border Crossers Sometimes Can Save a Fortune on Excise
Taxes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 13, 1997, at 3-H (citing expert estimates and

studies). The widening range of state tax rates generated substantial increases in crossborder purchases and smuggling, known as "buttlegging." Id. While neither producers
nor state governments welcome those affects, the increased divergence of state policies
over time belies any notion of a "race to the bottom" that deprived the states of
autonomous policy choices. Congress had proven willing to address the buttlegging
coordination problem. See e.g., Contraband Cigarette Act, Pub. L. No. 95-575, 92 Stat.
2463 (1978) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (2000)). The MSA made no provision
in that regard and may in fact have exacerbated the problem. Michael Beebe, Seneca
In'dians Sending Electronic Smoke Signals Over the Internet, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 12,
1999, at I-A. In short, the notion of the MSA as a response to collective action problems
and unresponsiveness on the part of national institutions is a canard. DERTHICK, supra
note 227, at 212-18.
229. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
230. Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 382; Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco
Litigation and the SeparationofPowers in State Governments: Repairingthe Damage,
31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563, 569 (2001) (stating consumers will pay roughly ninety
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The "damages" paid under the MSA represent the states' share of the difference
between the market price and the monopoly price.
Fourth, the MSA is one of only a handful of state agreements to be joined
by all, or very nearly all, states. Since the entry of the agreement, moreover, no
state has revoked its participation or demanded a significant revision of its terms.
The architects of the MSA, in other words, found an effective mechanism to
combat the holdout and defection problems that ordinarily bedevil state cartels.
That mechanism is the deliberate imposition and exploitation of the interstate
externalities against which the Compact Clause is meant to protect states and
their citizens. 3

A. A BriefHistory of the MSA
The first state lawsuit against tobacco manufacturers was filed in 1994, at
the suggestion of an anti-tobacco trial lawyer (and subsequently with his
cooperation) by Mississippi's enterprising Attorney General, Michael Moore. 2

percent of the cost of the MSA (citing interview with W. Kip Viscusi)). Price increases
immediately followed the announcement of the MSA. Id.
231. Arguably, the MSA's manifest conflict with the Compact Clause is the least
of its problems. Legal scholars and political scientists have harshly criticized the
collusive and, in some instances, corrupt relations between the private plaintiffs'
attorneys and state attorneys general who instigated the state lawsuits against tobacco
manufacturers. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS 29-62 (2003); and
Margaret A. Little, A Most DangerousIndiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political
Legacy of the Government's Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1150-56
(2001). Scholars have also criticized the legislative abrogation in some states of the
tobacco companies' common law defenses during the pendency of the state lawsuits. Id.
at 1147. Additionally, the symbiotic relationship between state governments and the
participating manufacturers that has resulted from the MSA has been criticized. See, e.g.,
Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 378-81. Critics have further described the state
lawsuits as essentially baseless. See, e.g., DeBow, supra note 230, at 570; see also
Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 354, 360-62. Critics also objected to the MSA on
antitrust and economic grounds. See, e.g., Thomas C. O'Brien, Constitutionaland
Antitrust Violations ofthe Multistate Tobacco Settlement, in POLICY ANALYSIS No. 371,
at I (Cato Institute 2000); Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco Deal,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 323 (1998). They also
described the MSA as inconsistent with the basic principles of representative
government. See, e.g., DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 223-27; Jonathan Turley, A Crisis
of Faith: Tobacco and the MadisonianDemocracy, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 437

(2000). See also further references cited throughout this Part. In light of this litany, an
insistence that the MSA also violates (of all things) the Compact Clause may seem
pedantic. If so, the discussion may serve as a reminder that structural constitutional
provisions, including such arcane provisions as the Compact Clause, often help to
prevent big, unmanageable political problems-so long as the provisions are enforced.
232. The history of state tobacco litigation has been told often and well. See, e.g.,

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/1

64

Greve: Greve: Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent
2003]

COMPACTS AND CARTELS

The lawsuit included, inter alia,a claim for recovery of Medicaid costs allegedly
attributable to smoking. Moore lobbied other state attorneys general to file
similar recoupment cases. By mid-1997, thirty-one states had followed suit.
These copycat suits alleged liability on a number of theories, including (in most
cases) Medicaid recoupment, consumer fraud, antitrust violations, unjust
enrichment, and violations of state consumer protection laws. Democratic
attorneys general were much faster to sue than Republicans.233 Major tobaccomanufacturing states (Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee)
refrained from filing, as did Delaware and Wyoming.
Mississippi's lawsuit settled for $3.6 billion in July 1997; Florida's case
settled a month later for $11.3 billion. At that stage, adverse developments-in
particular, the defection of the Liggett Company, a particularly vulnerable
tobacco producer, and the legislative abrogation of common law liability
defenses in such states as Florida and Maryland-had already induced the
tobacco companies to sue for peace. In June 1997, tobacco lawyers, plaintiffs'
attorneys, and attorneys general met in Washington, D.C. to hammer out a
comprehensive agreement, known as the "Resolution." A precursor to the MSA,
the Resolution provided for a comprehensive financial settlement, projected to
amount to $368.5 billion over twenty-five years,"3 of all pending state lawsuits,
in return for expansive protections against civil liability (including bars to class
action lawsuits, punitive damages in individual tort suits, and addiction claims)
for the settling manufacturers.23 The Resolution would also have conferred
authority on the federal Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to regulate
nicotine, the active ingredient of tobacco, as an addictive drug.
The parties then submitted the proposed federal legislation to Congress.
Under the leadership of Senator John McCain (R-AZ), then-Chairman of the
Senate Commerce Committee, a bill based on the Resolution-but containing
provisions for substantially higher industry payments and more limited liability
protections-was debated and eventually reported to the Senate floor. In June
1998, however, the bill died after a failed cloture vote. The prevailing-though
not uncontested-explanation for the failure is that anti-tobacco and public
health advocacy groups, unwilling to brook a compromise with tobacco

PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE (1998); CARRICK
MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE
CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998); MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE RISK: THE MAVERICKS, THE
LAWYERS, AND THE WHISTLE-BLOWERS WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO (1999); DAN ZEGART,
CIVIL WARRIORS: THE LEGAL SIEGE ON THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY (2000); and DERTHICK,

supranote 227. Unless otherwise referenced, the account in the text follows Derthick's
narrative.
233. More than two years passed before the first Republican attorneys general (of
Kansas and Arizona) followed Mississippi's lead. DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 79.
234. Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 364-65.
235. Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 365-66.
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companies, had loaded the compromise Resolution with provisions that proved
unacceptable to the industry.236 (The version of the bill that was reported out of
the Senate Commerce Committee stipulated industry payments in the amount of
$516 billion, and the civil liabilities provisions contained in the Resolution and
earlier committee drafts had been dropped.)237 In a massive advertising
campaign that may have had a certain "bounce" on Capitol Hill,23 the industry
portrayed the bill as a tax hike and a boondoggle for trial lawyers, rather than a
public health measure.
As the prospects for a federal enactment dimmed, nine state attorneys
general--chosen to represent a spectrum of regions, degrees of hostility to the
industry, and stages of progress in the lawsuits 239 -met in secret negotiations
with trial lawyers and industry representatives to work out an agreement along
the lines of the Resolution, though more modest in scope.240 In November 1998,
the parties reached an agreement. Total industry payments to the settling states
were reduced to roughly $206 billion by 2025. Provisions for the FDA
regulation of tobacco products, which obviously would have required federal
approval and legislation, were stripped.24' Likewise, the expansive civil liability
limitations contained in the Resolution were jettisoned and replaced with
narrower protections from state-initiated lawsuits against the industry.
The MSA was released on November 14, 1998, and all forty-six state
attorneys general promptly approved it. Four non-participating states
(Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota) had reached earlier agreements with
the industry (totaling $40 billion), which were preserved under the MSA. The
MSA was not presented to the Congress for approval.

236. DERTHICK, supranote 227, at 130-46, provides a balanced discussion of the
factors that contributed to the failure of the proposed legislation.
237. Dagan & White, supranote 225, at 367.
238. DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 122-23.
239. DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 171.
240. For a useful comparison of the major provisions of the Resolution, the Senate
bill, and the MSA, see Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 364-73.
241. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
126 (2000) (FDA lacks statutory authority to regulate tobacco). While the Supreme
Court's ruling of course postdates the MSA, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling
in the same case, to the same effect, was issued in August 1998, during the negotiations
over the MSA. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d
155 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 529 U.S. 120 (2000). While affirmance was not a foregone
conclusion, the MSA negotiators were not so bold as to contrive to confer upon a federal
agency, without the consent of the Congress, a regulatory authority that the agency may
or may not have possessed.
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B. The Structure of the MSA
In lawsuits challenging the MSA, defendants have averred that the MSA
does not constitute an "agreement or compact" among the states at all. 42
Because the MSA must under its terms be implemented through a consent decree
in each participating state's courts,243 it supposedly constitutes nothing but a
settlement of the lawsuits brought by each individual state against the tobacco
companies. It just so happens that the defendants and the terms of settlement are
the same in each case and state.
This hyper-technical argument is difficult to understand as anything but a
joke. The MSA bears the signatures of state attorneys general who never filed,
let alone prosecuted, a case against the defendants. Putting that aside, and
further ignoring that even the U.S. Steel Court declined to grant a Compact
Clause exemption based on mere formalities, 24 4 the MSA bears the "classic
indicia" of a state compact even in the narrowest sense of that term.245 The MSA
establishes, authorizes, and funds several joint bodies for the administration and
legal defense of the Agreement. 2" Unlike the earlier Resolution, the MSA
divides a stream of industry payments among the participating states in
accordance with an agreed-upon formula described in the Agreement, 247 an
arrangement that looks very much like an agreement among the states. 248 Under

242. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 360 (4th Cir.) (briefly
discussing and rejecting that contention), cert. denied sub nom. Star Scientific, Inc. v.
Kilgore, 123 S.Ct. 93 (2002).
243. MSA, supra note 1,at II(ss) ("state-specific finality"); MSA Exhibit L.
244. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1978)
("[T]he mere form of interstate agreements cannot be dispositive .... The [Compact]
Clause reaches both 'agreements' and 'compacts,' the formal as well as the informal.").
245. Cf Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472
U.S. 159, 175 (1985) (describing some of the "classic indicia" of a compact:
establishment of a joint body, conditional action by other states and bar to unilateral
modification or repeal, and mandatory reciprocity).
246, See MSA, supra note 1, at. VIII(c) (funding for the enforcement and

implementation of the MSA through the National Association of Attorneys General
("NAAG")); id. at VI(a) (establishment of a national foundation, under the auspices of

the NAAG and other state organization, for certain purposes); id. at IX(d)(2)(G)
(authorizing private consulting group, ominouslynamed "The Firm," to make "conclusive
and binding" legal and financial determinations concerning payment allocation).
247. MSA, supra note 1, Exhibit A. The Resolution contained no distribution
formula. Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 364-65, 373.

248. Industry payments are made, not to individual states but into an Escrow Fund
under the administration of independent third parties. MSA, supra note 1, at IX(a). So
long as the participating manufacturers make the appropriate aggregate payments,
disputes over the distribution are entirely among the states. Such disputes are subject to
mandatory arbitration. Id. at XI (c).
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its terms, the MSA cannot be fully implemented without entry of consent decrees
by state courts representing eighty percent of the number of states and of the
aggregate payment allocations specified by the Agreement.249 Receipt of the
proceeds requires performance of specific duties by the settling states, including,
but by no means limited to, entry of the MSA by a state court. 5 Withdrawal
from the Agreement or failure to perform specified obligations-such as the
enactment of a state model statute subjecting non-participating tobacco
manufacturers to taxation-carries severe financial penalties, which are
enforceable by the states that remain under the MSA's umbrella.25' Amendments
require the consent of all affected states and participating manufacturers.2 52
Most important for Compact Clause purposes, the central purpose of the
MSA, the establishment of a national producer cartel and the distribution of the
surplus proceeds to state govemments, could not be accomplished without
concerted state action. About the centrality of that purpose, the MSA leaves no
doubt. The agreement features a lot of bells and whistles, from lobbying
restrictions on tobacco manufacturers253 to document disclosure mandates254 to
advertising and marketing regulations, all the way to Joe Camel and the Kool
Jazz Festival. 5 But the financial terms form the hard core of the MSA. Those
terms restrict market entry, suppress price competition within the industry, and
ensure that the manufacturers' payment obligations are passed on to
consumers.

256

249. MSA, supra note I, at 11(u). The original participating manufacturers may
waive the requirement for final approval by unanimous written consent. Id.
250. See, e.g., MSA, supra note 1, at VII (Enforcement); Id. at IX(d)(2)(E)
(enactment, diligent enforcement, and full legal defense of "Qualifying Statute" that
"effectively and fully neutralizes the cost advantages that the Participating Manufacturers
experience vis-A-vis Non-Participating Manufacturers"; id. at XII(a) (mandatory releases);
id. at XIII (consent decree and dismissal of claims); id. at XVIII (1)(best efforts to cause
Agreement to become effective).
251. MSA, supra note 1, at IX(d)(2)(H); XVIII(g) ("Each Settling State and each
Participating Manufacturer hereby represents that this Agreement... will constitute a
valid and binding contractual obligation, enforceable in accordance with its terms, of
each of them.").
252. MSA, supra note 1, at XVIII(j). Certain portions of the MSA are amendable
by unanimous consent among the states, without the manufacturers' participation. Id. at
XI(f)(6).
253. MSA, supra note 1, at III(m)-(r).
254. MSA, supra note 1, at IV.
255. See, e.g., MSA, supra note 1, at III(a)-j); 11(l).
256. The following paragraphs describe the principal payment obligations stated
in MSA IX, which account for an overwhelming portion of the total settlement amount.
The MSA contains additional payment obligations concerning, inter alia, the
establishment of a national anti-tobacco research foundation, (MSA VI); contributions
to the NAAG's legal defense and MSA enforcement fund, (MSA VIII(c)); and plaintiffs'
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In order to meet their payment obligations under the MSA, the four
"original participating manufacturers" who, at the time, supplied close to ninetynine percent of the U.S. cigarette market, had to increase prices. Because price
competition would have precluded the requisite, dramatic price increase (of some
thirty-five cents per pack), 2" the MSA allocates the manufacturers' share of the
payments in proportion to current market share. A higher market share means
higher "damage" payments, rendering price competition for a higher market
share futile. In order to protect the original participating manufacturers against
new market entrants, the MSA provides non-participating manufacturers with an
incentive to join the MSA without incurring proportionate payment
obligations-provided, however, that those small manufacturers agree to
stabilize their sales at pre-MSA levels.5 8
For the regulation of producers who refuse to accept that bargain and for the
suppression of new market entrants, the MSA imposes a regime of interstate
transfer payments. If the participating manufacturers suffer sales losses
exceeding two percent of their aggregate market share, they may reduce their
base payments to the states by three percent for each percent market share loss
above that level.2" 9 In other words, a ten percent decline in aggregate market
share entitles the participating manufacturers to a twenty-four percent reduction
in (adjusted) base payments to the states. Any state may, however, escape an
adjustment by enacting a model statute that "fully and effectively neutralizes" the
participating manufacturers' cost disadvantages attributable to the MSA.26 °
While new market entrants have by definition caused none of the damages that
the MSA is supposed to redress, the MSA Model Statute requires them to make
payments, equivalent to roughly 150 percent of the "damage" payments they
would incur under the MSA itself, into an escrow account, supposedly in
anticipation of future costs and liabilities.26'
Should the participating
manufacturers still lose market share, their payment reductions will be imposed
on states that have failed to enact and enforce the model statute or an equivalent
qualifying statute. Such states may lose their entire allocable share.262 Due to

attorneys' fees (MSA XVII).
257. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 231, at 376-77.
258. MSA, supra note 1, at fX(i).
259. MSA, supra note 1, at IX(d)(1).
260. MSA, supra note 1, at IX(d)(2)(E); Exhibit T.
261. MSA, supra note 1, at Exhibit T Sec. I(f); Sec. 3(b).
262. Enacting states whose model statutes are struck down by a court may still lose
up to sixty-five percent of their allocable shares. MSA, supra note 1, at IX(d)(2)(F); see
also Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 381-82.
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'
these "diabolically clever"263
provisions and incentives, virtually all states have

enacted a model or qualifying statute.264
C. Compact Risks
All serious analysts agree that the MSA is a price-fixing cartel.265 The
MSA's effects on sister-state interests, political accountability, and federal
supremacy are marginally more subtle, but no less egregious.
1. Cartelization
An agreement in pursuit of the MSA's ostensible purposes--punishment for
past corporate misconduct, redress for past harms, the procurement of public
health gains through future smoking reductions-would be structured very
differently. For example, such an agreement would aim to capture
manufacturers' profits, instead of protecting them. It would facilitate and
encourage state action adverse to tobacco interests, instead of giving states a
direct financial stake in the viability and financial health of four individual
tobacco companies."" It
would reflect some correspondence between individual
defendants' past misconduct and their liabilities, and it would ensure that the
proceeds are put to uses related to past and present injuries. The MSA payments,
in contrast, are only tangentially (and, in the case of non-participating
manufacturers, not at all) related to past misconduct,267 and they flow into the
states' treasuries as general receipts.26 Notwithstanding their designation as

263. Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 381.

264. The restrictions on market entry have proven not entirely effective; by the end
of 1999, the market share of non-participating manufacturers had risen to over four
percent. Gordon Fairclough, Competitionfor Cheap Smokes Heals Up, WALLST. J., Feb.
15, 2000, at B-1. "The Firm" has adjusted the states' base payments accordingly.
Considering the states' and the manufacturers' enormous stakes in the MSA's
preservation, however, far more dramatic inroads into the cartel are needed to induce
conflicts that might endanger the arrangement.
265. See, e.g., Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 231, at 324; Dagan & White, supra
note 225, at 425; Christopher Schroeder, The Multistate Settlement Agreement and the
Problem of Social Regulation Beyond the Power ofState Government, 31 SETON HALL
L. REv. 612, 613-14 (200 1); O'Brien, supranote 231; Ian Ayres, Using Tort Settlements
to Cartelize, 34 VAL. U. L. REv. 595 (2000).
266. DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 22 1.
267. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 23 1, at 378-79 (manufacturers' market share
is a highly inaccurate proxy for past damages).
268. Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 372. The vast majority of states are using
only a very small portion of settlement payments for tobacco prevention purposes. See
Settlement Payments Received, Current Annual Funding &Minimum Recommendations
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"damages," the MSA payments bear no resemblance to a damage payment that
might settle a suit in tort or equity.269 They act like a uniform (and perpetual)
national tobacco sales tax. And in order to ensure that the tax will be paid by
consumers, the MSA cartelizes the tobacco market. The MSA, in short, is not
a wolf in sheep's clothing; it is a wolf in wolf s clothing.27 Had tobacco
manufacturers contrived to establish a comparable arrangement without the
states' collusion, their agents and officers might all be in jail.27'
Even the MSA's architects do not dispute that the MSA is a price-fixing
agreement. Their defense of the MSA rests on the state action exemption to the
antitrust laws and the related Noerr-Pennington doctrine.272 But while those
doctrines may render the MSA "not clearly illegal,' 273 state action-especially
state action of a cartelizing, exploitative nature-is precisely what the Compact
Clause targets. That does not render the MSA clearly illegal. It does, however,
render it illegal without congressional consent.274

for Tobacco Prevention, availableat www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/settlements/2002/
appendixb.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).
269. DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 177; Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 42628; O'Brien, supra note 231, at 2.
270. "[T]his wolf comes as a wolf." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The fit between Justice Scalia's fabulous phrase and the MSA has
also occurred to the plaintiffs' attorneys challenging the MSA. See Star Scientific, Inc.
v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 361 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing plaintiffs' brief), cert. denied sub
nom. Star Sci., Inc. v. Kilgore, 123 S. Ct. 93 (2002). The Fourth Circuit panel rejected
the wolf-as-a-wolf contention (advanced by plaintiffs under a due process and an equal
protection theory), substantially on the grounds that any measure that sails under an antitobacco label-including an arrangement that confers monopoly profits on purported
"defendants"-must ipsofacto be rational.
271. Olson, supra note 231, at 47. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)
(criminalizing conspiracies in restraint of trade); FTC/DOJ Guidelines Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, § 3.2., reprintedin 4 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) at 20,855 (2000) (defining "hard core cartel agreements" to be prosecuted
criminally without regard to "claimed business purposes, anticompetitive harms,
procompetitive benefits, or overall competitive effects").
272. See respectively, Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); California Retail
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (state action doctrine); and
E. R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mineworkers
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (limited antitrust immunity for mere attempts
to influence the enactment or enforcement of laws). The applicability of the doctrine to
the MSA has been questioned by commentators, see O'Brien,supranote 231, at 12-14,
and by anti-MSA litigants, albeit to date largely without success. See, e.g., PTI v. Philip
Morris, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Bedell v. Philip Morris, 263 F.3d 239 (3d
Cir. 2001) (finding defendants immune under Noerr-Penningtondoctrine but not state
action doctrine).
273. Ayres, supra note 265, at 598.
274. The point will appear particularly compelling to those who tend to the view
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2. Externalities
Tobacco policies vary enormously from state to state and even among local
jurisdictions. Rural Tennessee features smoke-filled diners; suburban Maryland
counties prohibit smoking in restaurants, bars, and even some outdoor areas.
Excise and sales taxes on cigarettes range from 2.5 cents in Virginia to $1.50 in
New York--an astonishing range, considering the ease with which many
consumers can evade sales taxes. These policy differences reflect stubborn
political and cultural variations, as well as differing economic interests (such as
the importance of tobacco farming and production in some states). In all other
policy areas, including areas where collective action problems are real and state
coordination would yield substantial benefits (such as insurance regulation), far
smaller state-to-state differences have proven insurmountable. The obvious
question is how the states, accustomed though they are to a prickly insistence on
state sovereignty and to the defense of parochial interests, could possibly agree
on a uniform scheme to tax and regulate tobacco sales and consumption.
The answer lies in the structure of the MSA payment provisions as a
national sales tax or, put differently, the sequential (and eventually collusive)
imposition of externalities. Consumers in each state will pay the tax regardless
of whether or not their state joins the MSA. Because states can opt out of the
receipts but not the taxes, a non-participating state would simply leave "its" share
of the MSA proceeds on the table and available for distribution to the
participating sister states. 75 Hence, the manifest political differences among the
states affected only the timing of the states' participation and the degree of
enthusiasm with which the attorneys general joined the campaign. Unanimity
was a foregone conclusion once the first few states had made their move.
In principle, one can envision an uncoordinated state-by-state decisionmaking process that would produce a financial result comparable to the MSA:

(including, unsurprisingly, this author) that the antitrust state action doctrine itself should
be confined, against the constitutional background, to state cartels, the costs of which fall
principally on in-state residents. The classic formulation of this view is Frank
Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics ofFederalism, 26 J. L. & ECON. 23 (1983).
See also Saul Levmore, InterstateExploitation &JudicialIntervention, 69 VA. L. REV.

563,626-29(1983). The Compact Clause analysis expounded here and in Part IV, supra,
tracks this analysis. If states gang up for exploitative purposes, we need not wait for
courts to get antitrust (or for that matter the negative Commerce Clause) right; the
likelihood of damage is so high that the Constitution calls for congressional review ex
ante. Id. at 570 n.17.
275. DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 163-73 (identifying nation-wide imposition of

MSA costs as the cause of state unanimity); William H. Pryor, A Comparison ofAbuses
and Reforms of ClassActions andMultigovernmentLawsuits, 74 TULANE L. REV. 1885,
1911 (2000) (Alabama Attorney General citing imposition of share of MSA costs on
Alabama as reason for signing MSA despite his grave misgivings).
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each state could impose an equivalent sales or excise tax on purchases within its
borders. Alternatively, each state could sue manufacturers and settle on terms
that impose the costs of the "damages" entirely on consumers within the state.
To pose the hypothetical, however, is to reject it. Many states would refrain
from taxing or suing at all; others might try and fail. Under those circumstances,
neither the producer-defendants nor the states could control private price
arbitrage at the borders. The costs of the MSA payments, in contrast, are
imposed uniformly and nationwide. Instead of replicating a series of internal
settlements that each state could have obtained on its own, the state lawsuits
generated a stream of interstate externalities and, in the MSA, divvied up the
proceeds among the states.
If one thinks of the MSA payments as "damages" (their official, though
implausible, designation), the MSA amounts to a particularly rigorous
application of the logic of modem products liability lawsuits. Under existing
choice-of-law rules, defendant-manufacturers can be sued in a state and under
a state's laws of the plaintiff's choice (usually, the plaintiffs home state).
Because the manufacturers cannot control cross-border arbitrage (for example,
by tailoring the price or design of a product to an individual state's liability
regime and by preventing the import of "unsafe" versions of the product into a
high-liability state), the costs of liability verdicts will be shared across the nation,
while the benefits accrue entirely in-state. Each state has an incentive to expand
276
liability.
In a powerfil article published a decade ago, Douglas Laycock argued that
the choice-of-law doctrines that drive modem products liability litigation are
unconstitutional. 277 A systematic preference for home-state law in interstate
disputes, Laycock argued, violates the basic premise of equality among states
and their citizens, a premise which underpins the structure and logic of the
Constitution and several of its specific clauses. One need not accept Laycock's
dramatic conclusion to acknowledge that joint cross-border exploitation under
the heading of "liability" is sufficiently problematic to trigger the Compact
Clause.278

The MSA, moreover (and in any event), systematizes cross-border
exploitation in several ways. First, it ensures that the costs are paid by
consumers, rather than the defendant-corporations' workers and shareholders.
Second, it provides that the proceeds go into the states' treasuries, rather than to
276.

Michael McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products-Liability
LAW 90, 92 (Walter Olson ed., 1988).
277. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and TerritorialStates: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice ofLaw, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1992).
278. As noted ad nauseam,the Compact Clause was meant to protect states against
more than "sister"-state practices that are already unconstitutional under some other
constitutional provision-for the excellent reason that such practices become more
troublesome, not less so, when states exercise them collusively.
Reform, NEW DIRECTIONS INLIABILITY
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harmed individuals. In other words, while the MSA's price effects may reduce
future consumption, the MSA severs liability from the state purposes of
deterrence and compensation that might otherwise be thought to justify an
incidental effect on interstate commerce. Third, the MSA imposes payment
obligations on producers who were not parties to the litigation nor, for that
matter, even in existence at the time of its instigation or conclusion.
The payments retain some attributes of damages. But those are trivial; it is
more natural to think of the "damages" as a tax.279 That tax would clearly be
unconstitutional if any one state attempted to impose it. (An attempt by, say,
Minnesota to impose a national excise tax would obviously be unconstitutional;
the only question is whether the states, acting in concert, may bring about that
feat.) Professor Ayres has identified "this extraterritorial due process challenge
[as] the strongest grounds for attacking" the MSA and state settlements 8 -- and
identified its shortcomings: no competent plaintiff can be found. The case,
moreover, would have to be litigated in front of a state court, and "we should not
put great faith in state tribunals being able to make [a] disinterested
determination of either th[e] standing question or the underlying substantive
issue.""8 While that may be a slight overstatement,282 Ayres is surely right on
the larger point: supremacy alone is an uncertain business, and courts cannot be
relied upon. That was James Madison's case for the negative, and with respect
to state compacts, the Convention emphatically agreed. The MSA and its fate
in the courts prove the Founders' wisdom.
3. Agency Problems
The MSA entrusts the National Association of Attorneys General
("NAAG") with continuing administrative and enforcement duties. These
activities are financed through assessments on the Participating Manufacturers.283
In addition, Participating Manufacturers must severally pay $50 million into a

279. Dagan & White, supra note 225, at 426.
280. Ayres, supra note 265, at 603.
28 1. Ayres, supranote 265, at 603-04 (footnote omitted). An excellent reason for
that suspicion, which Ayres does not fully spell out, is that a state court could invalidate
only its own state's extraterritorial taxation. Other states' impositions on the state's
citizens would remain unaffected.
282. One plaintiff has managed to maneuver an extraterritoriality claim against the
MSA into federal court, but it was rejected by the court. See Star Scientific, Inc. v.
Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 355-56 (4th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Star Sci., Inc. v. Kilgore,
123 S.Ct. 93 (2002). Star Scientific's claim differed from the theory sketched by Ayres
in two respects: it was asserted under a dormant Commerce Clause (rather than Due
Process) theory, and it concerned not the Settling Manufacturers' "damages" but the
MSA provisions for Non-Participating Manufacturers' escrow payments.
283. MSA, supra note 1, at VIII(a); III(p)(3); VII(g); VIII(b).
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NAAG-administered fund to supplement the states' enforcement and
implementation efforts.284 The NAAG's role under the MSA has been compared
28 5
to that of a federal regulatory agency.
The MSA displays, in a particularly drastic form, the same structural
problem as the MTC: imperfectly monitored and controlled state agents-in this
case, attorneys general-agree to a binding multistate scheme and its ongoing
administration by a supra-state agency, whose decisions are then presented to
state legislatures and state courts as a fait accompli.2 6 NAAG decisions
profoundly affect the states' general revenues, as well as the disposalof those
revenues. "Agency problem" does not begin to describe the difficulties with this
policy-making process: one wonders why states still have legislatures.
What distinguishes the MSA from the MTC is the pervasiveness of agency
problems in its creation. The drafting of the MSA and the establishment of a
national producer cartel in secret negotiations between industry representatives,
trial lawyers, and selected state attorneys general illustrates that the dynamics of
the MSA effectively left the citizens of many states, and their elected officials,
without any voice. In the early stages of the state tobacco litigation, Alabama's
attorney general refused to file a lawsuit in his state, sharply criticized the legal
theories on which the lawsuits in other states were based, and argued
vociferously against a comprehensive settlement. 87 In the end, he, too, signed
the MSA. At that stage, Alabama's position no longer made a difference with
respect to the collective policy choice and the attendant cost for (tobaccoconsuming) Alabama citizens; the only question was whether or not the state
should accept a proportionate share of the proceeds. The agency problem, in
other words, is not that the MSA drove a wedge between the citizens of Alabama
and their elected official.2 88 The problem is that Alabama citizens' choice was

284. MSA, supra note 1, at VIII(c).
285. See, e.g., Charles Joseph Harris, Note, State Tobacco Settlement: A Windfall
ofProblems, 17 J.L. &POL. 167, 168, 192-93 (2002).

286. Id. at 191-94; see also DeBow, supranote 231, at 563. As to state "courts,"
recall that a state court refusal to enter a settlement and model statute entails the state's
loss of a portion of its MSA proceeds; supranote 262.
287. Bill Pryor, Litigators'SmokeScreen, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1997, at A 14. See
Pryor, supra note 275, at 1885.

288. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the official champions of the state antitobacco campaign, rather than the opponents, may have acted at variance with their

constituents' preferences.

Opinion polls in Mississippi-the first state to file

suit-indicated public opposition to such a lawsuit, and the state's attorney general filed
the case in an equity court so as to avoid a trial by jury. DERTHICK, supra note 227, at
75-76. The attorneys general of Minnesota and Massachusetts, who had vigorously
championed the lawsuits, lost their subsequent bids for the governor's offices in their
states; Mr. Pryor, who had fiercely resisted the lawsuits, was returned to his position as
Alabama's Attorney General. Id. at 225-26.
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made for them by the attorneys general of neighboring Mississippi and far-away
Minnesota and Massachusetts.289
The agency problems just sketched are the political face of the dynamic that
drives the entire MSA-the sequential imposition of externalities. Beyond some
tipping point, joining the cartel becomes the dominant strategy for every state,
and defection becomes impossible. That observation provides a conclusive
objection to an already-rejected argument for a latitudinarian Compact Clause
jurisprudence-to wit, the notion that the Compact Clause negative is
unnecessary because collective action problems provide adequate protection
against state cartels.29 ° Unpersuasive, to my mind, even in settings where
collective action problems do impede state collusion to the detriment of sister
states, the argument cannot possibly apply when collective action dynamics
facilitate state cartels.
4. Federal Interests
Star Scientific v. Beales29' is to date the only appellate judicial decision on
the MSA's compatibility with the Compact Clause. In an extremely cursory
discussion, a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the MSA
passes muster under the U.S. Steel precedent. The MSA, the court determined,
does not encroach on federal power or interfere with federal supremacy, and it
creates no authority that the states could not exercise in its absence.292 The
application of the U.S. Steel test to the MSA, however, is not remotely so
straightforward. On Ayres' extraterritorial taxation theory, for instance, the
MSA quite clearly exceeds every individual state's authority. The question
becomes whether the states may do by collusion what they may not do alone.
Putting aside that question and its blazingly obvious answer, the Star Scientific
court dispensed even with the U.S. Steel pretense that the test is one of potential
impact on federal authority293 and instead looked exclusively to actualconflicts
between the MSA's provisions and federal law. It found such conflicts lacking

289. Arguably, dissident states did still have a voice. Under its terms, the MSA
requires the assent of eighty percent of the states, representing eighty percent of the
allocable payment shares, to take full effect. Thus, a fairly small number of states, acting
in concert, could have thwarted the deal. Any such concerted action, however, could
have been thwarted by the participating manufacturers' unilateral waiver of the eightypercent requirements. See MSA, supra note 1, at II(u)(2). In any event, an antisettlement coalition would have encountered insurmountable coordination and defection
problems.
290. See supra notes 219-20 and sources cited therein.
291. Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Star Sci., Inc. v. Kilgore, 123 S. Ct. 93 (2002).
292. Id. at 360.
293. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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on account of the MSA's savings clauses, which render the agreement
enforceable only to the extent that it is consistent with now and future federal
law (such as the Bankruptcy Code).294 But while it is certainly comforting to
learn that the parties to the MSA did not intend to repeal the Supremacy Clause,
the inclusion of savings clauses indicates a belief even on their part that the MSA
might very well present conflicts with federal law.
Provisions of the MSA that were not before the Star Scientific court are
equally problematic. For example, the MSA's advertising prohibitions and
regulations appear quite clearly preempted by federal law.2 95 The MSA's
compatibility with federal antitrust law is a very close question.296 And, in
negotiating the financial terms of the MSA, the parties were-under the
plaintiffs' own idiosyncratic theory-bargaining over the recovery of the federal
government's money and its contractual claims under the federal Medicaid
statute.297 One could argue, on the authority of U.S. Steel, that the Compact
Clause requires approval only for compacts that affect the federal government's
supremacy, as distinct from its contractual rights vis-A-vis the states. Like so

294. Star Scientific, 278 F.3d at 360.
295. Cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding that
Massachusetts tobacco advertising regulations are preempted by Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act) with MSA III (stipulating content restrictions on tobacco
advertising). Of course, tobacco manufacturers may voluntarily agree to advertising
restrictions. The entry of such an agreement by a state court, however, is more than a
mere notarization of a private contract, especially when the agreement purports to govern
the rights and obligations of third parties (in the instance of the MSA, non-participating
manufacturers). It is an official state act that is subject to ordinary preemption analysis.
To be technical about it, that analysis affects only the entry of the MSA in the various
states, not the MSA itself. But since the MSA requires entry by state court consent
decree in every state, the practical effect is the same.
296. See the careful, extended discussion in A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip
MorrisInc., 263 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001). The obvious federal antitrust implications of
a tobacco deal were a principal reason for the submission of the Resolution for
congressional approval. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 231, at 324. At the time, the
Federal Trade Commission voiced grave reservations about the Resolution and its
compatibility with federal antitrust law, and the proposed congressional legislation
contained an explicit antitrust exemption. The equally problematic MSA itself has, of
course, received no such dispensation.
297. The federal government affirmatively asserted its claims on the payments, to
the shrill protests of the state officials who were doing the negotiating. See, e.g., John
Schwartz, States Want US. Out of Tobacco Deal, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1997, at A-2 1.
In May 1999, months after the enactment of the MSA, Congress explicitly disavowed its
interest in the funds and authorized each state to use MSA proceeds "for any
expenditures determined appropriate by the State." 1999 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57(1999) (amending Sec. 1903(d)(3)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(d)(3)). The need to disavow the federal
government's claims only confirms that those claims were in fact affected by the MSA.
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many tenets of Compact Clause doctrine, however, that claim cannot possibly be
right.
D. Less Than Process
Star Scientific reflects the poverty and pathology of modem Compact
Clause analysis. The court reduced the judicial inquiry to the enhancement of
the power of the states, collectively, "quoad the national government" (in the
U.S. Steel Court's weird phraseology). It then found such an enhancement only
in the event of an actual conflict with federal law, thus rendering the Compact
Clause wholly academic. The step from potential impact to actual conflicts is,
for amply noted reasons, a clear error. The larger, more fateful error lies in the
first step-that is, in the demise of federalism's horizontal, state-to-state
dimension and of the purpose, central to the Compact Clause, of preventing
states from ganging up on sister states. The MSA illustrates the dangers that
attend the evisceration of that protection: a handful of states set in motion a
process that drove all states, many of them unwilling and some bitterly opposed,
into a uniform regulatory and tax scheme. The fact that all state governments
benefit ex post does nothing to remedy the constitutional process failure.
The MSA is comparable to the spontaneous creation of a federal grant-inaid system: the proceeds of a national tax on tobacco consumption are
transferred to states that agree to abide by certain restrictions.29 Such programs
are the stock-in-trade of the American welfare state, but they are not entirely
unproblematic. While states are nominally free to participate or not in a given
program, the fact that each state's citizens will pay a share of the program costs
even if their state declines to accept the benefits renders an autonomous choice
illusory. In the absence of a credible constitutional commitment against
interstate redistribution, the states' pre-enactment strategy is strongly biased in
favor of legislation-lest the states that favor intervention in any event massage
the distribution formula further to their advantage. Post-enactment, the states'
default strategy is to change the mix of federal funds and obligations in their
favor. Barring truly exceptional circumstances, defection becomes impossible
even if the federal grant pays only a fraction of the program cost (the usual case),
and even if the state pays a disproportionate share (relative to sister states) of the
program cost.299

298. The final negotiation of the MSA, Martha Derthick has written, "was as if the
[negotiating] group had been constituted to perform legislative acts.... [L]itigants and
tort lawyers would now sit down, much as Congress does when it legislates grants-in-aid,
to distribute benefits among the states." DERTHICK, supra note 227, at 171.

299. Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment: On Public Choice, PublicInterest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1355 (1993); Michael S.Greve, Against CooperativeFederalism,70 Miss. L.J. 557,594-
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While the asymmetry of costs and benefits that drives grants-in-aid and
conditional funding statutes may not constitute "coercion" in a constitutionally
significant sense,"' some scholars have come to view those dynamics as so
corrosive of constitutional federalism norms, and so conducive to horizontal
exploitation, as to warrant judicially enforced controls.01 While theirs is (still)
a minority view, it is sufficiently powerful to merit a response. That response
must rest on the ground that grants-in-aid schemes are legislated in and by the
United States Congress, where states can mobilize and exercise opposition, and

98 (2000). The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports this analysis: one cannot
readily think of a single case in which even a few states, let alone a majority of states,
have advocated the abolition of a burdensome federal grants program.
300. That, of course, is the generally accepted view of the matter. In
Massachusettsv. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
individual Massachusetts taxpayers challenged the federal Maternity Act, which extended
federal funding to states that agreed to participate in a federal entitlement program. Id.
at 479. Massachusetts argued that the statute effectively coerced the state into
participating, since her citizens would be asked to pay a share of the federal tax revenue
in any event. Id. The Supreme Court dismissed the state's and the taxpayers' cases on
jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 488-89. (For a trenchant analysis of this aspect of the
decision and its nexus with the merits, see Richard A. Epstein, Standing and
Spending-The Role of Legal & Equitable Principles, 4 CHAPMAN L. REv. 1 (2001)).
Having done so, the Court added that the state could avoid the "coercive" effects of the

federal statute "by the simple expedient of not yielding." Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482. The
Supreme Court has left open the possibility that some federal funding statutes may be
unconstitutionally coercive. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1987).
The "coercion," however, lies in the disadvantageous mix of federal funding and state
obligations and in the lack of a nexus between the two, not in the asymmetry between
taxpayer burdens and receipts.
301. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora'sBox of Federalism: The Case
for JudicialRestriction of FederalSubsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461,
481-85 (2001) (arguing that virtually all federal grants programs to states are
unconstitutional under New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and for other
reasons); Joshua D. Samoff, CooperativeFederalism,the DelegationofFederalPower,
andthe Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 205, 270-74 (1997) (arguing that general revenue
sharing constitutes excessive delegation of legislative power); and see especially Lynn
A. Baker, The SpendingPower and the FederalistRevival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 219-20
(2001) ("While [process federalism] may well ensure that 'state interests as such' are
protected against federal oppression, federal oppression is not the problem. The
problem, rather, lies in the ability of some states to harness the federal lawmaking power
to oppress other states." (footnotes omitted)). Baker's contention that such oppression
will occur with great regularity is buttressed by public choice theories that predict, on the
basis of a very modest assumption of information asymmetries between state officials and
their citizens, that the adoption of a re-distributive program in some states will eventually
produce a federal mandate, by virtue of dynamics paralleling those that produced the
MSA. Supermajoritarian obstacles at the federal level may not suffice to counteract that
tendency. Zelinsky, supra note 299, at 1402-03.
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where a multitude of competing interests may help to thwart excessively partial
legislation before those schemes unfold their inescapable economic dynamics.
Federalism's process protections constitute the bare constitutional minimum.
The MSA mirrors the economic dynamics of grants-in-aid legislation--but
shortcircuits the process protections that, minimal though they are, provide a
check on interstate exploitation. The MSA's precursor collapsed in Congress
under the weight of interest group conflicts. In other words, it failed for the
constitutionally envisioned reason. And so the MSA's architects moved to a less
open and cumbersome process of negotiation, where the range of interests could
be restricted and the hold-out states were left without a realistic chance.30 2 The
congressional consent requirement of the Compact Clause would provide a
safeguard against that maneuver. In dismantling that safeguard, the judiciary has
dismantled an enforceable constitutional protection for federalism. The courts'
position smacks in that regard of a process federalism that recognizes no
judicially enforceable federalism norms.30 3 But that characterization is unfair to
process federalism: extant Compact Clause theory, assuming it deserves that
honorific, will not even protect the process.30 4
VII. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
A. James Madison, Functionalist?
The Compact Clause, I have argued, is the Madisonian negative in a
specified range of application. Its purpose is to invert the ordinary supremacy
302. David S. Samford, CuttingDeals in Smoke-FilledFreeRooms: A CaseStudy
in Public Choice Analysis, 87 Ky. L.J. 845, 886-92, 899-900 (1999) (broader range of

interests prevented approval of the Resolution in Congress; exclusion of many interests,
including public health advocates, facilitated state-based settlement process).
303. See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards ofFederalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection ofthe NationalGovernment, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954). The most forceful articulation of a neo-Wechslerian perspective is
JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). For one

of the many critiques of the Supreme Court's "somewhat stunning" reliance on Wechsler
and Choper-prior to its recent re-discovery of federalisn--see Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 325 (1997) (citing and briefly discussing those
critiques). For a rare but valiant neo-neo-Wechslerian defense of process federalism as
something different from rank nationalism, see Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); and Larry Kramer, Puttingthe PoliticsBack
Into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).

304.

In this context, it is worth noting that even Garcia v. San Antonio

Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the high-water mark of the
Supreme Court's process federalism, contemplated judicial protections of the political

process itself. See id. at 554 (judicially enforced federalism norms should be "tailored
to compensate for possible failings in the national political process").
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rule operating on state enactments. One can argue with perfect justice that courts
ought to respect and enforce that constitutional arrangement-and leave it at that.
The structural argument for the Compact Clause can stand on its own, without
the crutch of a functional analysis. The purpose and, as it were, the function of
that analysis is simply to explicate the constitutional background presumption of
the Compact Clause: state agreements, as a class, are problematic in a way that
run-of-the-mill enactments by an individual state are not. The transaction cost
analysis shows that presumption to be warranted, and the compact risks it
delineates parallel the Founders' apprehensions.
No: James Madison did not anticipate the specific dangers and
arrangements discussed in the preceding sections. Conversely, he and his
contemporaries had every reason to contemplate dramatic compact risks that no
longer concern us, including the fear that economic warfare among the states
might engender actual war and the destruction of the Union. To deny these
differences is to invite ridicule. One easily dismissed complaint against the MSA
characterized the agreement as a "tax confederacy on American soil." ' 5 The
phrase, and the fear it conjures up, seem grossly overwrought.
And yet, the image of a single-purpose confederacy captures, albeit
awkwardly, the common theme of Madison's nightmares and modem-day
compacts-the problem of factionalism in a federal republic. Factionalism was
the central theme of Madison's campaign for a congressional negative.
Factionalism, too, is the theme behind regulatory compacts. The dangers posed
by regulatory compacts-compact formation at the behest of local interests
seeking to thwart federal intervention; the deliberate infliction of externalities;
cartelization and exploitation; the evasion of accountability and
responsibility-are so many facets of interest group bargains and political
accommodation.3 °6
Madison proposed a comprehensive negative as an essential safeguard
against faction. The Convention rejected that proposal and instead limited the
negative to state actions that could be expected to have substantial effects on
sister states and their citizens. Madison himself was, as noted, deeply skeptical
of the attempt to divide state activity so neatly into largely harmless, internal
measures and dangerous, external stuff. Its proponents, he thought, mistook the
outward symptoms of factionalism for the disease itself, and the clever design of
arresting factions at the state borders grossly underestimated the states' capacity
305. Hise v. Philip Morris, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1210 n.18 (N.D. Ok. 1999)
(citing plaintiffs' complaint).
306. Empirical studies show that regulatory compacts are typically a response to
interest group demands at the state level. See, e.g., WELDON V. BARTON, INTERSTATE
COMPACTS INTHE POLITICAL PROCESS 8-33, 164 (1967); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FLOOD CONTROL POLITICS: THE CONNECTICUT RIVER VALLEY PROBLEM 1927-1950,250
(1953); PARRIS N. GLENDENING & MAVIS MANN REEVES, PRAGMATIC FEDERALISM 199

(1977).
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for obstinacy and evasion. But the Convention's choice reflects Madison's fears
to the extent that state factionalism is both more likely and more dangerous when
it crosses borders-more likely, because schemes that impose costs on outsiders
tend to face little internal opposition; more dangerous, because cross-border
exploitation undermines the foundations of constitutional federalism.3 7
Federalism must start with a premise of formal equality among states-not
because they are in fact equal, but because no other genuinely federal principle
is plausible."' This in turn implies a principle of non-aggression and nondiscrimination among states: in a world of equal (contiguous) states, limited
territory, and scarce resources, no other principle makes sense. In protecting
against unapproved state agreements to the detriment of sister states, the
Compact Clause reflects both these principles. The inversion of the default
rule-relative to the mere supremacy rule that operates on single-state
enactments-is, admittedly and especially by Madisonian lights, an imperfect
arrangement, because states may easily pursue factional schemes to the detriment
of sister states even when they act alone. We have in recognition of that reality
created a broader negative and called it the dormant Commerce Clause. As a
constitutional first cut, however, the Compact Clause rule is perfectly reasonable.
It guards against the distinct risks of collusion and, in so doing, ensures a rough
equality and reciprocity.
The twin presumptions of equality and non-aggression in place, federalism
must organize the exchanges that states may wish to undertake. Some exchanges
(called treaties) threaten such a dramatic departure from the initial, equal
allocation of entitlements that the Constitution subjects them to a per se
prohibition. That rule, though, when applied to all state bargains, would
suppress beneficial agreements along with nefarious ones. The constitutional
task, then, is to allow mutually beneficial bargains, while guarding against the
constitutional risk. To that end, the Compact Clause provides a monopolistic
forum and procedure for all other exchanges. In that forum, under those
procedures, states may cooperate. They may even change the original allocation

307. The edifice need not tumble; we can prop it up in all sorts of ways. But it is
then no longer the same building.
308. Some federal systems (such as Germany) have departed from formal equality

and have instead constitutionalized principles principles of material equivalence and
solidarity among states. Such systems entrust the central authority with an affirmative
obligation to redress inequalities that might newly emerge from, among other things, the
exercise of state autonomy. Unlike our federalism, however, this brand of federalism
reduces the states' "autonomy" to the independent administration of federal programs.
For a sophisticated defense of administrative federalism and a proposal to enshrine it in
American law, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't, 96
MICH. L. REv. 813 (1998). For arather more skeptical perspective, see Michael S. Greve,
Against CooperativeFederalism,70 MIss. L. J. 557 (2000).
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of entitlements and collude to exploit sister states. But they must do so within
the constitutional bounds and through the established, agreed-upon procedures
and institutions. A principle that would allow everyone to defect from that
arrangement would satisfy the demand of equality; but it is a lottery for the
states, not a principle on which they can rely. Therefore, equality requires the
categorical rule of the Compact Clause: no one may defect.
By emasculating the congressional approval requirement, and by reducing
Compact Clause analysis to its vertical, federal-state relation, the Supreme
Court's Compact Clause invites defection-in the name of, of all things,
"harmony" and "federalism."'30 9 The functional analysis just presented, in
contrast, emphasizes federalism's horizontal dimension-the question of what
equal states may and may not do to each other. Extant doctrine views federalism
as a shorthand for the states' opportunistic agenda; the functional analysis insists
that federalism must respect the states' equality and integrity. In so insisting, it
tracks the logic of the Compact Clause and the larger federal architecture.
The functional analysis, then, is consistent with the conclusion that the
Compact Clause ought to be enforced as written. But it does not quite compel
that conclusion. The identification of discrete (though connected and
overlapping) compact risks may allow a more nuanced and perhaps efficient
Compact Clause rule than the Founders' congressional approval requirement for
any and all state agreements. Unlike the Compact Clause, the functional analysis
contemplates the existence of a set of exchanges that can, ex ante, be shown to
pose no constitutional risk, and which should, therefore, be exempt from the
negative. While this approach will turn out to have its own problems,310 it merits
exploration for pragmatic reasons. The Madisonian argument runs up against
adverse Supreme Court precedent, cooperative enthusiasms, and entrenched
interests. The perceived overbreadth of the Compact Clause has provided the
impulse, as well as a patina of plausibility, for its emasculation. Insofar as a
functional interpretation addresses that concern, it may aid in reviving the
Clause.
To be sure, the conciliation can only go so far. Any Compact Clause
doctrine that is remotely faithful to the constitutional text and structure, for
example, will conclude that U.S. Steel was preposterous in its reasoning and
wrong in its outcome. Any such doctrine will likewise compel the conclusion
that the MSA is unconstitutional. Still, a serious functional Compact Clause
doctrine can incorporate and explain many and perhaps most Compact Clause
precedents. Moreover, such a doctrine is broadly consistent with, and may in
fact reinforce, the two most attractive features of the modem Supreme Court's

309. See, e.g., New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1,6 (1959) (quoted suprain the text
accompanying note 28).
310. See infra text accompanying notes 378-79.
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federalism-the partial revival of enumerated powers, and the emphasis on
political accountability. 3 '
B. A Functional,ConstitutionalCompact Clause Test
1. The Test
I follow extant Compact Clause doctrine in assuming that a state agreement
or compact, in the constitutionally relevant sense, must impose an enforceable
contractual obligation, for the duration of the arrangement, on the participating
states.3" 2 I assume, moreover, that an agreement or compact in the
constitutionally relevant sense requires participating states to act in their official
capacity as states, not in a proprietary or market-participant capacity. 3 ' Once
such a state agreement has been shown to exist without congressional approval,
a constitutional challenge for lack of congressional consent should succeed if the
plaintiff makes a credible showing that the compact, reasonably construed, poses
one of the four now-familiar risks-an exercise of powers concurrently
possessed by the Congress; interstate externalities; cartelization; or agency
problems, including a dilution of political accountability and a delegation of state
legislative or executive power. Defendants may rebut that case by proving that
the proposed compact poses none of those risks. Absent such a showing, the
compact is void without congressional consent.

311.

I have argued elsewhere that enumerated powers and anti-delegation

arguments-rather than "states' rights" protections under the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments-constitute the most attractive features of the Supreme Court's federalism.
MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, How IT COULD HAPPEN 79-82

passim (1999).
312. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985).
313. State A's purchase of electric power from publicly owned utility in State B
is an ordinary contract, not an agreement or compact requiring congressional consent.
Similarly, and notwithstanding hysterical assertions that enforcement of the Compact

Clause might lay waste to the National Association of Governors or the National
Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") (see, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 19), ex
officio lobbying and information-sharing associations of state officials are not agreements
or compacts among states as states. Where such organizations play a role in negotiating,

administering, and enforcing an agreement or compact, it is that instrument, not the
sponsoring organization, that requires congressional approval. Likewise, the NAAG's

enforcement guidelines and increasingly common multistate enforcement actions,
especially for alleged antitrust and consumer protection violations, present a variety of
political, economic, and legal problems. Barring an enforceable mutual obligation,
however, they do not present a Compact Clause problem. Jason Lynch, Note,
Federalism,SeparationofPowers, and the Role ofState Attorneys Generalin Multistate
Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1998, 2016-22 (2001).
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In requiring plaintiffs to establish no more than a reasonable
likelihood-while requiring defendants to prove that no such likelihood
exists-the proposed test stacks the deck in favor of the plaintiff. That is
intentional, and necessary to afford the Compact Clause any room at all. Even
the US. Steel Court purported to hold that the appropriate Compact Clause test
goes to potential rather than real effects."a 4 The Court proceeded, however, to
ignore that pronouncement and effectively required the plaintiffs to prove that
the MTC infringed on federal supremacy. Shifting the burden of proof in
Compact Clause cases to defendants is a procedural means of re-orienting the
judicial inquiry towards risks and potentialities, rather than certainties.
2. Precedents and Conceptual Lines
The Supreme Court has tended to scrutinize the effects of individual
compacts on a case-by-case basis.3" 5 The proposed test, in contrast, turns on
compact risks per se, rather than on the expected effects of any individual
compact, and so substitutes a conceptual rule for a case-by-case inquiry. If a
particular compact is shown to be a cartel, it requires congressional consent; the
magnitude of the effects is irrelevant. Likewise, a compact commission cannot
be a little bit pregnant with delegated state powers; if it exercises such powers
to any extent, the compact requires congressional consent. A conceptual rule is
appropriate to the structure of the Compact Clause, which commits an
assessment of effects and consequences to the Congress rather than the courts.
And in fact, leading Compact Clause precedents imply, even though they do not
articulate, conceptual distinctions akin to the ones proposed here. Boundary
compacts are one example; reciprocity agreements are another.
The precedents hold that a state agreement to demarcate more precisely a
pre-existing boundary line does not require congressional consent,3" 6 whereas a
boundary change does. That rule rests on a conceptual distinction, not on casespecific effects. One can easily imagine a (small, inconsequential) boundary
change that would neither affect the supremacy of the United States nor entail
adverse consequences for sister states. But it is likely that a boundary-changing
agreement might have such consequences, and nothing more need be shown to
bring the agreement under the ambit of the Compact Clause. The defendant state
(or states), in contrast, must prove that those risks are non-existent, and the only
way to do so is to show that the agreement does not in fact change a boundary.
Similarly, the functional test supplies a plausible rationale for the judicial
exemption of so-called reciprocity agreements from the Compact Clause

314. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472 (1978).
315. Engdahl, InterstateArrangements, supra note 13, at 68.
316.

New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369-70 (1976); Virginia v.

Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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negative. 17 Reciprocity agreements pose no danger of cartelization or thirdparty externalities, and they delegate no powers to an interstate agency. Such
agreements may affect areas where Congress is competent to
legislate-foremost, interstate commerce.
But they cannot burden that
commerce and, in that sense, interfere with federal prerogatives.3 18
By way of illustration, varying and conflicting state regulations require
nurses to obtain a license in the state where they wish to practice. Licensed
nurses in each state attempt to restrict market entry by nurses licensed in another
state, 1 9 thus creating a regulatory race to the bottom that requires some
coordinated response. A state attempt to "solve" the coordination problem by
means of regulatory harmonization, to be accomplished by an Interstate Nurse
Licensing Commission, would pose dangers of cartelization, regulation in
restraint of interstate commerce, and a delegation of state authority to a suprastate entity. Even if the arrangement could be shown to constitute a plausible
policy response, it should require congressional consent. In contrast, if states
solved the problem through reciprocal recognition-such that each participating
state recognizes the nursing licenses issued by another state-no risk of
cartelization, externalities, or delegation arises. And while mutual recognition
affects interstate commerce, it solves the coordination problem through private
arbitrage rather than political harmonization-thereby liberating, not burdening,
interstate commerce. In short, reciprocity or mutual recognition arrangements
pose none of the identified risks, and may, therefore, be exempted from the
Compact Clause negative. 2

317. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S.
1 (1939); St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896).
318. A possible exception to this general proposition-and a difficult problerrm-is
posed by reciprocity agreements that are by their terms limited to selected states. Such
agreements might provide at least a piecemeal solution to state parochialism and
interstate coordination problems, and a categorical, all-or-nothing non-discrimination rule
might deter such advances. Still, the discriminatory and exploitative potential of selective
agreements to my mind precludes an exemption from the congressional approval
requirement.
As noted supra note 103, the Supreme Court confronted the problem of selective
reciprocity in NortheastBancorp Inc. v. Bd.of Governors of FederalReserve Sys., 472
U.S. 159 (1985). The most plausible defense of the state statutes there at issue-though
not the Supreme Court's defense-is that the Douglas Amendment, as interpreted by the
Federal Reserve Board, constituted an implicit congressional approval of selective state
reciprocity agreements. If that understanding of the Douglas Amendment is untenable,
Northeast Bancorp was wrongly decided as to the Compact Clause claim.
319. See Alex Maurizi, OccupationalLicensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL.
EcoN. 399, 413 (1974) (see especially sources cited therein).
320. I have found one explicit judicial articulation of this rationale: General
Expressways, Inc. v. Iowa Reciprocity Bd., 163 N.W.2d 413,420 (Iowa 1968) ("[T]his
being a purely fiscal interstate agreement which was intended to encourage ratherthan
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The fact that such disparate arrangements as boundary demarcations and
reciprocity agreements should be found under the same, no-approval-required
umbrella is explained by a thoroughly Madisonian argument. The dangers of
compacts arise from the operation of faction. One-shot boundary demarcations
do not implicate factions. Reciprocity agreements expose domestic factions to
foreign competition, signaling that such factions have been crushed. The rare
instances in which states manage to do so do not warrant the suspicion that
attends to institutionalized interest-group bargains.
3. Enumerated Powers
In addition to "exemptions" for boundary demarcations and reciprocity
agreements, a functional Compact Clause test can accommodate a "police power
exemption" to ameliorate the overbreadth concern that has driven judicial
analysis since Virginia v. Tennessee. The risk of state bargaining with rights that
are held, solely or concurrently, by the national government does not arise in
areas where the national government has no rights-that is, beyond the purview
of the enumerated powers and the Supremacy Clause. Hence, states need not
necessarily obtain congressional approval for compacts that fall outside the scope
of federal enumerated powers.32'
As suggested earlier, an implied "police power exception" to the Compact
Clause was quite probably what Justice Field had in mind in penning his dicta
in Virginia v. Tennessee.322 The point was lost due to Justice Field's lack of
clarity, the cooperative enthusiasms of later generations, and the de facto
renunciation of the enumerated powers doctrine. Arguably, the latter
development contributed to the wholesale inversion of the Compact Clause in
U.S. Steel. Recall Justice Powell's rejoinder to the dissenters' observation that
the MTC presented a grave interference with federal supremacy: the dissent,
Powell averred, confused federal interests with federal supremacy.323 At the time
of U.S. Steel, virtually nothing fell beyond the reach of congressional power
(with the lone and soon-repealed exception of government employment

restrain commerce among the states, it is not the type of interstate contract which

requires Congressional consent.") (emphasis added).
321. If the compact violates other constraints (e.g., by exposing sister states to
externalities), it will still require approval.
322. Supra text at 321. One can find stray suggestions to the same effect in later
cases. See, e.g., New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 11 (1959) ("The Constitution of the
United States does not preclude resourcefulness of relationships between states on
matters as to which there is no grantofpower to Congress."). New York, however, is an
extended exercise in adjudication by free association, and the quoted passage no more
constitutes a holding than anything else in the opinion.

323. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 479 n.33 (1978).
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Under these circumstances,

the Compact Clause would require congressional consent in literally all cases.
Confronted with that conclusion, Justice Powell limited the scope of the Clause
in the only way he knew: instead of requiring consent for all compacts thatfall
under the umbrella of federal supremacy (and in that sense, "interest" the federal
government), he restricted it to compacts that actually conflict with it. For
reasons discussed at great length, that conclusion is very wrong.
The Supreme Court's partial rediscovery of the enumerated powers doctrine
over the past decade provides an opening for a supremacy exemption that is
broadly consistent with the Compact Clause or, at least, does not turn it on its
head. Under a functional test (though not, of course, under the original Compact
Clause), states would need no congressional consent to form a compact on the
prevention of gender-based violence, which we know to be beyond the
jurisdiction of the United States Congress.325 I also assume, although we do not
yet know, that states are free to negotiate and enforce an interstate compact on
the prosecution of purely in-state and non-economic crimes, such as the
possession of drugs.326 A state agreement regulating isolated wetlands (for
instance, to facilitate cross-border swaps for mitigation purposes) may likewise
be permissible without congressional approval.327 The scope of compacts that
require no congressional approval expands as the scope of enumerated powers
contracts. If the federal government lacks the power to legislate on the interstate
enforcement of child support obligations, state compacts to that end require no
congressional approval. If Congress does possess that authority (as appellate
courts have held), such compacts require approval.32

324. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
325. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
326. I assume that a federal provision of this type would fall outside the scope of
the Commerce Clause as interpreted in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. Lower courts have split on the question. See Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause
JurisprudenceEncountersthe Lower Courts(unpublished law review manuscript, on file
with author) (surveying post-Morrisoncase law).
327. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2000) (suggesting, but not holding, that regulation of wetlands
isolated from waters of the United States exceeds scope of congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause).
328. All appellate courts that have addressed the question have held that the federal
Child Support RecoveryAct, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000), constitutes valid Commerce Clause
regulation. See, e.g., United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001). But see id.
at 494 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute does not regulate interstate
commerce and therefore exceeds congressional authority). It bears mention that the states
have adopted-without congressional consent-several compacts on closely related
matters such as adoption, child custody, and foster-care placement. See Vorr, supra note
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More controversially, the functional analysis suggests that state compacts
that affect federal spending do not, by virtue of that fact alone, require
congressional consent. A number of interstate arrangements, such as various
education compacts to which many states are parties, regulate and coordinate
state functions that are typically performed under federal spending statutes.
These compacts are of obvious "interest" to the national government in the sense
that they may affect the distribution of federal funds. Federal spending, though,
is not an "interest" of the sort that should trigger the congressional consent
requirement, because the exercise of the spending power is not an exercise of
federal supremacy in the same way in which, say, a regulation of interstate
commerce is an assertion of federal supremacy.329 States must of course comply
with the contractual obligations they have agreed to undertake in exchange for
federal funding, but they cannot "interfere" with federal spending in the way in
which they may-and often do-interfere with federal regulation under an
enumerated power. Suppose the states agreed, one and all, to refuse federal
funding for sexual abstinence education:33 ° While that agreement would
obviously frustrate federal objectives, it cannot be said to interfere with national
supremacy. The states simply agree to restrict, by mutual agreement, their
otherwise unlimited autonomy to accept or reject federal funds. They are
bargaining with and over rights that belong to them exclusively, and no
congressional approval may be required.'

10, at 27-32.
329. A federal Spending Clause statute trumps, supersedes, or preempts nothing.
Its force stems entirely from the state's acceptance of the funds; if a state refuses to
accept the money, nothing follows. For a forceful scholarly presentation of this view, see
David Engdahl, The Spending Clause, 44 DUKE L.J. I(1994). The same perspective is
implied by the U.S. Supreme Court's characterization of Spending Clause statutes as
being "in the nature of a contract." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 17 (1981); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002) (nothing
"short of an unambiguously conferred right support[s] a cause of action" or remedy under
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
330. The federal program, 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2000), is one of the exceedingly rare
federal funding programs for which states have refused to accept funding. See Lynn
Smith, Chastity Makes a Comeback, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at Al (describing
California's refusal to accept funding).
33 1. The proposition requires important provisos. The argument assumes, first,
that Congress lacks the authority to regulate the funded state activities directly, under its
enumerated powers. With respect to education, that assumption maybe inferred, though
with no great confidence, from United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). It assumes,
second, that the state compact in question does not purport to violate or circumvent
federal strictures with which the compacting states have agreed to comply as a condition
of receiving federal funds. Finally, the argument assumes that the state compact at issue
does not threaten other, independent federal interests. See infra note 335.
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4. Agency and Delegation
Under a functional Compact Clause test, a credible showing that a compact
poses a risk of delegating state power and of diluting the political accountability
of state officials would trigger the congressional consent requirement. By that
standard, state agreements that establish standing interstate commissions and
administrative bodies should be subject to aper se requirement of congressional
approval, at least to the extent that such agencies perform more than merely
consultative or information-gathering functions: s32 any such body might wind
up exercising delegated state powers, and that risk alone suffices to trigger the
Compact Clause negative.333 The special suspicion of compact commissions is
broadly consistent with extant precedent,334 and it dovetails with the Supreme
Court's federalism decisions. In fact some of those decisions very nearly compel
the per se rule.
In the course of its partial rehabilitation of the enumerated powers doctrine,
the Court has also resurrected the principle that the states may not delegate their
sovereign (police) powers to the Congress. That injunction is inherent in the
notion of limited, enumerated powers.335 Nothing follows from it, practically

332. An exception for information-gathering functions finds some support in the
Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. In Printz v. United States, the Court
suggested that a constitutional prohibition against the federal "commandeering" of state
officials does not extend to federal mandates requiring state data collection and
maintenance. 521 U.S. 898, 917-18 (1997). The most plausible rationale for this
exception is that data collection is merely a ministerial rather than a true sovereign state
function. Analogously, a delegation of such functions to a state compact commission
seems less troublesome than a delegation of sovereign, coercive powers.
333. Since state cartels almost invariably require joint administration, see supra
notes 158-64 and accompanying text, a per se rule that subjects such instruments to
congressional approval also buys protection against state cartels. That may be a
considerable advantage, since the anti-joint-body rule is bound to be subject to fewer
judicial errors than an anti-cartel rule.
334. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Gov. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 175 (1985) (joint body "indicia" of compact); Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278
F.3d 339,360 (4th Cir.) (administrative body created by MSA establishes compact), cert.
denied sub nom. Star Sci., Inc. v. Kilgore, 123 S. Ct. 93 (2002).
335. The anti-delegation principle was stated explicitly in several cases decided in
(dual) federalism's heyday. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 560 (1891)
(citing Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610, 623 (1872); United States v. Dewitt, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 41,45 (1869); and Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 304
(1851)). Contemporary cases acknowledge the principle by implication. For example,
the endorsement of a federal civil remedy for gender-based violence by a large majority
of states does not render such regulation constitutional. United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 653 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting states' amicus support for federal
enactment). The majority opinion in Morrison does not respond to the dissent's
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speaking, if congressional powers are not actually enumerated (or, what amounts
to the same thing, enumerated but unlimited). But while that was pretty much
the Supreme Court's federalism riff at the time of US. Steel, subsequent
decisions have partially restored federalism's logic.
New York v. United States336 invalidated a core provision of the 1985 LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act.337 Intriguingly, though of no
direct consequence to the delegation point here at issue, the act encouraged the
formation of state compacts for the disposal and storage of low-level nuclear
waste. Through a convoluted statutory scheme, it essentially subjected states that
failed, within a certain timeframe, to join a congressionally approved compact
to a severe federal regulatory regime, obligating each state to provide for the
disposal of waste created within its borders. That approach had been developed
and urged upon Congress by the states, acting under the umbrella of the National
Governors Association ("NGA"). 338 In 1990, New York, one of the few states
that had failed to join a regional compact, challenged the statute on Tenth
Amendment and other grounds. While sustaining large portions of the statutory
scheme, the Supreme Court found that a so-called "Take Title" provision--one
of the statutory "incentives" to pressure states into implementing, by compact or
on their own, acceptable waste disposal pflicies-impermissibly
"commandeered" the states' legislative processes.
In reaching that conclusion, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
confronted the argument, pressed forcefully in a dissent written by Justice
White, 39 that New York had consented to the statute, including its contested
incentive provisions. In enacting the statute, the dissent argued, Congress had
merely "refereed" a process of state bargaining.3"' New York's participation in
that process over a period of many years "fairly indicate[d] its approval of the
interstate agreement process"34 ' embodied in the statute. In the dissenters' view,
New York's belated resistance to the incentive provisions constituted an
impermissible attempt to welsh on a deal that had gone sour for the state.
The majority rejected this argument on the ground that New York could not
consent to the federal commandeering of its legislative process, because the
Constitution does not grant Congress such a power. Explicitly analogizing the
observation-most likely, because the states' willingness to surrender their powers is of
no constitutional consequence.
336. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
337. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 202(l)(b)(l)-(14)).
338. For a colorful description of the states' and the NGA's agenda-setting role,
see New York, 505 U.S. at 189-94 (White, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 188 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined by Justice Blackmun

and Justice Stevens, who also dissented separately.
340. Id. at 194 (White, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 196 (White, J., dissenting).
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"consensual" transfer of state authority to the national government to the
principles governing delegation in horizontal, separation of powers cases, the
Court determined that "[s]tate officials... cannot consent to the enlargement
of
3 42
the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. 1
The application of this anti-delegation principle to the delegation of state
authority to compact commissions is not altogether straightforward. First, the
scope of the New York holding itself is unclear, and the broad statement just
quoted cannot be quite right. For instance, while Congress lacks the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I powers,343 states may
consent to such an abrogation by accepting federal funds, provided that the
Spending Clause statute clearly states the congressional intent. 44 (New York
itself, in a different part of the majority opinion, explicitly declared federal
"conditional spending" programs constitutionally unproblematic.)3 45 Second,
New York can be read to suggest that states may delegate their sovereign power
to anyone they want (including perhaps compact commissions)--except to the
Congress. 3 " The constitutional problem may be the augmentation of the powers
of Congress, rather than the delegation of state sovereignty per se.
New York also suggests, however, that the enumerated powers doctrine and
its anti-delegation logic occupy a central place in the larger constitutional
architecture. In explaining the point of the anti-commandeering, anti-delegation
principle, the New York Court articulated an accountability rationale: a
"delegation" of state sovereignty to Congress would enable state officials to
avoid political accountability for inconvenient decisions by "purport[ing] to
submit to the direction of Congress. 347 New York rests on the recognition that
"[tjhe interests of public officials... may not coincide with the Constitution's
intergovernmental allocation of authority. 3 48 Constitutional federalism, though,
is not "for the benefit of public officials" but for citizens,349 and citizens cannot
avail themselves of federalism's protections if state officials are permitted to
diffuse and obfuscate political responsibility in an end run around the
constitutional forms.

342. Id. at 182.
343. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
344. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
345. New York, 505 U.S. at 158-59.
346. See, e.g., id. at 182 ("Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
States,... the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent'
of state officials." (emphasis added)).
347. Id. at 183.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 181.
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The Supreme Court has applied and extended the New York accountability
rationale in several subsequent decisions,35 and while its reach and contours
remain somewhat unclear,3"' an injunction against delegations of state
sovereignty to compact commissions seems close to its core. It is true that the
Supreme Court's federalism decisions indicate a pronounced respect for state
autonomy, which is in large measure grounded in the belief that the states
are-in the common phrase-"closer to the people," more accountable to them
and more reflective of their diverse preferences, than the distant national
government. Neither that respect, however, nor the presumption on which it is
based, can possibly extend to state-created compact commissions.35 It is
likewise true that the Supreme Court's federalism reflects a preoccupation with
the federal-state "balance," a consideration that may weigh against state
delegations to Congress butfor compact commissions as another line of defense
against an overbearing national government. But if the accountability principle
means anything at all, it must mean that delegations to extra-constitutional bodies
created from whole cloth are far more problematic than a state-induced
augmentation of congressional authority. To the extent that the Constitution
leaves room for such bodies, their creation requires congressional approval under
the Compact Clause.35 3

C. The Functional Compact Clause and the Real Thing
Like the actual Compact Clause, the test just sketched aims to establish an
error-minimizing rule that guards against harmful state compacts, without unduly
restricting fruitful and beneficial state cooperation. The functional test is more
nuanced than the Compact Clause itself. It is more accommodating to
"federalism" (in the primitive sense of uninhibited state activity), and it entails

350. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Alden v. Maine,

527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999).
351. The accountability principle's uncertain reach and application have generated
considerable academic criticism. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Printz, StateSovereignty,
and the Limits ofFormalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 109; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998);
William P. Marshall & Jason S. Cowart, State Immunity, PoliticalAccountability, and
Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069 (2000).
352. Note, ChartingNo Man's Land, supra note 133, at 1995.
353. For reasons mentioned supra note 163, congressional approval would
ameliorate the accountability problem. It would not, however, solve the delegation
problem. The congressional approval of a state compact commission and its exercise of
delegated state powers is on a par with the congressional creation of such a commission
and a direct congressional delegation of federal authority. The difficult questions of
whether and to what extent such delegations are permissible are beyond the scope of this
Article.
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lower institutional transaction costs in the formation of compacts. Unlike the
judicial enforcement of the Compact Clause, as written, the functional test
accommodates the great majority of precedents.
Against these advantages weighs a powerful Madisonian objection. The
intended benefits-a reduction of the states' bargaining costs-are likely small:
risk-free state agreements are unlikely to prompt any more acrimony or delay
than the congressional declaration of National Dairy Goat Appreciation Week." 4
The compacts that are bound to trigger argument and delay are the ones that
ought to do so, on account of their consequences for sister states or national
concerns. On the other hand, the effort to strike the constitutional balance just
so invites an awful lot of confusion, argument, and abuse. A Compact Clause
with a police power or reciprocity exemption resembles a requirement that all
candidates for president must be thirty-five years of age, except for persons of
uncommon maturity: though consistent with the purpose of the Clause, it
undermines its operation."' 5

354. The contention that Congress is "too busy" to deal with thousands of state
compacts is belied by experience. Thousands of military promotions each year are
technically new "appointments" requiring congressional approval, and Congress has
managed that workload. As for compacts, Congress may approve entire classes of state
compacts ex ante, and has on occasion done so. For example, an Act of June 6, 1934, ch.
406, 48 Stat. 909 (codified at 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2000)) provides ex ante congressional
consent to state "agreements or compacts for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in
the prevention of crime." Numerous state compacts enacted pursuant to that
authorization are listed in VOIT, supra note 10, at 45-58. Such advance-approval statutes
are not entirely unproblematic. A congressional enactment providing for ex ante
approval of any and all state compacts would put the Compact Clause itself out of
operation and, for that reason, pose constitutional obstacles. Certainly, though, the ex
post approval of an entire batch or slate of state compacts poses no such obstacles, and
even a wholesale advance approval seems justifiable so long as Congress specifies the
permissible subject-matter, purposes, and perhaps the duration.
355. For example, suppose that Texas were to grant Oklahoma students preferred
access to its public universities, provided that Oklahoma extend comparable treatment
to an equal number of Texans. Such an endeavor to enhance citizen choice and
government efficiency (by expanding the applicant pool for educational fields with
insufficient in-state demand) falls squarely within the states' domain. Suppose, though,
that one state is covered by a direct judicial prohibition against non-remedial racial
preferences (see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996)), whereas the other may and does continue to extend such benefits: it is at
least possible that the covered state is enlisting the help of its luckier sister state to do
indirectly what it may no longer do directly--that is, to grant affirmative preferences to
minority students. Well short of a direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
would implicate the authority of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Amendment.
The hypothetical is not entirely-well, hypothetical. A Southern Regional
Education Compact in 1948 failed to obtain congressional approval because civil rights
leaders, including Thurgood Marshall, feared that the compact was a ruse to escape

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/1

94

Greve: Greve: Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent

2003]

COMPACTS AND CARTELS

Too, a functional Compact Clause test invites the courts to police the
boundaries and, relative to the actual Compact Clause, both expands and
complicates the judicial function. Because a state compact designed to
circumvent the congressional consent requirement will not declare that purpose
but rather disguise it, the judicial inquiry will turn into a fact-intensive and errorprone examination. That does not sound like a good idea. The courts have made
hash even of the actual Compact Clause; who knows what they might do with a
four-prong test.
The potential for state evasion, coupled with the difficulty of policing such
evasion through the judiciary, explains why the Compact Clause does not contain
a police power exception or any other qualification but rather applies to "any
agreement or compact"--to "any cases whatsoever," as Madison put it. The
man's logic is at some level implacable. The most urgent task at hand, though,
is to recapture the core purpose of the Compact Clause, and the functional test
may do the job precisely because it does not restore the Clause to its original
sweep and glory. Since the courts have mucked up the Compact Clause, the
practical task is to figure out a doctrine that comports, so far as possible, with
modem precedents and prejudices without compromising core constitutional
purposes. That more limited doctrine might help to direct the states' search for
cooperative gains into areas where the national government's competence is
most limited, and it may alleviate the fears over unwarranted federal interference
that have contributed to the judiciary's Compact Clause inversion. The courts
just might get the functional doctrine right. In the process, they might even take
a meaningful step towards the reassertion of a serious constitutional federalism.
That cheerful prospect is examined below, immediately following the tying-up
of a loose end.
D. A Note on CongressionalConsent
If state agreements require no congressional consent, the timing and form
of consent are unlikely to become live issues. For that obvious reason, Virginia
v. Tennessee was the last case to address those questions directly. 56 A reinvigoration of the Compact Clause would raise the question anew. The Clause
itself supplies no answer, and the presumptions with which one might want to
approach the question cut both ways. The logic of the Compact Clause dictates
that consent must ordinarily precede a compact; antecedent approval of state

federal anti-discrimination requirements. BARTON, supranote 153, at 132-33. Marshall
argued that the Compact did not require congressional approval: unless it were
understood as avehicle to perpetuate segregation, it did not involve national prerogatives.
Id.
356. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893).
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arrangements, as distinct from expost preemption, is the point of the Clause.357
Then again, the unequivocal commitment of all agreements and compacts to the
Congress implies a case for some congressional license and corresponding
judicial deference conceming the form and the timing of consent. Recognizing
as much, the Supreme Court has held that congressional consent may be given
after the fact and, moreover, may be implied, both for ex ante and ex post
approval.358 The most plausible and precedent-friendly way of reconciling the
conflicting considerations is to require a clear statement of congressional intent
at some point in the life of a compact or else, overwhelming evidence of
congressional acquiescence.
The first, "clear statement" leg has a clear analogy: a clear statement is
required for congressional validations of state activities that otherwise violate the
negative Commerce Clause.3" 9 In that application, the clear statement rule
reflects federalism's horizontal dimension: in applying the negative Commerce
Clause, the Court acts as a line of defense against interstate exploitation. If
Congress wishes to overrun that line, it must clearly say so. A clear statement
rule for compact approval has the same structure and consequence, and it is
particularly appropriate in that context. To the extent that the clear statement
rule may seem suspect in the negative Commerce Clause setting, that is because
the negative Commerce Clause itself is suspect. No such objection arises under
the Compact Clause. The state enactments at issue are themselves suspect under
the Constitution; they are not made suspect by a judicial construct.360
As noted, the Supreme Court has in the past inferred congressional approval
even without a clear statement. These ancient rulings-issued without exception
in cases involving state boundary compacts, where the courts viewed finality as
357. Madison clearly intended the negative to operate ex ante, and in adopting the
negative in a limited range of application, the Convention understood and accepted that
interpretation. Supra notes 110-12, 120-21 and sources cited.
358. For implied approval ex ante, see, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1985) (possibly dictum). For
implied approval after the fact, see Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893);
Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39,60 (1878); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1,
85-87 (1823).
359. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992) (citing Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,
427-31 (1946)).
360. Similarly, in its application in the ordinary statutory context, the clear
statement rule has been criticized as a form of surreptitious judicial nullification: it
imposes such inordinate legislative transaction costs that congressional bargains-also
known as legislation-often become impossible. See, e.g., William Eskridge, Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331,409-14 (1991).
That objection, too, is inapplicable in the Compact Clause setting, where affirmative
legislation ought to be difficult and expensive. See also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982) (stating the test and citing the cases).
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supremely important 3 61-- do not readily yield a doctrine that fits the
contemporary constitutional universe and compacts of a very different nature.
The reach of the implied consent exception is hard to discern, because no case
presents an instance of congressional acquiescence that failed to constitute
implied congressional consent. The facts of the cases, though, suggest a
standard comparable to the contemporary judicial approach to congressional
acquiescence to administrative interpretations of federal statutes: where such
interpretations implicate constitutional questions concerning the outer limits of
congressional authority, the Supreme Court will infer acquiescence only "with
'
extreme care" and in the face of "overwhelming evidence."362
Consistent with this standard, implied consent cases under the Compact
Clause uniformly presuppose that prior (and explicit) approval is the
constitutional baseline; otherwise, consent by implication would require no
judicial explanation and justification at all. The exception for congressional
approval after the fact covers (in dicta) emergencies363 and (in holdings)
instances in which the nature of the agreement does not permit of prior
approval. 3" Uniformly, moreover, the judicial inference has been based on
congressional actions that necessarily imply consent to a state agreement, such
as the admission of a new state whose boundaries were earlier agreed upon by

361.

The cases consistently emphasize the importance of clear and settled

boundaries-recognized as vital under the law of nations-as a reason for recognizing
congressional consent expost and by implication. See, e.g., Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U.S. 503, 522-23 (1893); U.S. v. Stone, 65 U.S. 525, 537 (1864); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 734 (1838); Boyd's Lessee v. Graves, 17 U.S. 513, 517-18

(1819).
362. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 169 n.5 (2001). The approach is predicated on constitutional problems; barring
such problems, administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutory language are
generally entitled to judicial deference under Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def
Council,467 U.S. 837, 866 (1987). For reasons that are not altogether evident, the Solid
Waste Court applied both the "overwhelming evidence" and the "clear statement" rule.
Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172-74.
363. See supranotes 139-42 and accompanying text.
364. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 521 ("[W]here the agreement relates to a

matter which could not well be considered until its nature is fully developed, it is not
perceived why the consent may not be subsequently given.").
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compact; 365 or on ample evidence showing that Congress affirmatively relied on
a particular state agreement for a period spanning over a century.366
A rule requiring either a clear statement or else overwhelming evidence of
congressional consent would save neither the Multistate Tax Compact nor the
Master Settlement Agreement: Congress has never explicitly consented to those
arrangements, and the evidence of implied consent is decidedly
underwhelming.3 67 Such a result would certainly distress states and private
interests that have come to rely on those arrangements. They should direct their
complaints and concerns to the forum that the Constitution provides-the United
States Congress.
VIII. COMPACTS AND THE CONSTITUTION
Why does the Compact Clause matter? Why should its judicial evisceration
concern us? One obvious and perfectly plausible answer is that we ought to care
about representative government. It is not a good thing to be governed by
obscure commissions somewhere between the states and the nation. Taxes
should be levied by the legislative bodies that are authorized to do so. A
decision to turn a major industry into a public utility and to exact the monopoly
rents from consumers should be discussed and voted upon in an open,
responsible fashion by the bodies that are authorized to make such decisions.
The emasculation of the Compact Clause could wreak yet more serious
havoc. The Multistate Tax Compact may encourage states to extend tax cartels

365. Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39, 60 (1878); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 1, 87 (1823); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

§ 1405 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) stating:
[T]he consent of congress... is always to be implied, when Congress adopts

the particular act by sanctioning its objects and aiding in enforcing them.
Thus, where a State is admitted into the Union, notoriously upon a compact
between it and the State of which it previously composed a part; there the act
of Congress, admitting such State into the Union, is an implied consent to the
terms of the compact.
366. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 522-24.

367. Congress has occasionally acknowledged the MTC's existence and, for
reasons of administrative convenience, relied on its standard-setting functions. See, e.g.,
Mobile Telecomm. Sourcing Act, Pub. L. No. 106-252, 114 Stat. 626 (2000) (codified
at 4 U.S.C. §§ 116-26 (2000)). Such acts of convenience hardly amount to a clear
statement of congressional approval, let alone overwhelming evidence of congressional
acquiescence. Similarly, the federal government's decision to surrender its claims on the
states' Medicaid recoupment under the MSA constitutes only a (revocable) permission

to use the funds in a particular fashion, not an acceptance of the MSA per se. See Pub.
L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57 (1999) (amending § 1903(d)(3) of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(d)(3) (2000)). The recitation of congressional purposes in the statute
contains no suggestion of such an acceptance.
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to new forms of interstate commerce, such as Internet sales. The permissive
doctrines developed under the domestic Compact Clause may spill over into
foreign affairs.36 The tobacco cartel may serve as a precedent for similar
campaigns against other disfavored industries.369 Harbingers of these
developments are already upon us: insistent state demands for a compact-based
"Streamlined Sales Tax Project" that would enable states to impose sales tax
obligations on remote (Internet or catalogue) sellers in foreign states; 370 state
efforts to pursue a foreign policy of their own, at variance with the foreign policy
of the United States;3 71 state attorneys general trolling for tobacco-style
lawsuits.3 72 The MSA has come to serve as a template for coordinated litigation
campaigns not only against deadly and disreputable industries (such as gun
manufacturers) but also, and with greater, against the manufacturers of
pharmaceutical products (which have been known to save lives) and against
once-reputable investment banks.373

368. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 37, at 1223 (articulating that

fear).
369. The prediction is a staple in the literature. See, e.g., Dagan & White, Injurious
Industries, supra note 225, at 355; Ayres, Tort Settlements, supra note 265, at 607-08;
MICHAEL I. KRAUSS, FiRE AND SMOKE: GOVERNMENT, LAWSUITS AND THE RULE OF LAW

(2000).
370. See, e.g., Jonathan Fried, No Hype: Four Web Tools That Work and Save
Money; of Marshmallows and Tax Agita, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2001, at H-3;
Christopher Swope, States Approve Sales-Tax Pact, GOVERNING MAGAZINE 44 (Jan.
2003).

371. See, e.g., Swaine, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 37, at 1130-32; EARL
H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INU.S. FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (1998).
372. See, e.g., http://www.overlawyered.com/archives/99oct2.html#991026a

(describing state attorney general proposal to sue lead paint and pigment makers in
partnership with trial lawyers and to "go after" latex rubber industry for alleged health
problems possibly caused by latex allergies) (last visited Apr. 15, 2003).
373. See, e.g., Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and
Beyond-A Critique ofLawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
1334 (2001); for a brief description of state attorney general-led campaigns against
pharmaceutical firms and investment banks, see Michael S. Greve, Federalism's
Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L & POL. 93, 100-04 & nn.41-61 (2002). I have argued in a more
journalistic forum and vein that the exposure of industries to state litigation campaigns
is determined primarily not byproduct characteristics and industry conduct but rather by
industry structure. Highly concentrated industries with high entry barriers can be locked
into regulatory cartels and, therefore, constitute particularly likely targets. Michael S.
Greve, States' Rights on Steroids, AEI FEDERALIST OUTLOOK No. 14 (Sept. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.14296/pub.detail.asp. (last visited
April 4, 2003). That prediction is consistent with the analysis of the tobacco settlement
provided by Ayres, supra note 265.
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Modem economic realities lend special force to these temptations. The
greatly increased mobility of capital, labor, and business enterprises puts the
states' budgets and their ability to control their own affairs under enormous
pressure. Increasingly, states will respond to that pressure through cartel
arrangements that trump state competition. At the same time, the national
government has proven increasingly unwilling to regulate-or incapable of
regulating-large sectors of the economy. The political demand for regulation
has consequently migrated to the state level and generated support for aggressive
and creative state litigation to regulate problems, from antitrust to tobacco
marketing to pharmaceutical pricing, that were once thought to be the province
of the national government. The Compact Clause cannot stem this tide. Like
most constitutional barriers, it will bend to overwhelming social demands. If a
state-supported trial lawyer campaign against the fast food industry were to
gamer the support of the New York Times, the U.S. Surgeon General, and the
trial bar's congressional patrons, 74 the Compact Clause would not save us. One
must hope that the MSA precedent will encounter cultural and political obstacles
before it plays itself out to its absurd extreme.
Among those obstacles, though, is a sense of the general constitutional
order. (Or so one would hope.) Certainly, the MSA should generate unease:
when a handful of state attorneys general and tobacco lawyers meet behind
closed doors to impose a national sales tax, it ought to be obvious that something
has gone quite wrong-and that the mistake cannot be a mere technicality. The
agreement signals a constitutionalcrisis, and the fact that it has come to serve as
a model confirms that assessment. A Compact Clause revival, all by itself,
cannot restore constitutional order. It can, however, play an important and
perhaps irreplaceable role in that endeavor.
While a competent appellate lawyer could easily distinguish the MSA from
the MTC and argue that the tobacco agreement is unconstitutional even under
U.S. Steel,375 that lamentable precedent does not merit the exertion. It is a
pristine exhibit of free-form adjudication,376 marked by total indifference to the
constitutional text and architecture; tendentious readings of the precedents; and
a resort to functional arguments that collapse upon inspection. A judiciary that

374. See, e.g., Shelly Branch, Obese America: Is FastFood the Next Tobacco?

WALL ST. J., June 13, 2002, at B-I (describing lawsuits against fast food companies and
efforts by Tobacco Products Liability Project to develop litigation strategies for obesityrelated claims).
375. That brief would rely on the U.S. Steel Court's insistence that the Compact
Clause is one of potential interference with federal interest and downplay--as fact-bound
and case-specific-the analysis the Court actually applied in that case. See supra notes
95-100 and accompanying text.
376. The felicitous term is Professor Tribe's. See Laurence H.Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation,108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995).
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is committed to constitutionalism could do worse than to discard this particular
bauble. Less obviously and immediately, the clean-up effort would render the
Supreme Court's federalism more plausible and sustainable.
The restoration of judicially enforceable federalism norms has by all
accounts been the Rehnquist Court's central project. Thatjurisprudence, though,
has reached the theoretical and political limits. A bolder re-interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, for example, would quickly bump up against Wickard v.
Filburn377 and threaten a confrontation with the regulatory state. Barring that

extravagant undertaking, the Court can go only as far as it has already
gone-which is to say, not very far.37 Even the already-trod ground, moreover,
is strewn with paradoxes and unintended consequences.379

While this facet of the Rehnquist Court's federalism has generated
extensive comment and controversy, a second and arguably more serious
problem has virtually escaped scholarly notice: in its preoccupation with the
protection of "states as states" against federal intrusion, the Rehnquist Court has
ignored-and at times denigrated-horizontal federalism doctrines that protect
states against aggression by sister states.380
Stephen Gardbaum has traced horizontal federalism's demise to the New
Deal's revolution and its continued dormancy, to a misunderstanding of that
revolution.' Contrary to the prevailing interpretation (Left and Right), the New
Deal did not simply unleash the national government on the states; it also

377. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
378. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause decisions effectively
give a clean bill of health to all "economic" regulation. With the exception of symbolic

federal statutes and, perhaps, federal criminal laws governing non-economic conduct,
virtually all federal legislation passes Commerce Clause muster under that test.

379. The difficulty has generated a respectable body of law review comment. See,
e.g., Pamela Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable
Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1311 (2001) (Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence may prompt more rather than lessjudicial intrusion into state

affairs); Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have PerverseEffects?, 46
VILL. L. REv. 1325 (2001).
380. For a lengthier analysis of the wholesale indifference to horizontal state
aggression as a central problem of the Rehnquist Court's federalism, see Greve, supra
note 373, at 93. By way of suggesting the dimension of the problem, it is difficult to
think of a single decision by the Rehnquist Court that even mentions sister-state

aggression as a constitutional concern. On one of the rare occasions when the Court
dimly perceived that concern, it parked it under, of all provisions, the Due Process

Clause. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568-77 (1996) (extraterritorial
effect of state court award of punitive damages may pose constitutional problems). See
id. at 598-607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding majority opinion).
381. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalismand the Unshacklingofthe
States, 64 U. CHi. L. REv. 483 (1997).
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unleashed the states against each other. Among the central doctrinal innovations,
Gardbaum lists the demise of the dormant Commerce Clause as a subject-matter
limitation on state legislation; the contraction of diversity jurisdiction and,
correspondingly, the enormous expansion of the extraterritorial reach of state
court authority in the wake of Erie3 82 and Klaxon;. 3 and the weakening of
federal preemption doctrines. Gardbaum's central insight is that the vertical
distribution of power between the national government and the states does not
exhaust the range of federalism's dilemmas. Given the right-or rather the
wrong--constitutional doctrines, it is possible to suffer from federal overreach
and pervasive state aggression.
The Rehnquist Court has addressed the former problem--in a fashion-and
ignored the latter. One reason, certainly, is that the defense of "states' rights"
against federal overreach looks unambiguously "federalist," whereas the defense
of states against sister state aggression and exploitation-a necessary part of any
coherent federal order-might sometimes seem to compromise states' rights.
(That is so particularly when one confuses states' rights and federalism with
"whatever the states may want to do"--such as forming compacts to exploit
sister states.) But the judicial recognition of state aggression as a constitutional
problem-a federalism problem-has also been impeded by the lack of a
plausible starting point to address the problem. Gardbaum's list of the New Deal
Court's state-unshackling doctrines suggests a revision of the negative
Commerce Clause; a revision of diversity jurisdiction and a re-imposition of
constitutional limits on state courts' choice-of-law rules;. 4 and a need for
preemption doctrines that re-establish a constitutional equilibrium between
national and state authority. To that list, one could add comparably ambitious
projects, such as a revamped Spending Clause jurisprudence.3" 5 A judicial
reform effort in any of these venues is daunting. Each would affect an enormous
range of state activities. Each would likely produce paradoxes and undesired
consequences in another arena."8 6

382. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

383. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfr. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
384. For a powerful critique of constitutionally unconstrained state choice of law,
see Laycock, supranote 277, at 249.
385. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
386. By way of example, it is superficially attractive to argue for an "originalist"
federal preemption doctrine that would eviscerate much of what we now call "implied"
preemption. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L.REv. 225 (2000). The force
of that argument, however, is undermined by the demise of practically all constitutional
doctrines that once upon a time limited state aggression. In a post-Erie, post-Klaxon
universe, expansive and seemingly "nationalist" preemption doctrines maybe the last line
of defense against state aggression, and their demise would spell a state-to-state state of
nature that is the very opposite of the Founders' federalism.
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It is much easier to reassert constitutional principles under the Compact
Clause. As I hope to have shown, the Clause is an integral part of the
constitutional logic and architecture. The intellectual confusions that turned the
Clause on its head-a wholesale disregard of federalism's horizontal dimension;
cooperative enthusiasms that mask state exploitation; the tendency to conflate
the states' opportunistic agenda with federalism-are the same confusions that
afflict our federalism. In short, Compact Clause analysis reflects the general
constitutional pathology-in a circumscribed universe. Because doctrines
developed in this comer can be compartmentalized, it is easier to get them right.
To that advantage, one can add others. Horizontal federalism's principal
domains are cluttered with messy precedents; Compact Clause jurisprudence
consists of a single shoddy opinion accompanying an incontrovertibly wrong
decision. One can have a long and difficult discussion over the appropriate
constitutional standards under the dormant Commerce Clause; one can even have
an involved debate as to whether the beast exists in the first place. The Compact
Clause, in contrast, is right there in the Constitution, and while it may not mean
exactly what it says, it has been held to mean the opposite of what it says.
Respectfully, that cannot be right.
A Supreme Court decision to put the Multistate Tax Commission or, more
likely, the Master Settlement Agreement out of its misery would strike at
something real without, at the same time, exposing the Court to a serious
political backlash. Unlike a far-reaching ruling under, say, the Commerce
Clause, a Compact Clause revival would not only be limited in scope; it would
not even be a final word. Unlike federalism decisions that invite criticism on
account of the Court's willingness to second-guess the Congress,387 a

constitutionalist ruling on the Compact Clause would send the opposite,
deferential signal. Instead of choking offpolitical deliberation, it would generate
a public and congressional debate that we should have had before those
monstrosities went into operation.
The dispersion of constitutional federalism doctrines would remain
controllable. Even if litigants have the imagination to connect the dots between
a judicial re-discovery of the Compact Clause and the larger constitutional
universe, judges and Justices may disavow or deny that connection. If they wish
to press it, they may do so at their own chosen speed, and under suitable
conditions. The Compact Clause presents, in stark relief, the need for a more
coherent federalism--and a splendid starting point for that journey.

387. For thoughtful criticisms of this aspect of the Supreme Court's federalism, see
Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997); Evan H. Caminker, Appropriate Means-Ends
Constraintson Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001).
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